State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
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General Collins: General Bradley will not be able to come this morning so I think we had better go ahead.
Mr. Matthews: The first question which we would like to bring up is that of the recent publicity on our plans for future negotiations on the Korean issue. I have here a newspaper dispatch which goes into, at some length, U.N. plans for negotiating with the Communists on the POW issue. (At this point Mr. Matthews read the newspaper dispatch which in general stated that Clark would make exchange of sick and wounded his first order of business and that he would then seek satisfactory answers to questions raised by Chou En-lai’s proposal, such as the question of who would be the neutral, how would forcible repatriation be avoided, etc.)
We have had word from our Secretary that the President does not want any talk about negotiations or any negotiations until the Communists have really put into effect the exchange of sick and wounded. We think that any publicity about our plans for future negotiations would be contrary to the expressed wishes of the President.
General Collins: I think it might be wise to send out a message to Clark in which we could refer to the report that you have read and also point out that the President made a further statement at his Press Conference2 yesterday to the effect that we would review carefully any Communist proposal and see whether their actions demonstrated that their proposals were made in good faith. We should stress to Clark the inadvisability of Clark or anybody on his staff making any statements at this time about future negotiations and emphasize that every precaution should be taken to avoid publicity. I think the message should go out today. (At this point Mr. Matthews read the memorandum [Page 862] from the Secretary which described the President’s wishes on the timing of negotiations.)3
General Collins: Generally speaking, I think that the substance of your Secretary’s memorandum is already reflected in the messages which we have sent to Clark.
Mr. Johnson: Should we take up the question of Clark’s incoming message?4
General Collins: The Army has gone over the message but I am not sure that the other services have seen it. In general what Clark proposes to say seems to be all right to us. We have a draft message approving his proposal. There is one point on which we do have a question. Chou En-lai in his proposal always refers to the “sick and wounded”. In our statements we have been saying “seriously sick and wounded”. I have checked on the articles in the Geneva Convention and they actually do refer to seriously sick and seriously wounded. As a matter of fact they go into great detail on the categories of sick and wounded and how they should be handled. (At this point General Collins read Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention.)
It seems to me that we may be making a mistake in constantly repeating the word “seriously”. If the Communists are willing to send back slightly sick and wounded, I should think we would have nothing to lose from playing along with them.
Mr. Nitze: It seems clear that we should try to get back as many of our own fellows as possible.
General Collins: As you agree, I think we should suggest to Clark that it is not advisable for him to refer to the sick and wounded as seriously sick and wounded. Johnson and our men over here can draft a message.
Mr. Johnson: There is another point I would like to bring up. We have instructed Clark not to raise the question of impartial verification by a neutral of the sick and wounded to be exchanged if the number that the Communists propose to exchange appears to be satisfactory. But we do feel that it would be an advantage to us on our side if we had the ICRC carry out its normal functions and help to separate the sick and wounded who don’t want to be repatriated. The Red Cross could either examine the sick and wounded or could check on the procedures that we are using to select the sick and wounded who want to go back.
Mr. Matthews: I think there would probably be some advantage in at least having the ICRC observe the procedures that we use.
[Page 863]Mr. Nitze: I should think that Clark would want to discuss with the ICRC what might be the best way of their reviewing his procedures.
General Collins: I think there would be some advantage in having the ICRC review the procedures so long as it wouldn’t occasion any delay in the exchange of sick and wounded.
Mr. Johnson: We do have another question on Clark’s incoming message. His message on page 4 paragraph 3,5 has proposed instructions to Daniel as chief of the liaison group. This paragraph is, in fact, taken from the fifth paragraph of our instructions to him6 and would call for Daniel to question the Communists about Chou En-lai’s proposal. Our thought was that this would be done by the delegation and not by the liaison group. We don’t want the liaison group to discuss the proposal because they could easily be drawn into negotiations on it and this we want to avoid. We think the liaison group should only ask for a detailed statement of the Chou En-lai plan so that it can be studied while the exchange of sick and wounded is taking place.
Admiral Fechteler: As Clark’s instructions to Daniel stand, they really are inconsistent. They say Daniel should and shouldn’t talk about negotiations.
Admiral Libby: The difficulty could be cured by omitting paragraph 3 and the last sentence on page 4.7
General Collins: I think, however, that Clark will need clarification on the reasons for the change. Why doesn’t State draft a message and let Libby and G–3 look at it over here before we send it out.8
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A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Of the JCS General Collins and Admiral Fechteler as well as Vice Chief General Twining attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and Nash the Department of Defense. In all, 20 persons were present.
In addition to Korea, U.S. relations with the Republic of China and military aid to France for Indochina were topics at this meeting.
↩ - For the text of the President’s news conference of Apr. 2, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 147–160.↩
- Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.↩
- The reference was to telegram C 61723, Clark to JCS, Apr. 3, 1953, supra. Because of the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram was received in the early morning of Apr. 3.↩
- Reference in Clark’s telegram was to Part 2, paragraph b 3.↩
- Telegram JCS 935344, Mar. 31, p. 829.↩
- Reference in Clark’s telegram was to the sentence in the proposed reply to Communist proposal, Part 2, paragraph c, which read: “It is my understanding that subsequent to reasonable settlement of this mat, the Liaison Groups will discuss the resumption of armistice negotiations.”↩
- For the text of the message as transmitted to Clark, see infra.↩