Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

[Extract]

top secret
personal and private

Augusta, Georgia, April 19, 1954.

1. I first went over with the President the draft of a statement which might be issued either by him or by me. I said that Mr. Hagerty was of the opinion that it would be better if I made the statement as it would be useful to get it on to the newsreels. The President agreed. The President made a few verbal changes and he proposed what became the final paragraph.²

2. I reported on my trip to London and Paris,³ with which the President was already familiar so far as the main lines were concerned. I added a little “color” with a view to giving a more vivid impression with reference to Churchill and Eden and Laniel and Bidault. I said that our trip had been useful not only in regard to Indochina, but also in regard to EDC, where the talks which MacArthur and I had had with Laniel had, I thought, played a decisive part in helping Laniel to make up his mind in announcing the date for debate in the Chamber on the EDC Treaty.⁴

The President expressed some chagrin that the Senators had publicly stated that they had not been consulted. It seemed that they had forgotten.⁵

3. I referred to the fact that Mr. Eden had insisted upon calling off the prospective meeting of the 10 Southeast Asia countries to make a beginning on creating the collective defense. I explained that we had compromised on an arrangement which “fuzzed” the matter by combining the 10 with the 16 Korean countries.⁶ I said that I thought this was probably largely due to pressure from Nehru.⁷

4. I told the President that there was still some risk that the Geneva Conference might fail because of Soviet insistence that it should be organized as a “Five Power” conference, including Red China. I said I felt that the Russians, who had vainly fought for this at Berlin, were trying to take advantage of the buildup of world hope in the Geneva Conference to repudiate their Berlin agreement and to put us in a position of either having to accept the five-power concept or be responsible for breaking up the conference. I said I regarded it as vital that the five-power concept should not be accepted. The Berlin understanding was to the contrary and was the “charter” of the Geneva Conference and I saw little use in going into a new conference with the Communists if they started out by repudiating the agreement on which the conference was based. I added that American public and Congressional opinion would be deeply resentful of our throwing away the principle which we had defended, and the acceptance of which we had won at Berlin.

The President was in entire agreement. He suggested that I should hint in my going-away statement that there was still a possibility of the conference breaking on the “five-power” issue. I indicated I would not want to deal with this on other than a very delicate basis before consulting with the British and French, who so far had stood fast with us.

The President asked what the position would be if we refused to attend and if the others went on without us. I said I felt this was unlikely to happen in relation to the initial, i.e. Korean phase, of the conference because I was confident that the ROK would follow us in this matter, and that any conference about Korea which was not participated in by both the ROK and the United States would be a farce. I said as regards the Indochina conference, that was different because France was principally concerned. However, this phase of the conference had not yet been arranged and the invitees had not been designated.

. . . . . . .

1. Secretary Dulles accepted an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit with him at Augusta, Georgia (telegram 3546 to Paris, Apr. 14, 110.11 DU/4-1454) by letter of Apr. 15. In his letter to the President the Secretary wrote: “I would like to have this chance to tell you of the results of my present trip and obtain your guidance before I leave for the NATO Meeting and Geneva Tuesday evening [Apr. 20]. I had useful meetings with Bidault and Laniel in Paris yesterday, which I think will help in moving forward toward some of our objectives in Indo-China and EDC.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”)

   For documentation on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris on Apr. 23, see volume v.

2. The Secretary’s statement made at Augusta, Georgia on Apr. 19 following his meeting with the President was issued as a White House press release and is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, pp. 668–669.

   James C. Hagerty wrote in his diary: “He [the Secretary] had prepared two statements: one by himself and another by the President—Asked for my advice-recommended that he as Secretary make statement for prestige purposes since he was leaving for NATO and Geneva meetings Tuesday night.” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty papers, Hagerty Diary, Apr. 19, 1954)

3. See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, and editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.
4. For documentation on the proposed establishment of a European Defense Community, see volume v.
5. Senators Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Mike Mansfield of Montana, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated on Apr. 16 that President Eisenhower had not consulted with them on the preparation of his message of Apr. 15 to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). The New York Times, Apr. 17, 1954, p. 2) The President’s message was issued as a White House press release and is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.
6. Ambassador Makins called on Secretary Dulles on Apr. 18 and showed him a telegram from Eden which said in effect that the British would not participate in the scheduled meeting of the “Ten on Indochina” called for noon on Apr. 20 with the Secretary. Instead of calling off the meeting the Secretary proposed that representatives from the Southeast Asian nations meet with the 16 nations concerned with Korea and that he would make a report and discuss the Geneva Conference in general terms. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation of this meeting and a previous meeting between Makins and Under Secretary Smith, Apr. 18, see volume xiii. For Eden’s reply, see infra.
7. A news release from Bombay on Apr. 15 suggested that Prime Minister Nehru might take countermeasures against the collective organization for Southeast Asia at the forthcoming conference of the Colombo nations, scheduled to meet on Apr. 28. (The New York Times, Apr. 16, 1954, p. 2)