Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, April 3, 1953—1:35 p.m.

C 61723. Ref: A. JCS 935344.¹ B. DA 935413.² C. CX 61707.³ This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

a. Your comments in para 6a⁴ are concurred in. It is suggested that since Norway is no longer under consideration as a member of the Neutral Nations Supv Com, it might be a better choice to perform the “Neutral State” role. It is also suggested that Mexico or India might be possible nominations as the “Neutral State” in recog of their proposals, but the extent of Indian neutrality is not considered as well defined as in the case of Mexico.

b. Regarding para 6b, I concur in the undesirability of trans non-repatriates to a neutral state. While trf in small groups to neutral cust in the demilitarized zone would have the advantages of permitting easy access to neutral detention camps by the orientation groups prov for in CX 51489,⁵ part 2, para 3b (5) and the Red Cross pers of both sides, it would create needless log and admin problems, including dup of existing fac, possible friction and interference between neutral state auth and the Mil Armistice Com, the introduction of armed guards into the demilitarized zone, and undue delay in the final processing of non-repatriates. The use of existing island installations would obviate most of the serious problems anticipated if neutral detention takes place in the demilitarized zone. If the problem can be limited to Chinese non-repatriates, as now appears probable, the present location at Cheju Island would minimize anticipated difficulties. If Korean non-repatriates should be required to undergo similar processing the vacated fac of Koje Island could be used to advantage. Accordingly, I remd that we make every effort to obtain agreement to neutral cust at existing island fac.

c. In view of the purely speculative destination implied in para 6c, I consider it essential that the problem be limited to the 15,000 Chinese non-repatriates. I consider mvmt of these pers to Sweden, Switzerland or Norway completely unrealistic, and believe that ultimately the choice of actual mvmt would have to be between Mexico and India. Curr internal unrest is considered suff reason to drop Indonesia or Burma for consideration, and could be used as an argument against India. I consider that the log problems involved should be decided and fin by the UN with the Unified Comd cont in the role of exec agent. The need to employ force in any such mvmt of Chinese non-repatriates is considered unlikely to assume serious proportions, but could become a maj problem if these Chinese were to be moved to a “Neutral State” under an agreement that they would not be ultimately relocated in Formosa. If such a problem arises, believe it can best be met by complete orientation, and personal guarantees by the UN as to their safety and final relocation in the country of the indiv choice wherever possible.

d. Regarding the ques in para 6d, I consider that no other intrp of Chou’s statement would be logical. In the intmed para Chou stated “nor do we ack the assertion …⁶ that there are among the PW indiv who allegedly refuse repatriation.”

e. As indicated above I thoroughly concur in the psn that trans Koreans to a “Neutral State” would be absurd, and that only the Chinese should be subject to “Neutral State” detention. However, if the ques of “Neutral State” cust of Korean non-repatriates should become an issue, neutral detention in Korea is considered the only acpt UNC psn to avoid serious disturbances in the ROK, and to preclude the need for employing force in conducting the mvmt. The use of vacated fac at Koje was suggested earlier in para b.

f. The ans to the ques in para 6f, I consider to be limited to the prov mentioned in para c above. At most, I consider that what is contemplated is prov for access to the non-repatriates “neutral cust” as set forth in proposals 7, 8, 9 and 11 of the Indian Resolution submitted to UNGA by the Indian Del.

g. In ans to ques 6g, I consider that the “Neutral State” must act as the court of appeal. Even the Indian Resolution visualized the Repatriation Com employing an umpire to cast a deciding vote. Prov a truly “Neutral State” can be decided upon, I consider that its decisions should be final. I further consider that pris who steadfastly oppose repatriation should be returned by the neutral state to the cust of the orign detaining power for subsequent release, and resettlement in accordance with the wishes of the indiv insofar as practicable. Considering arbitrary Communist disp of thousands of ROK pers, I consider the above proposed procedure a completely “just solution” to the problem.

Part 2.

Clarification contained in ref B most helpful.

a. My comments on para 3 of ref A, as rqst in ref B, fol. While I realize that there may be extreme pressure from our allies, the enemy, and certain sectors of the US pub to proceed immediately with a resumption of negotiations, I remain skeptical of Communist motives. After their rejection of the Indian Resolution, which covered in gen the substance of what the Communists now apparently propose, I consider that it would be completely naive on our part not to anticipate any and every form of chicanery in their apparently straightfwd proposal. Until the Communists really accede to our proposals regarding the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured pers and proceed to faithfully carry out their part of the contract, I rcmd that we refrain from discussion by liaison groups of resuming negotiations, at least until reasonable progress in repatriating seriously sick and wounded has been accomplished. I consider that such delay in discussing a resumption of negotiations is fully justified by Chou’s statement “consider that subsequent upon reasonable settlement of the ques of sick and injured … a smooth solution to the whole ques (armistice) … should be achieved.” In the meantime however, every effort will be made to develop the Communist psn in accordance with para 2 and 5 ref A.

b. The Communist reply passed in ref C disposes, at least temp, of the problems set forth in para 1 and 4 of ref A. My proposed instr to the senior member of the Liaison Group will therefore be as fol:

1. “At the initial, or an early meeting of Liaison Groups, when you deem the occasion aprop, desire that you make ref to the Communist proposal on the ques of repatriation of PW rec on 2 Apr and state that the UNC would be pleased to rec, at as early a date as possible, a detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be studied while arrangements for the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured pers are being completed.

2. Avoid making any commitment with regard to undertaking discussion of the Communist proposal by the Del or to acpt the principle of the proposal. If pressed for an ans, you should state that the UNC would like to have a clearer idea of what the Communists have in mind.

3. When discussion of the Communist proposal as a basis for resuming negotiations is started, your tactics will be to place on the Communists the burden of putting fwd a detailed and practical plan which the UNC can reasonably acpt. Any UNC contribution to the dev of such plans will be along the lines suggested in para 3b, part 2 of CX 51489 of 7 Jul 52, except that you should avoid any commitment not to permit Chinese PW ultimately to proceed to Nationalist China.

4. Until such time as it is clearly apparent that the Communists are carrying out our proposal for repatriating sick and wounded in good faith, I desire that you refrain from discussing a resumption of negotiations or agreeing to a particular date for the resumption of negotiations.”

c. The text of my proposed reply to the Communist proposal set forth in ref C fols:

“To: Gen Kim Il Sung, Comd of the Korean Peoples Army, Gen Peng Teh Huai, Comd of the Chinese Peoples Vol. I appreciate the courtesy of your prompt reply to my ltr of 31 Mar 53 contained in your ltr rec 2 Apr 53, and have rec the incl statements. I agree to the proposal that the Liaison Group of your side meet with the Liaison Group of our side at Pan Mun Jom on 6 Apr 53 to arrange the mat of repatriation by both sides of seriously sick and wounded captured pers. It is my understanding that subsequent to reasonable settlement of this mat, the Liaison Groups will discuss the resumption of armistice negotiations. I suggest that the time of meeting be 1000 hours, if that is convn to your side, and that the details of the actual time be left to the Liaison Off of both sides. Signed Mark W. Clark, Gen USA, CINC, UNC.”

d. Rqst your comments on para b and c of part 2 earliest.

1. Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.
2. Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, pp. 829 and 830, respectively.
3. This telegram from Clark to the JCS, dated Apr. 2, 1953, contained the text of a letter from Commanders Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Clark, Apr. 2, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) A text of this letter is published in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 570.
4. Reference was to JCS 935344.
5. Dated July 7, 1952, p. 380.
6. Ellipses throughout are in the source text.