Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

[Extract]

top secret

Washington, March 6, 1953—11 a.m.

. . . . . . .

Unilateral Action on the Release of Non-Repatriate POWs

General Bradley: We asked General White to talk to Clark about the fait accompli on the prisoners and Clark wired us that he would like to send a staff officer over, and one has just arrived this morning.

(At this point General Bradley introduced Colonel Kogstad from General Clark’s staff.)

These gentlemen all know what this matter is about and we have asked you to come to give us Clark’s views.

Colonel Kogstad: At the present time the U.N. Command has about 132,000 POWs in custody. About 83,000 of these were classified as procommunist as a result of the screening. The 83,000 would be repatriated; they are now settled at island camps on Kojedo and several other islands. Of the remaining 50,000, 35,000 are North Koreans who will not be repatriated. All of the North Koreans are on the Korean mainland in a scattering of camps. The last 15,000 are non-repatriate Chinese who are in camps on the south part of the Cheju Do (?) where there is also a camp of Chinese Communists.

When General White came over, General Clark had a plan drawn up which he had considered sending. General White read it. This plan has been worked on for several months. It began to get maximum attention after October 8, when the truce talks receded. I brought a short message describing the plan, which has been worked over by General Clark’s staff and by him. I would like to read it:

The United Nations Command had been holding in custody for over eighteen months 35,000 North Korean and 15,000 Chinese prisoners who, as the result of the screening, have been segregated and will forcibly resist return. I realize the disposition of the non-repatriated Chinese has political complications at the highest level. However, the release of the 35,000 North Koreans appears feasible and relative easy of accomplishment. In view of the stand of our Government on repatriation and the lack of communist interest in our proposals, retention of this group serves no useful purpose.

The following is a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of releasing the North Korean anti-communist POWs:

First the disadvantages: (1) The communists might develop a propaganda attack on our unilateral action as constituting a final break-off of negotiations. I do not believe this action would affect the course they are following.

(2) There is the possibility of retaliation against UN POWs. This is a potential danger but we would retain many POWs in our hands and reprisals would be difficult for them to justify. They might claim they had released an equivalent percentage of their UN prisoners, but this possibility exists anyway. They have already admitted they have released 50,000 POWs which gives a propaganda basis for our action.

(3) The release of North Korean prisoners and not the Chinese might be taken as showing that we are not firm with respect to the Chinese.

(4) When the inmates of the pro-communist camps learn the Koreans are being released, some may claim they have also defected and we might have to offer an asylum to prisoners in the 83,000 group whom we have reported as available for return. We should be able to keep the number to a minimum by screening. Also, there may be some in the North Korean non-repatriate group who are communist plants, and if released would join subversive elements, but the police system of the ROK is very effective. General Clark believes the ROK authorities could keep a close watch.

(5) Those of our allies who have not fully supported the principle of non-forcible repatriation might view this action with alarm.

The following are the advantages: (1) It would provide further evidence of the finality of the UNC position.

(2) The orderly and peaceful integration of North Koreans into the civilian population of South Korea would establish the propriety of the UNC position and might increase defections.

(3) The POW issue would be reduced to limits which, on the surface, it has had for many months. The communist negotiators have indicated the disposition of the Chinese is the primary sticking point and the release of the North Koreans might lay a foundation for some kind of settlement, either by release or by some agreed disposition.

(4) We would be relieved of the logistic burden and would save men and dollars. South Korea is willing to receive the North Korean nonrepatriates. The ROK is aware that their absorption will add strength to the political stand that all of Korea should be under a single sovereignty.

General Clark goes on to say that in appraising the advisability of the action, he cannot evaluate its effect on other courses of action now being developed by the Government, but if we intend to abide by the principle of non-forcible repatriation, then he sees no obstacle to further developments. In implementing the release of the POWs he would follow in general the plan used for releasing 37,000 civilian internees. He would stress the voluntary nature of the procedure and the release covers only prisoners who have expressed a desire to be released in South Korea. The International Red Cross would be invited to witness the procedures, and reports would be made to Geneva.

In summary, General Clark believes that the proposal is feasible, that it gives an excellent publicity position and constitutes a saving, and will have no appreciable effect on the prospects for an armistice.

After the message I have just read was prepared, General Clark wanted to emphasize certain other things. His main concern in the release of POWs has been the fear of reprisals. He feels this proposed action won’t make any change in that danger. He recognizes that this might set a dangerous precedent in future wars but he still favors the principle.

He feels, however, that the first step should be the release of North Korean non-repatriates because—

(1) They can be released locally.

(2) South Korea is willing to receive them.

(3) The ROK is unwilling to receive the non-repatriate Chinese.

(4) The Chinese prisoners present political implications.

(5) We can begin the release of North Koreans on the same basis as civilian internees.

(6) If the Chinese non-repatriates are to be released, there should be some appropriate destination for them, agreed to in advance. Otherwise, they would have to be held under military guard and subject to military discipline on Cheju Do.

General Clark’s last thought is that in our press policy the public announcement should be worded so that it does not indicate what plans we have for the Chinese, so the communists might interpret it as part of a program which would include the Chinese eventually.

General Bradley: Thank you very much. That was a clear and fine presentation. The last part makes it clear that Clark thinks this should be done in two steps. A decision might be made to release all the POWs, including the Chinese, after arrangements had been completed to shift the Chinese some place. Would General Clark still think it should be done in two steps?

Colonel Kogstad: If the decision were made, sir, he might be prepared to do them both at once.

