175. Editorial Note
According to the memorandum of discussion at the 247th meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, the Council listened to the usual briefing by Allen Dulles on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”. The following excerpt from the briefing concerned Vietnam:
“Mr. Dulles continued his briefing with comments on the situation in South Vietnam. The Binh Xuyen had largely been driven from Saigon and were unlikely to be able to go underground there for the simple reason that the ground was nothing but mud. The real problem which now looms in this country was how to control what appeared to be a genuine revolutionary movement. At least three groups or committees were now operating on the scene. The first was the small so-called revolutionary committee, consisting of about a dozen members. Beyond that was the so-called States General, numbering perhaps 1000 individuals. Finally, there was a rabble numbering about 4000 who were noisily calling for the deposition of Bao Dai. Mr. Dulles predicted that it would be difficult for Diem to control these groups.
[Page 370]“The Vice President inquired of Mr. Dulles whether these groups were all nationalist in character. Mr. Dulles replied that we couldn’t be sure that there wasn’t Communist influence behind some of them. While the French claimed that the small revolutionary committee had two Communist members, the CIA was inclined to doubt the validity of this claim. Mr. Dulles pointed out that Bao Dai was searching for an intermediate solution to the problem of legitimate authority. He was trying to constitute a kind of regency committee which would include Diem himself. Mr. Dulles feared, however, that the situation had gotten beyond such a solution. Diem had been having a number of talks with General Collins, who had been urging him to go slow as far as Bao Dai was concerned.
“The President inquired whether Diem had moved to take in Quat, Do and the other cabinet ministers who had previously resigned. Mr. Dulles replied that he had not, because he believed that by resigning, these individuals had demonstrated their unfitness for office. Mr. Dulles furthermore expressed doubt that Diem would actually organize a strong coalition cabinet. On the other hand, it was undeniable that Diem was showing great strength both in Saigon and elsewhere throughout the country. He had become the symbol of the break away from the French. This fact alone made it very difficult for Diem to compromise with regard to Bao Dai.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)