396.1 GE/3–2454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)
Subject:
- Geneva Conference
Participants:
- Ambassador Spender, Australian Embassy
- Minister Blakeney, Australian Embassy
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA
Ambassador Spender called this afternoon at his request accompanied by Minister Blakeney. He handed to Mr. Murphy the attached Aide-Mémoire1 indicating that Australia considered itself an “interested State” in so far as the Indo-Chinese phase of the Conference is concerned and would desire to participate in that phase of the Conference if participation is extended beyond the Four Powers, Communist China and the Associated States.
Mr. Murphy received the Aide-Mémoire and indicated that the matter of the composition of the Indo-China phase of the Conference had not yet been determined; in fact might possibly not be determined until Geneva itself.
Ambassador Spender then asked a number of questions attempting to ascertain what position the United States and also the French intended to take on Indo-China at the Conference. He expressed the view that while probably agreement could not be reached with the Communist at the Conference that it was important that the Western participants develop a firm position prior to the Conference and also emerge from the Conference with a united Western position. He expressed the view that the Communist side would probably hold out for one or more of the three following concessions from the West: (a) recognition of Red China; (b) admission of Red China to the United Nations and (c) relaxation of trade barriers with Red China.
The Ambassador expressed some concern at waiting too long for the development of a French position being apprehensive that the French might desire to go to Geneva without a position and thus have full maneuverability at the Conference. The Ambassador also inquired about the military situation in Indo-China but agreed that more serious factors were the political situation in Paris and also the political problem vis-à-vis the Associated States.
Mr. Murphy indicated that although we were keeping in close touch with the French we did not yet have any indication of what their position [Page 481] would be at Geneva. He indicated that we have not thus far been pressing the French too hard as we were not anxious to expedite the beginning of the Indo-China phase of the Conference. He indicated to the Ambassador that we hoped the Conference would open on Korea and exhaust that subject before beginning on Indo-China although he admitted that events might not work out in that manner. He admitted that a French desire for maneuverability at Geneva might be a contributing factor in their delay in developing a position but he thought also that there were many diverse opinions in Paris and that the government might be having real difficulty in developing a government position.2
- Not printed. (396.1 GE/3–2454)↩
- In a staff meeting on Mar. 26 attended by the Secretary, Murphy, Robertson, Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, and others, the Secretary reported on the conversation with Ambassador Spender. He said the Ambassador was very concerned that the Allies be organized in order to take action quickly if the situation in Indochina deteriorated. The Secretary inquired how many votes could be obtained in the United Nations if the United States proposed action on the Indochina problem. He remarked that it would have to be clear to every country in the world that the Associated States were truly independent. MacArthur suggested that it might be useful to ask Ambassador Spender to discuss the matter with the British, indicating that “the rather indifferent U.K. attitude tended to support the French desire for peace at practically any cost.” MacArthur thought “it would be very useful if the Australians would ram home the hard facts of life as to what else would happen in Southeast Asia if Indochina fell.” (Secretary’s staff meetings, lot 63 D 75)↩