Office of the Historian

227. Telegram From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State1

Jakarta, April 27, 1955—5 p.m.

2061. For Robertson. Saw Prince Wan2 this afternoon. His version luncheon meeting April 23 with Chou En-lai in general confirms versions given me by Romulo and Mohammed Ali. Wan does not think that plans or systematic thinking regarding Taiwan can be complete without also taking into account Korean problem. On latter point he believes UNCURK should be reorganized by next General Assembly so as to include all Colombo Powers.

Regarding Taiwan he says he suggested to Chou that American airmen be released in such a way as to save Chinese face to give US evidence of Chinese sincerity in proposing negotiations on Taiwan. Chou replied that he had seriously been considering airmen’s release but Kashmir Princess incident had so inflamed Chinese press and public opinion against United States that action was presently impossible. (Wan did not comment on fact that Peking can inflame and quiet Chinese public opinion at will). Wan believes Chou really wants to come to a peaceful solution of Taiwan problem but a formula must be found that will save Chou’s face as well as take United States desiderata into account. In this connection Wan said Chou once during conversation referred to “peaceful liberation” of Taiwan.

Wan does not believe Chou will publicly announce or agree to a formal cease fire but that what Wan calls a de facto cease fire might be brought about if groundwork carefully laid. Chou several times mentioned to him fact that Chinese and American Consuls General Geneva had been in touch with one another over POW question. This led Wan to believe that we should very seriously consider some similar contact with Chinese elsewhere and perhaps at a higher level. He thought that while a third party might be of assistance in bringing about such a contact, the contact should be continued without [Page 526] the presence of third country or group of countries. Wan said Chou had rejected suggestion that Nehru might be such an intermediary.

I gave Prince Wan copy of Secretary Dulles’ press conference of April 26,3 which he read carefully and thought excellent. Prince Wan said he had sent his Prime Minister,4 now in United States, summary of his conversations with Chou but had not yet prepared a full report for his government or completed his own reflections as to what conversations really meant and what might next best be done.

Cumming
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Taipei and Bangkok.↩
  2. Thai Foreign Minister Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh.↩
  3. See Document 222.↩
  4. P. Pibulsonggram.↩