Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/4–1454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, April 14, 1954—7 p.m.

3897. Repeated information London 934, Moscow 301, Saigon 440. April 13 French–US preparatory meeting for IC phase Geneva.²

Informal bilateral preliminary talks were held morning April 13 with French (including Chauvel, Lacoste, Roux, Offroy, Cheysson), with next meeting, which will be tripartite meeting, to be held morning April 15.³ Summary highlights April 13 meeting follow with particular emphasis on broad lines French position as indicated therein.

1. French raised various procedural aspects Geneva conference indicating desirability obtaining four power agreement delegate responsibility their respective representatives Geneva to resolve such matters as those concerning conference security guards and conference seating arrangements. Re latter, French indicated desirability having US sit with ROK on right facing North Korea/CPR/USSR across table in Korea phase. French expressed concern lest unresolved question conference chairmanship delay opening Korea phase. There was agreement that there are established lines for dealing such matters and present group should not inject itself.

2. Re timing IC phase Geneva conference, French agreed question participation one for resolution by four powers and expressed hope four Foreign Ministers could meet as soon as possible after arrival Geneva to reach decision. Although recognizing substantive consideration must await resolution organization problems including participation and invitations, they added it would be most helpful for French public opinion to know consideration being given IC problem at opening of Geneva conference. We expressed full agreement regarding quadripartite nature of decisions to be taken this regard and desirability raising these questions at Geneva.

3. Re participation Associated States IC phase, the general French position indicated, although qualified as representing preliminary thinking on French side only, does not favor Associated States being invited as full participants IC phase conference. French stressed that they had not yet discussed this question formally with Associated States although they recognize necessity and intend to do so as soon as possible.

On one hand, French desire keep IC conference small in size and within manageable proportions and avoid if possible it becoming propaganda forum. On other hand, French understand Vietnamese fear consequence possible consecration status Viet Minh as state arising from presence latter if invited as full conference participant and believe propaganda use made of presence Viet Minh as full participant would have harmful effect on course military campaign and Vietnamese opinion. In French view, if Associated States participate conference, difficult see how Viet Minh could possibly be excluded although presence puppet governments Laos and Cambodia could probably be resisted. French do not think that Vietnamese Government will for this reason desire participate in conference. This connection, French pointed out that if Associated States invited Cambodia would certainly accept (with all that that would imply in view instability evidenced at times by Cambodians), which would probably prompt Vietnamese to participate for prestige reasons regardless presence Viet Minh.

While French do not consider full participation Associated States as invited powers desirable, they feel this problem best handled by giving three Associated States and Viet Minh Government (and perhaps puppet governments Laos and Cambodia under these circumstances, but this questionable), special status as limited conference participants deriving in essence from the immediacy of their conflict of interests. These states would neither be observers nor full participants but their representatives would be readily available at Geneva for participation as occasion required thus avoiding any discussion legal basis these governments and confrontation at conference table of belligerents. French thinking this subject, however, not yet very clear.

On the other hand, in order avoid five power connotation and as best means keeping conference as small as possible, French inclined favor limitrophe principle with four powers, CPR, Burma and Thailand constituting participating powers for IC phase.

We stated view that failure invite Associated States to conference where their fate at stake would be widely misunderstood in US and in Asia generally and would tend cast doubt on status these states. We expressed belief Associated States should receive formal invitation with decision as to acceptance or rejection up to them. We said we would be willing oppose inviting Viet Minh if reasonable formula could be found although pointing out that western powers have already accepted conference presence of CPR and North Korea without according recognition.

4. In general terms, French tentative thinking is apparently in direction finding, as first step at Geneva, some basis for a cease-fire on purely military grounds with political negotiations to follow achievement of cease-fire. French emphasized basic French preoccupation with cessation hostilities in IC and importance French public opinion pressures this regard. French indicated that they do not favor negotiations with Viet Minh nor evacuation with agreement with Viet Minh. They said that military experts were studying Laniel’s March cease-fire conditions⁴ to determine guarantees and safeguards needed so that these conditions could in effect achieve Laniel objective of guaranteeing security of French and Associated States forces and of friendly elements. On military situation, French hazarded prediction present military equilibrium might become somewhat more favorable to French union particularly if Associated States forces are developed as planned. French pointed out that they thought the following elements might favor negotiations for a cease-fire and for an eventual settlement: (a) Soviets may not care see IC in Chinese hands or care risk generalized war (French attach considerable importance to expressions of goodwill and of a desire to be of service which they have received from Soviet Ambassador here); (b) Chinese fear possibility US intervention; and (c) both Vietnamese and Viet Minh do not care see extension Chinese influence in Vietnam. Although admitting extreme nature difficulties involved in attempting find political settlement IC, French indicated that it was conceivable that there could be a cease-fire in IC without political settlement as in Korea.

US delegation limited itself to statement regarding necessity keep IC out of Communist hands and expression of interest in French military study of Laniel cease-fire conditions in view extreme importance of controls and guarantees.

Dillon

1. Transmitted in two parts.
2. Minutes of meeting transmitted to the Department in despatch 2654 from Paris, Apr. 20, not printed. (396.1 GE/4–2054)
3. See telegrams 3919, 3921, and 3925 from Paris Apr. 16, pp. 524, 525, and 527, respectively.
4. See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.