Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

320/11–2452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

secret
niact

New York, November 24, 1952—11:54 p.m.

Delga 252. Dept pass New Delhi niact; sent New Delhi niact 3. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Please see Nehru urgently on basis following:

1. This afternoon in UN Political Comite, shortly after Vyshinsky flatly turned down Indian resolution on Korea, Secretary made very friendly speech¹ praising India and Menon for great statesmanship. He emphasized common purpose and satisfaction that Indian proposal based on principle of no force against PW’s. While noting that there are a number of problems with Indian resolution, with exception of para 17 Indian draft Secretary did not stress though he mentioned changes which US considers desirable.

2. Re para 17, Secretary made point that Menon’s speech clearly indicated that his intentions were the same as those of US, but that draft resolution did not carry out these intentions. Secretary made following points:

(a) Though not absolutely adamant, US has grave doubts of desirability of sending problem of disposition of non-repatriates to political conference. Repatriation question has been subject of futile debates Panmunjom for eight months and for weeks at GA comite. It is hardly likely that political conference will make any greater progress towards agreement this subject. Stressing US has agreed to recommended political conference and has no objection to conference for purpose originally agreed, Secretary pointed out that progress toward solution of difficult problem of peaceful unification of Korea will not be aided by opening conference with bitter deadlock over PW question. Further it is difficult to see purpose of discussion this question at conference. It is not intended that conference should discuss forcible repatriation, since UN position and Indian resolution outlaw this possibility. If only question is disposition of non-repatriates, i.e., where they should be resettled, political conference is hardly best body for that purpose. That question should preferably go to UN which will have responsibility of care and resettlement.

(b) Menon draft, even as revised, makes no provision for release of non-repatriates from detention. This question is left to political conference which will probably never reach agreement. Indian revision puts care and maintenance of these persons in hands of UN, but still leaves them in indefinite captivity despite Menon’s speech to effect that this should not be done.

(c) Keeping PW’s not repatriated in indefinite captivity would violate principles of law and humanity. Indian draft obviously did not mean to do that.

(d) Repatriation Commission must dispose of PW’s within brief period. If any not repatriated they must be released to and cared for by agency of UN.

3. Secretary concluded by expressing confidence that in view of common intentions and purposes, agreement on necessary changes these paras will be forthcoming and all can give blessing to Indian resolution. He stressed that despite Vyshinsky’s rejection no country can long resist united moral judgment, and expressed continued hope that armistice will result.

4. US places highest value on Indian support for resolution which Assembly will adopt. To this end US prepared to support Indian version with absolute minimum of amendments. Discussions with Menon here indicate that we might be able work out some desirable amendments in various paras of resolution other than para 17. US does, however, consider essential amendments to para 17 which meet points made by Secretary above. Nehru also will appreciate need for clarity on issue para 17. We cannot agree to indefinite negotiation this subject, particularly when after armistice Commies will rebuild air fields and we might find ourselves discussing non-repatriates under pressure and threat of renewed Commie aggression.

5. You should urge in the strongest terms, therefore, that Nehru instruct Menon himself to introduce, or to accept, “clarifications” to meet above points on para 17. US feels strongly that best version of para 17 would read:

“17. Within 120 days after the armistice agreement has been signed and becomes effective, the Repatriation Commission shall release to UNKRA (unless prior to such date another United Nations agency shall have been designated for this purpose) any PWs not repatriated in accordance with the procedures set out above. UNKRA shall have the duty of care and the settlement of such persons on a voluntary basis.”²

You should point out that in this way a conference will in fact begin at least 30 days prior to release of non-repatriates from detention and any agreements or proceedings at conference can be taken into account in disposition of PWs.

For your information we would like India to accept above text and, even if it should abstain on para, still vote for its resolution as a whole. If, however, price of Indian adherence to its own resolution is some mention of political conference in para 17, US prepared to agree to following as absolute maximum:

“17. At end of 90 days after the armistice agreement has been signed, the disposition, consistent with para 3 of this resolution, of any prisoners-of-war, whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further 30 days, there are any prisoners-of-war whose disposition has not been provided for by the political conference, they shall be released to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (unless prior to such date another United Nations agency shall have been designated for this purpose) which shall have the responsibility for their care and settlement on a humanitarian basis.”

6. We hope you can persuade Nehru to instruct Menon along the lines indicated. If India will not go along with even latter version, US will, nevertheless, be forced to seek necessary amendments para 17 and will propose first text quoted above.

In your discussion with Nehru, you shld not go beyond urging first alternative text para 5 above. If Nehru insists India cld not live with resolution containing this version as final para, you may offer Nehru second version, but this shld not be done before receipt confirming tel³ which will follow shortly.

Acheson

1. For text of Vyshinsky’s and Acheson’s speeches, see UN document A/C.1/SR.529.
2. According to Delga 253, sent also as niact telegram 4 from New York to New Delhi, Nov. 25, 1952, this final phrase should have read “on a humanitarian basis”, a change which would “make it easier for Nehru to accept” (320/11–2552).
3. In telegram Delga 253, Nov, 25, 1952, the Ambassador in New Delhi received authorization to offer Nehru the second version of paragraph 17, if it became necessary.