Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795B.11/2–1552

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret
official–informal

Pusan, February 15, 1952.

Dear John: I trust that you will have seen our three part telegram regarding Syngman Rhee and the forthcoming presidential elections here (Embassy telegram No. 804 February 14).¹

We discussed including an additional section regarding the United States influence in the elections. I decided against it, however, since it is a pretty touchy subject and am sending you my views on the question in this letter.

It is pretty clear that fate has not dealt us a good hand of cards in the coming election. As we pointed out in our telegram, Rhee is becoming increasingly recalcitrant and senile. While he is president no one else seems to have the guts to stand up to him. Two of the other possible candidates, Yi Pom-suk and Sin Ik-hi, are pretty crummy from our point of view. The best two, Chang Myon and Ho Chong, lack popular followings and are somewhat weak.

A trade of Rhee’s re-election for a system of cabinet responsibility to the National Assembly would be one way of cutting Rhee down to size in the absence of another strong candidate. Rhee wouldn’t have it, however, and I think it would be “out of the frying pan, into the fire”, since the Koreans, I feel certain, would be totally unable to make a parliamentary system work.

Chang Myon’s chances in an election by the National Assembly are probably our best hope. As we mentioned in our telegram the fact that the United States is thought to like him is perhaps his greatest strength within the Assembly. If our influence in the elections, however, became anything like a public issue, I think that the Assembly’s sensitive feelings ROK dignity would flare up and Chang’s close ties with the United States would be a liability rather than an asset.

This delicate situation makes an open position of neutrality between candidates essential for the Embassy. For the time being I feel that the best tactic is to let Rhee and other “subtle” operators know that we are continuously aware of their maneuverings. My most recent move with Rhee in this direction is reported in despatch No. 237 February 14.² If this is not wholly effective, however, the opportunity exists for us to take a very firm stand with Rhee and others in his Government on the observance of the principles of constitutional government and the holding of free elections. They must be made to understand the serious consequences of their use of political intimidation and realize that totalitarian tactics would be bound to prejudice future United Nations support for the ROK.

At the same time we will do what we can to strengthen National Assembly backbones by reassuring key members of the Assembly’s right to vote independently without fear that the Assembly’s decision might be disregarded and the cause of reprisals. The strengthened UNCURK which I mentioned in my telegram No. 796, February 12,³ would help us materially in these efforts. It would also have the specific advantage of showing that the observance of constitutional practices was not just a matter of US interest.

I do not know the background for the Department’s request for our views on possible candidates other than Rhee, although I realize, of course, that it was a most reasonable request (and one that we were in the process of trying to anticipate). I wondered, however, if the specific occasion of the Department’s sending it might not have been an expression of opinion by another Government agency⁴ as to how the vexing problem of the ROK presidency might be solved. I trust that any plans of influencing the course of ROK politics will be thoroughly coordinated in the Department. The delicacy of the situation is such and the chances of plans misfiring or boomeranging so great that I feel I should be informed of any instructions affecting the operations in this field of any group here.

My very best regards,

Sincerely,

John

1. This was an 8-page telegram appraising potential candidates for the ROK presidency other than Rhee and estimating their chances against Rhee, as well as assessing Rhee’s physical health, not printed (795B.11/2–1452).
2. Supra.
3. Not printed (357.AD/2–1252).
4. The reference here is to the CIA. McClurkin later assured Allison that the Department of State query was in no way an expression of opinion by “another government agency”, but rather a product of the curiosity of the members of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and “was perhaps influenced by our subconscious and sometimes conscious desire that Korea could find a new and better President.” (Memorandum to Allison from McClurkin, Mar. 6, 1952; 795B.00/3–652)