Office of the Historian

396.1 GE/4–1354: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

confidential
priority
Saigon, April 13, 1954—8 p.m.

1984. Repeated information priority Paris 646, Geneva 2, Hanoi unnumbered.1 Embassy has carefully studied Department’s various draft position papers for Geneva conference.2

[Page 516]
(1)

We have certain reservations in regard to recommendation in paper on “participation in the Indochina phase of conference (GI D–7a)3 that in addition to China and the four Berlin powers the three Associated States of Indochina, Viet Minh, Thailand, and Burma be also invited. We urge that no public position be taken on possible participation of the Associated States until opportunity has been had in Paris three-power talks to consider most carefully the views of the Vietnamese Government itself.

The Vietnamese Government is deeply disturbed at prospect of facing Viet Minh delegation across the conference table.4 They feel that lacking concrete evidence that Chinese Communists would be willing to consider cessation of aid to Viet Minh, the conference would be merely a Communist propaganda exercise. They conceive no advantage to Vietnamese Government in participating in such “propaganda” conference but definite loss of its position by de facto recognition of Viet Minh Government which would follow on Viet Minh participation. In order to prevent such de facto recognition of Viet Minh, which would in itself be an achievement and net gain for the Communists, Vietnamese Government is thinking in terms of sending observers to Geneva rather than formal delegation claiming a participating status. This is the view of Bao Dai and Buu Loc and I may add is shared by Ambassador DeJean.

Two obvious disadvantages to non-participation of the Associated States come immediately to mind: (1) Danger of having the Indochina phase resemble a five-power conference, and (2) possible reflection upon independence of the Associated States should France appear to be deciding their fate without their participation. The following considerations must be weighed against this, however: (1) assumption that in any event there is little chance for successful resolution of the problem which would lead to cessation of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh and (2) real advantage to Viet Minh in prestige and status to be recognized at such a conference with no compensating advantage to Vietnamese.

Should it be decided that Vietnamese Government not participate, they could issue statement explaining reasons for non-participation. Properly worded this could serve as counter to charges that non-participation was evidence of lack of status as sovereign power. This matter can be thoroughly explored at Paris before a firm stand is taken and the fears of the Vietnamese Government should be given due weight. Invitations to Cambodia and Laos should be considered in light of decision re Vietnam.

(2)

With regard to position paper on US aid in post-war reconstruction of Indochina (GI D–10A)5 we doubt that it would be advantageous psychologically at Geneva to indicate to the French and Vietnamese that if the war is won in 1954 the President will appropriate funds for post-war reconstruction in Indochina and that in later years we intend to urge Congress to continue aid for Indochina reconstruction.

I do not believe any such promise would have much effect at the present time in determining French willingness to continue the war here nor would it have an important present effect on Vietnamese Government. Our advice is to defer such commitments to later date when they might be effective in persuading Vietnamese Government and public opinion to better political and military performance.

Heath
  1. Telegram summarized in a memorandum from Deputy Director of PSA Henry B. Day to U. Alexis Johnson, Apr. 13, not printed. (396.1 GE/4–1354)↩
  2. For a list of position papers prepared for the Korean and Indochina phases of the Geneva Conference, see notes on sources, pp. 3 and 397.↩
  3. Dated Mar. 24. p. 481.↩
  4. See telegram 1956 from Saigon. Apr. 10. p. 512.↩
  5. “US Aid in Postwar Reconstruction of Indochina,” Mar. 24, not printed. (FE files, lot 60 D 330, “Position Papers”)↩