Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 263
The Director of the Office of Foreign Military
Affairs of the Department of Defense (Davis) to the Coordinator for the
United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference (Johnson)
top secret
Washington, April 15, 1954.
Dear Alex: This Department is becoming increasingly
concerned regarding the lack of a U.S. position in preparation for the
Indochina phase of the Conference to be held at Geneva. I fully
appreciate the difficulties which, up until this time, have made it very
difficult to draft a position on Indochina. However, in view of the
short time remaining until the Conference convenes at Geneva, it is
essential that consideration be given to the U.S. position.
It appears to me that ample guidance is available to provide the basis
for an initial draft of a U.S. Government position on Indochina
[Page 521]
for Geneva. NSC 54051 as well as reports of the Special
Committee2 set forth,
in positive terms, U.S. policy with respect to Indochina and Southeast
Asia. At the meetings of the Indochina Working Group the need for a U.S.
position on Indochina has been discussed at considerable length, but to
date no progress has been made. In order to initiate action on a draft
position, the Defense representatives at the working level submitted an
outline of views to the State members of the Indochina Working Group. A
copy of this paper is attached for your information.
In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that immediate action be
taken to draft a U.S. position paper on Indochina for the Conference at
Geneva. I would be glad to discuss this matter further at your
convenience or at a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries.3
Sincerely yours,
For the Assistant Secretary of Defense (
ISA):
A. C.
Davis
[Attachment]
Draft
United States Position on
Indochina To Be Taken at Geneva
Assumptions
- 1.
- NSC 5405, approved 16 January
1954, continues to be the policy of the United States with
respect to Southeast Asia.
- 2.
- It is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be
obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent
with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. (JCS memorandum, 12 March
1954).4
- 3.
- At Geneva, the French Government under continued domestic
pressure will favor a negotiated settlement of the fighting in
Indochina at almost any price.
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Discussion
The French Government has been under considerable domestic pressure
to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. In order to forestall a
showdown prior to Geneva, M. Laniel, in a public statement, proposed six points
as conditions for a cease-fire in Indochina.5 These six points would
unquestionably be unacceptable to the Communists, particularly if
reinforced by additional conditions to assure enforcement of the
armistice terms. However, domestic pressure on the French Government
to terminate hostilities is expected to increase during the course
of the Geneva Conference, rather than decrease. In view of this, it
would be extremely difficult for the French Government not to accept
an agreement which would be less than the conditions of the
Laniel proposal. It should
be noted that although the above factors make it almost certain that
the French Government will seek agreement at Geneva at practically
any price, there has been no indication that this “price” has been
considered realistically by the French Government or public.
Communist tactics at Geneva are likely to follow closely those
tactics employed by Communist negotiators at Panmunjom. Communist
intransigence and other tactics, short of actually breaking off
negotiations, led to prolonged discussions which worked to the
disadvantage of our side. As a result, the Korean Agreement in its
final form produced an armistice bringing about a cease-fire but
with which it has been impossible to assure Communist
compliance.6 On the other hand, in Korea the
United Nations Command is required to live up faithfully to the
terms of the armistice. It should be noted that this problem would
be considerably more complex and disadvantageous to the French in
Indochina.
The Department of Defense has considered the military implications of
terminating the fighting in Indochina under conditions less than a
military defeat of organized Viet Minh forces. It was the conclusion
of the Department of Defense, as indicated in Assumption No. 2
above, that inasmuch as it is highly improbable that Communist
agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would
be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia,
a continuation of fighting with the objective of seeking a military
victory appears as the only alternative in Indochina. (JCS memorandum, Tab A.7)
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Conclusions
If the Communists follow the same tactics they employed at Panmunjom,
they will be prepared for a long and difficult negotiation. The
French will find it almost impossible to withstand pressures for a
weakening of their position (the Laniel proposal) and will most likely give way under
these pressures. Further, the French, once engaged in a negotiation,
will of necessity be required to seek every possible means of
settlement.
The United States should not join with the French in any Indochina
negotiations at Geneva unless there is prior French commitment not
to accept terms leading directly or indirectly to the loss of
Indochina. This commitment should be positive and definite, for it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to
disassociate itself from the negotiations once they had begun. Thus,
if the negotiations result in a settlement leading to the ultimate
loss of Indochina, the United States would have participated in this
loss.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
- a.
- The United States adopt the position that it is highly
improbable that the Communist agreement could be obtained to
a negotiated settlement at Geneva which would be consistent
with basic United States objectives in Southeast
Asia;
- b.
- The United States position for Geneva be positive and
definite that we will agree to no settlement which would in
any way compromise our objectives with respect to Southeast
Asia;
- c.
- The French Government be informed of the United States
position (a and b above) at the earliest possible date;
- d.
- Concurrently with informing the French of the United
States position, consideration should also be given to the
following pressures to be brought on the French if
circumstances dictate:
- (1)
- If France through one means or another
countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it
will mean far more than the end of France’s position
in the Far East. Rather it will be a public
exhibition of France’s inability to carry on any
longer as an equal member with the United States and
the United Kingdom of the Big Three;
- (2)
- The effect of abandonment would be so severe in
North Africa as to have serious repercussions not
only on the French position there, but also on the
nature of the relationship between France and the
United States in that area;
- (3)
- If the Indochina war ends on terms considered
unsatisfactory by the United States, our dollar aid
to France would, of course, automatically
cease.
- (4)
- Beyond these points, conclusion of negotiations by
France resulting in Communist domination of
Indochina, an area of extreme strategic interest to
the free world, would result in consequences in
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Europe as
well as elsewhere whose seriousness would have no
apparent limitation.
- e.
- If the French Government refuses to agree to the United
States position, the United States Government should not
participate in the Indochina discussions at Geneva;
- f.
- The United States immediately determine whether in the
event of (e) above, we should
approach the Governments of the Associated States and our
allies with a view to continuing the struggle in Indochina
either jointly with the French, in concert with our allies,
or, if necessary, unilaterally.
