Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President1
In the talks on March 5 with Mr. Eden,2 the Secretary of State outlined the general thinking of the United States with respect to the overall strategic situation in Asia. He stressed the unity of the whole front extending from Korea to Indo-China and pointed out the necessity of creating a threat of pressures in the center (mainland China) to the end that it would make it less likely that the Chinese Communists would send increased forces to help the Communist rebels in Indo-China or to send additional forces into Korea. Mr. Dulles stated, in response to a question from Mr. Eden, that the United States Government had not as yet made any decisions with respect to specific courses of action to be taken in the Far East but that it was studying the problem from all angles.
[Page 806]With respect to Korea, Mr. Dulles stated that it had long been his personal opinion that it probably was neither wise nor feasible to try to hold the line of the Yalu. However, he did believe, and this had been confirmed to him by General Van Fleet, that there was a definite morale problem with the soldiers and people of the Republic of Korea. It would be difficult for them to continue to suffer great losses if they had no hope of creating an eventually economically and politically viable country. If the territory of the Republic of Korea could be increased so that it included territory up to the waist, that would mean some 85% of the population of Korea would be within Republic of Korea boundaries and the industrial complex above the 38th parallel would be part of the Republic’s economy. This would make possible an economically viable country and a one-third shorter line at the waist, which would be easier for the South Koreans to defend. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he did not know what the military cost of such an operation would be and that it might be determined that this cost was excessive. This was a matter for the military. The Secretary emphasized that even an operation designed to push the line north of the waist might require, as an incident, air action in Manchuria. He did not wish to exclude this possibility.
Mr. Eden seemed to agree with the general lines taken by the Secretary but the only statement he made was that he hoped that before any major action was taken his government would be consulted. He said he did not necessarily want to impose a veto on any action but merely wanted to insure that the British not be taken by surprise.