222. Editorial Note
At a press conference on April 26, Secretary Dulles made a statement which reads in part as follows:
“The Bandung Conference, as we had hoped, seems to have exerted a restraint on the Chinese Communists. I had always felt that it would be salutary if the Chinese Communists were confronted with the opinion of the free nations of Asia. That opinion was powerfully expressed in favor of peace and against direct and indirect aggression. There seems now a chance that the Communist Chinese may be deterred from pursuing the course of violence which has characterized their action in relation to Korea, to Tibet, to Indochina, and, more recently, in relation to the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits.
“The Chinese Communists found no backing for their announced program of seizing Taiwan (Formosa) by force. On the contrary, they felt it useful in the last hours of the Bandung Conference to propose to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists were merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China.”
In response to questions, the Secretary indicated that the United States would be willing to enter multilateral or bilateral discussions with the Chinese Communists without the presence of the Nationalists, although, he stated, “We are not going to deal with the rights of the Chinese Nationalists, and their claims, in their absence.” In response to another question, he replied:
“The first thing is to find out whether there is a possibility of a cease-fire in the area. That is a matter which can be discussed perhaps bilaterally, or at the United Nations, or possibly under other circumstances. But I regard a cease-fire as the indispensable prerequisite to anything further. When you get into further matters, then the interests of the Chinese Nationalists would naturally come to play a very large part.”
Referring to a statement by Premier Chou En-lai, made in a speech at Bandung on April 24, that China and the United States should enter into negotiations “to settle the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in the Taiwan area” but that this should not affect “the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan,” Secretary Dulles said:
“Now, I have said previously that we would not expect the parties to this struggle, whether the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists, to renounce their ambitions. We don’t expect that to be done any more than we expect that to happen in the case of Germany or Korea or Viet-Nam. But even though they retain their ambitions—retain their claims—they might renounce the use of force to satisfy their claims and their ambitions. Now I don’t know whether what Chou En-lai said was intended to be responsive to what I had previously said on that phase of the matter, or not. That is one of the things which I think deserves further exploration.”
For a complete text of the Secretary’s statement and a transcript of the portions of his press conference relating to the possibility of a cease-fire, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1955, pages 754–759. The text of Chou En-lai’s April 24 statement at the Bandung Conference is in Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pages 427–429.