Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/3–2254: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

secret
priority

London, March 22, 1954—5 p.m.

4072. Repeated information Paris 552, Saigon 16. Deptel 4818 March 18¹ and Embtel 4053 March 20,² both repeated Paris, Saigon. Geneva Conference.

1. Embassy officer asked call this noon at Foreign Office where he given oral statement UK position as follows:

(a) We agree (i) We must do all we can prevent principle from being established at Geneva that the five powers are recognized as being in a special position as a kind of inner directing group, and (ii) before substantive talks can begin on Indochina procedural question must first be settled as to which are the “other interested states” to be invited.

(b) But we think that to insist too formally and rigidly that this procedural question is a matter for decision by the four powers might merely compel Communists press thesis it is matter for the five; moreover in practice the procedural question cannot be settled without consultation of some kind with the Chinese.

(c) Therefore, our best hope of making progress without precipitating the five-power issue lies in maintaining principle that all powers at Geneva are there on same footing, in avoiding formal establishment of any inner group whether four power or five power and in keeping all consultations outside the conference meetings as private and informal as possible and our procedures reasonably flexible.

2. In telegram sent Washington yesterday evening Foreign Office outlines for British Embassy its thinking on number of related points. Foreign Office believes we will have difficulty in preventing use of Chinese as official language, especially as Chinese is recognized as official language in UN. If Soviets insist on use of Chinese as official language, we might initially counter by proposing English, French and Russian as official languages and Chinese and Korean (and perhaps others) as unofficial languages. We must not however let ourselves be maneuvered into a position where conference could break down merely over relatively minor question of procedure, and in event strong opposition from Communists should be prepared give in on language question. As might be expected, Foreign Office concerned not so much over issues of prestige (including whether or not Chinese Communists gain qualified recognition as great power) as over necessity of having western position at Geneva defensible in eyes of as many nations as possible.

Aldrich

1. The Department in telegram 4818 to London, Mar. 18, asked for confirmation that Britain agreed that after opening of the conference, four Foreign Ministers at Geneva would take up and decide the questions of (1) participants in the Indochina phase, (2) issuance of invitations, and (3) the date on which substantive discussions could begin. (396.1 GE/3–1854)
2. In telegram 4053 from London, Mar. 20, the Embassy informed the Department that the Foreign Office had offered the tentative view that the U.S. position might be too rigid and that “while we can avoid substantive talks on Indochina beginning concurrently with substantive talks on Korea, it may prove quite impossible avoid procedural talks on Indochina beginning immediately conference opens.” (396.1 GE/3–2054)