General Bradley: Releasing the North Koreans is the easiest thing to do, but it does not answer the question because you can’t go to the bastards and offer an all-for-all exchange. So the question is whether he proposes doing it all in one step if the necessary arrangements are made for the Chinese.

Colonel Kogstad: I think he would still prefer two steps.

Mr. Allison: It would raise some political questions not to release the Chinese now. We would be asked whether we mean business on the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: I think an announcement that makes it clear you aren’t disposing of the Chinese would put you in a position you would be unable to hold. You would have to take a position.

General Hull: I don’t think you can leave it open, as Clark suggests.

Admiral Fechteler: So, before the release of the North Koreans you would have to have definite plans for the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: Exactly.

Mr. Johnson: I think so.

General Bradley: I don’t think Clark’s statement could leave it open.

Mr. Bohlen: If you could hold it, there would be practical advantages in doing it in two bites.

Mr. Nitze: I am not so sure you couldn’t hold on to the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: You would have to make it clear your stand on the principle of non-repatriation was firm.

Mr. Johnson: You might call the North Koreans something else, as we did in the case of the civilian internees.

Mr. Bohlen: You might declassify the whole bunch from their status as POWs and then release the North Koreans first. The object is to be in a position to present the communists with an all-for-all list. What you do with them after reclassification is none of the communists’ business.

Mr. Nitze: Would any of the Chinese change their minds about going back?

Colonel Kogstad: I think the 15,000 Chinese on Cheju Do are good nationalists.

Mr. Nitze: Do you think they would want to go to Formosa?

Colonel Kogstad: I can’t answer that.

General Bradley: I think that is where the decision really comes. If he had to go to Formosa a POW might choose to go home.

Mr. Bohlen: The death of Stalin² may have changed this, when we had thought about this in the past we thought you might be able to safeguard yourself somewhat by going to Stalin and telling him that this was going to be done and that any reprisals against UN prisoners would be regarded as absolute proof there would be no armistice. At least you would make them think seriously about the problem. Now I don’t know whether that angle would be useful or not.

General Bradley: There is a point not mentioned in this discussion so far. If you release the North Koreans and keep the Chinese for a second step, then the resolution in the UN to take over the disposition of the prisoners would be aimed at a small group and that would make it easier for the UN to assume responsibility and might result in the passage of the resolution.

Mr. Bohlen: It is difficult to know what some of the fellows up there would do. They probably would not want to take unilateral action to deal with these prisoners. The worst position for the U.S. would be to have no armistice, reprisals against our prisoners and everything else remaining in status quo. You would get quite a roar in this country.

Mr. Nitze: The danger of reprisals is much less on the first step than the second. Does General Clark have any views on this?

Colonel Kogstad: You would have a sampling when you released the North Koreans.

Mr. Nitze: That would not really raise the issue or give you much of an indication.

Mr. Bohlen: They have already admitted they have done the same thing with the South Koreans they captured.

Mr. Johnson: They tend to equate the Chinese with the non-Korean UN prisoners.

Mr. Bohlen: It would be hard to proceed further before we see what is going to happen in Moscow. At present it is a bad moment to put something like this into operation.

Mr. Nitze: Even the first step?

Mr. Bohlen: Well, it is arguable. They will be concerned with unity and showing no sign of weakness in the immediate coming weeks. It is difficult to come to a firm conclusion.

Mr. Nitze: There is one possible counter-argument. In the month after the funeral I think they might be reluctant to take dangerous actions.

Mr. Bohlen: They would be cautious on military action but I am not so sure on reprisals.

Mr. Nitze: I see what you mean.

General Bradley: It is Paul’s idea that if you are going to do it, you have less chance of reprisals now than later.

Mr. Nitze: I was just advancing another line of thought.

Mr. Bohlen: It’s worth considering.

Mr. Johnson: We had not contemplated carrying this out until the General Assembly adjourns.

Mr. Nitze: When will that be?

Mr. Johnson: I think it will be earlier as the result of Stalin’s death and Vishinsky’s departure.

Mr. Nitze: Could we get from Clark an analysis on the Chinese similar to the one we have had this morning on North Koreans, on the assumption that we would take a position as to where to send the Chinese?

Colonel Kogstad: I don’t think General Clark could be of much help on that.

General Bradley: Your Secretary will want to consider this problem.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, the best thing is for us to discuss this with the Secretary and General Smith. I take it this is not a matter of days with Clark.

General Bradley: Colonel Kogstad, do you have authority to let us have copies of the message you read?

Colonel Kogstad: I was instructed to give you this copy.

General Bradley: Fine. Admiral Lalor will make the proper distribution.

Mr. Johnson: We will need only one copy.

General Bradley: The Army will need one and we will keep one here.

Mr. Nitze: We can return our copy.

Mr. Johnson: Colonel Kogstad, we appreciate your coming over.

Mr. Nitze: It has been very helpful to us.

Mr. Johnson: There are some operating problems I would like to explore with the Colonel while he is here.

General Bradley: You will be here a few days?

Colonel Kogstad: Yes sir, I’d like to be.

General Bradley: Well, we will arrange it and you can get together with Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews.

. . . . . . .

1. A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.”

   Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chiefs Generals Hull and Twining. Nitze headed the Department of State contingent. Nash represented the Department of Defense and Gleason the NSC. Colonel Arthur W. Kogstad made a presentation on behalf of General Clark. In all, 22 persons attended. Discussion also took place on matters relating to China and Spain.

2. Stalin died on Mar. 5, 1953.