396.1 GE/4–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State
2468. 1. In examining implications Geneva conference for Japan, important to note at outset that government has not sought representation. When Right Socialist Diet spokesman raised question early March Prime Minister stated flatly government would not attempt seek participation. This not due lack of interest but realistic appreciation that having received no invitation, any bid for participation would not be favorably received and to make such a bid would only embarrass US and result in public snub.
2. Beyond this general motivation probably lies feeling Japan stands gain little or nothing from participation since conference is not expected by most Japanese to produce any basic or lasting settlement Far Eastern problems. Conclusion of Japanese policy planners is probably that Far East likely remain fluid state for considerable period and Japanese interests therefore best served by waiting until nation strong enough to play more independent role than now possible due Japan’s political and economic dependence on US.
3. In spite of above little doubt that Geneva proceedings will be followed with keen interest here in contrast Berlin conference which in their minds was concerned with problems relating to another world. There is wide recognition here that Geneva deliberations will have potentially vital significance for Japan even though no change in Far Eastern status quo likely result from conference. Japanese feel US statements indicate no room for compromise and Communists not likely retreat from present positions of power in North Korea and Indochina unless high price paid.
4. Few Japanese in responsible positions expect unified Korea or any other kind of Korean settlement to emerge, but most Japanese continue indulge in good deal of wishful thinking on subject. Japanese [Page 511] Government and people would probably welcome idea of unified Korean “buffer state”, neutralized under effective international guarantee by great powers, including Japan due general feeling it would eliminate primary source of tension in Far East between US (sic) and Communist world, reduce to minimum danger of clash in which Japan might become involved, and facilitate establishment normal diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and China–USSR. (Danger Communist infiltration and eventual control under such circumstances unfortunately not taken seriously; many Japanese in fact think danger greater under present circumstances, with inefficient and corrupt ROK Government providing “hothouse” for Communist growth.) Also hopefully believed unified neutralized Korea under new government might be easier for Japan to deal with than present ROK Government. In this connection it has been suggested Japan go slow on negotiation settlement with ROK until dust settles and Korean situation “stabilized”.
5. Looming behind Korea and Indochina issues and of overriding importance to Japan is question of what kind of relationship between Japan and Chinese mainland can be evolved. Japanese press and official reaction to Berlin decision to hold Geneva conference characterized by strong feeling status of Peking regime greatly enhanced, that US agreed to what in essence will be five-power conference, and that ability of Chinese Communists to speak on Asian problems increased. Press also speculated that regardless of Geneva outcome, Chinese Communists now convinced of need for foreign trade to carry through their program of national development, and this offers possibilities which Japan cannot ignore.
6. In order consolidate regime’s internal control and develop nation’s industrial and military power, Chinese Communists might conceivably agree at Geneva to settlements of Korean and Indochinese struggles embodying major concessions to free world positions those areas. One respected Foreign Office source has expressed fear such conciliatory course of action on Communists’ part, presumably resulting in major relaxation of tension in Far East, could have disastrous effect in Japan. With threat of Communist aggression apparently removed, emotional Japanese people would be strongly inclined to let down their guard and “buy” Communist peace offensive. Japan’s embryonic rearmament effort might then receive setback, disposition toward neutralism would be strengthened here, and pressure increased to remove controls on China trade and establish diplomatic relations with Peking. In move toward latter step Japan might be receptive to Soviet move to seat Japan and Communist China in UN on link basis.1
[Page 512]7. In event Geneva conference breakdown that results in renewal of aggressive Communist Chinese or Russian action, Japan would have no choice but to abandon its hopes for normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union. Tightening of security and economic ties with US and free world would result, and rearmament effort would presumably move forward.
8. In more likely eventuality that Geneva conference results in no change in present unsettled state in Far East probable effect in terms Japanese policy expected to be closer that described paragraph 7 than in paragraph 6. Much will depend on light in which US and Communist-bloc representatives appear at conference. If failure to achieve any real solution of major Far Eastern issues clearly due to Communist recalcitrance and it could be shown that basic aggressive aims of Communists remained unaltered, Japanese realization of need to cooperate closely with free world would be strengthened. If, however. Communists were to succeed in giving impression they had put forward reasonable proposals which US had rejected because of its refusal to recognize international existence of Peking regime. Japanese neutralism and anti-American sentiment might well receive fillip.
9. Foreign Office officials have emphasized importance of Western unity at Geneva, referring to outstanding success this respect at Berlin conference. They believe Japanese will quickly interpret any signs of discord between American, British and French allies over either Korea or Indochina as indications that a Far Eastern Munich, with grave potential complications for Japan, is in the cards.
- For documentation on this matter, see vol. iii, pp. 620 ff. and 802 ff.↩