795.00/4–1553: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
1226. Repeated information CINCUNC eyes only ClarkDIP 465. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.1
Conversation with President Rhee reported in detail because shows state of mind with which we have to cope. Discounting part as old stuff and even more as “Rhee act” enough nevertheless remains to hamper our peace efforts, perhaps seriously. I am not so much concerned over possibility Rhee might try to make good on his threat “to march to Yalu alone” as I am at prospect of deliberate development of his local campaign (agitating his five points2 for example) to point where open break with armistice or peace negotiations inevitable.
In those circumstances I recommend:
- 1.
- We give early consideration to making unilateral declaration as mentioned Dulles–Yang talk3 and if possible to permitting Rhee to comment on text before issuance.
- 2.
- We re-examine Rhee’s position with view to discovering whether consistent our own ends there may not be possibility of meeting certain important Korean requirements. Impression among Koreans is they have in past been given cavalier treatment on matters of importance to them and seems possible this may in fact have been case. If so, would it not be desirable now to recognize extent of Korean stake in common effort and go as far as possible toward taking Koreans into our confidence? For example we might immediately give ROK Government liaison representation on UN armistice delegation and in future on political conference delegation. Aim would be to avoid leaving them out of decisions bearing directly on their interests or facing them with faits accompli in matters of legitimate concern to them. In this connection might also be helpful give Rhee confidential statement our ideas how POW talks may go, what we might consider undue delay and views regarding Commie strategy.
- 3.
- We take fresh look at substance some of Rhee’s other specific points, for example, his fear Article Four of draft armistice agreement may be booby trap. I recognize that whatever its dangers we perhaps cannot reopen Article Four at this stage. I recommend, however, we give serious consideration to possibility convening political conference earliest possible date and certainly not later than 30 days after armistice agreed. Believe also we should, either before conference or at its outset, set definite time limit its duration perhaps 60 days. I agree with Rhee’s opinion Korean Government and people in their present uncertain and unhappy state will not tolerate protracted talks and have impression American public opinion likewise would not again tolerate indefinite delays. Reasonable period, such as 60 days, certainly gives ample time for Commies to demonstrate whether they intend peaceful settlement Korean problem.
- Dated Apr. 15, p. 910.↩
- Rhee’s five points were as follows: a settlement in Korea to include withdrawal of Chinese forces; disarmament of North Korean forces, UN efforts to prevent any third country from rendering further economic or military aid to North Korea; full ROK participation in any international consideration of a settlement of Korean problems; and a prohibition on decisions which adversely affected the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation by Young reporting on this meeting of Apr. 8, p. 897.↩