795.00/4–1753: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
780. If opportunity offers to do so ostensibly casually in course general conversation possibly in talk following presentation your credentials2 or if not then at subsequent early opportunity, Department believes desirable in your discretion you make following points to Molotov re letter General Harrison to Nam Il (Deptel 777):3 (A) Communist side should clearly realize that UNC cannot change its substantive position on non-forcible repatriation prisoners held by it; (B) UNC however is interested in substance and not in words. Without necessarily excluding [Page 915] other possibilities General Harrison’s letter is considered a reasonable and practical compromise in framework Chou En-lai statement put forward by UNC with intent of expediting agreement; (C) Essential Communist side recognize that unless armistice agreement is now promptly reached at Panmunjom, reaction of American people will be strong. In US view Communists should realize seriousness of recent proposals and importance that initiative which has been taken expeditiously reach fruition in armistice.
Feel that while desirable our position this regard be made abundantly clear Soviets, appearance threat or ultimatum which might be implied in formal presentation should be avoided and foregoing informally set forth as simple statement of facts inherent in present situation.
- This telegram was drafted by Johnson and Barbour and cleared by Smith.↩
- After heated confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles E. Bohlen was confirmed as Ambassador to the Soviet Union on Mar. 27, 1953. He presented his credentials in Moscow on Apr. 20. For Bohlen’s own extensive account of these hearings, see Witness to History, pp. 309–336.↩
- Telegram 777 to Moscow, Apr. 16, is not printed (795.00/4–1653); for a text of Harrison’s letter, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.↩