Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

396.1 GE/4–754

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1

secret

[Washington,] April 7, 1954.

Terms of Reference for the Paris Working Group on Indochina Phase at Geneva

1. Objectives and Tactics of Working Group

a.: The objective of the Working Group is to shore up the French so that they do not adopt a position at Geneva which would mean, directly or indirectly, the loss of Indochina to the Communists. Its [Page 504] role would be to conduct a holding operation pending the arrival of the Secretary in Paris on April 21 or 22. The Working Group, which will include a representative of the Department of Defense, will commence talks with the British and French on Tuesday, April 13, in Paris. A brief press statement to this effect will be released then, although the Paris press already has this information.
b.: The tactics of the Working Group are to advance no general position but rather to listen to the French proposals. Our representatives should express their views along the following general lines:

2. US Position To Be Presented by Working Group

a.: At Berlin it was understood with Bidault that France would not agree to any arrangement that would directly or indirectly result in the turnover of the area to the Communists, while we would retain full freedom of action to refrain from any agreement at all at Geneva. We are confident France will not take any step at Geneva which will jeopardize our Berlin understanding.2 This is our point of departure.
b.: Insofar as the possibility of US concessions to the Chinese Communists is concerned, the US position was made clear in the Secretary’s March 29 speech,3 and we should stand firmly on this position. This point should be made to the British and French, with especial reference to the following paragraph:

“The United States Delegation will go to Geneva in an effort to bring about a united and independent Korea, from which Communist China will have withdrawn its army of invasion. Also, we hope that any Indochina discussion will serve to bring the Chinese Communists to see the danger of their apparent design for the conquest of Southeast Asia, so that they will cease and desist. We shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us, merely to buy its promises of future good behavior.”
c.: We are of course fully cognizant of the French domestic situation, the pressure to end the war in France, and the warweariness of the French people after eight years of the struggle. We agreed to having Indochina discussed at the Geneva Conference for the purpose of helping the French Government to resist these domestic pressures by exposing the real Communist position. We realize that because of these pressures the French Government must give the appearance of exploring every possibility for reaching a settlement which would safeguard France’s interests, responsibilities and commitments with regard to the Indochina war.
d.: The Working Group should set forth and endeavor to secure French and British agreement to the general principles which the US believes must be firmly adhered to in any solution of the Indochina problem. The general principles which should be established are that the US, the UK, and the French have common obligations to see to it that any settlement with the Communists would not: (1) Result in or tend to result in a turning over of the politically important and strategic area of Indochina to Communist control; (2) Jeopardize the security of the French Union forces; (3) Jeopardize the freedom of the peoples of Indochina who have been loyally supporting the anti-Communist effort; (4) Endanger the prestige and status of France or her allies.
e.: Having established these general principles the Working Group should explore with the French and British whatever types of settlements the French or British might propose (such as plebiscite, partition, coalition government, etc.), drawing out the French and British on how such settlements might work out in practice, testing the possible results of such settlements against the established general principles, and indicating how such settlements fell short of meeting the general principles. The Working Group should be prepared to question the French on the Laniel proposals and to raise, through questioning, the various guarantees and safeguards which would be necessary to make such a plan conform to the general principles.
f.: The Working Group should be authorized to express the hope that before Geneva, or at least before substantive discussions at Geneva with regard to Indochina are begun, it will be possible to announce the conclusion of current Franco-Vietnamese negotiations since an announcement to this effect will have favorable repercussions in Vietnam and therefore in the other free-world countries most directly concerned.

3. Procedural Questions

a.

Participation

(1): Emphasize strongly the quadripartite aspect of the decision agreed to at Berlin regarding participation and the US firm opposition to any five power discussion of this issue. The decision as to who will participate in the Indochina discussions in addition to the four Berlin powers and Communist China must be made by the four Berlin powers.
(2): Convey the Secretary’s view as stated above again, repeating our position on participation so far is definite only for the US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and that our position on further participants is not yet firm. Australia, the Philippines and Thailand have expressed an interest in participating to us.
(3): Under any circumstances we insist on a formal invitation by the four inviting powers to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. If the French inquire whether this means inviting the Associated States even if it means also inviting Ho Chi Minh, the group should reply in the affirmative.
(4): We will find it easier to make our own decisions when the French and British have given us their definite views which the Working Group will transmit to Washington.

b.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1