As I have found that on such occasions it is more effective to state my
case and to refrain from argument or discussion until perhaps a later
date, I adopted this tactic on this occasion. I gained the impression
that the President, who had got up from a sick bed to talk with me, was
somewhat shaken by what I had to say. He had very little comment to make
and I expect he will do a good deal of thinking and speculating on the
significance of my remarks. Regardless of any effect this may have on
his actions, I believe it will do some good just to tip him off that we
are closely following some of his more devious activities.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
Korea (Muccio)
secret
[Pusan, February 12, 1952.]
I decided that it was time for me to make President Rhee aware of the fact that we knew
of some of his more nefarious maneuvers.
[Page 48]
I called by appointment to deliver the note in connection with the
ROK proclamation of sovereignty
over the high seas.1 I then mentioned to President
Rhee that I was finding it
increasingly difficult to explain to my government certain
manifestations here and that I hoped he would be well enough in the
next few days so that I could sit down and discuss with him this
matter that is disturbing me a great deal. He immediately urged that
I tell him what the problem was. I hesitated since he is very low
from a persistent cold.
At his insistence, I mentioned that there was the UN Commission,
several other US Governmental agencies and many intelligence
agencies reporting on developments on the peninsula and that Korea
was in fact living in a “goldfish bowl” due to the large number of
press representatives and intelligence sources from all over the
world. I mentioned that CIC and
ROK
CIC and other intelligence units
were so interwoven, we could hardly expect either side to be able to
carry on any activities without the other knowing about it.
The President quickly inquired for specific cases. I mentioned that
in his address to the people of Seoul on January 28, he had made
certain derogatory remarks regarding General
Walker2 which had shocked
Washington and jarred all the military on the isthmus. For the
President to publicly challenge General
Walker’s gallant and courageous contribution
was simply incomprehensible. President Rhee merely said that he had been speaking
spontaneously and might have made such remarks, he could not recall,
and muttered that the many enemies of the government had undoubtedly
given me the wrong interpretation. This at least has made President
Rhee aware that we are
keeping tabs on his speeches. I have for some time been concerned by
General Van Fleet,
General Ridgway or I
being on public platforms with him when he harangues “no ceasefire”
and “on to the Yalu”.
I then said that the Embassy and UNCURK had reported as favorably as possible on the
NDC and Kochang scandals.3
Reports reaching Washington from other sources cited the parts
played therein by officers close to the President. This raised the
whole question of the caliber of the men selected by him. I cited
that General Kim Yun-kun, leader of the Youth
Corps and in charge of coralling manpower at the time of the retreat
last December and January and who was executed later was a man who
had been appointed by, received orders direct from and reported
[Page 49]
directly to the President.
On the Kochang incident, our controlled sources had reported that it
was “Tiger” Kim Chongwon who kept the investigating committee from
getting into Kochang by having some of his men fire on them as they
approached, for which he is now serving a three year term. Here
again was a man appointed by, reporting to and receiving
instructions directly from the President.
I then went on to mention that I had been queried by my superiors as
to the appointment to the important post of Home Minister of a man
as notorious as “Montana” Chang Sok-yun, a man
who had been publicly tried for misuse of appropriated funds and had
been a leader in the notorious Political Action plot.4
I then referred to the efforts to make the recent campaigns to arouse
anti-ceasefire clamor and public emotions appear “spontaneous”.
However, controlled American sources had reported on the official
orders issued to both the police and Youth Corps last June and the
specific order issued through the cabinet on November 29. This
touched the President off. He said, “Mr. Ambassador, you may tell
the Department of State that I will never accept a ceasefire”, and
went on that I should tell President Truman that he is mistaken in trying to negotiate
with the Communists. I pointed out that the Youth Corps in
particular were under his direct order and when one of the “Armband”
boys comes into my grounds and orders my chauffeur to attend a
“spontaneous” rally or when all the newspapers appear on one day as
they did on January 10 with almost identical editorials based on two
absolutely erroneous premises, it is hard to convince the people of
the world that this has not been directed by the ROK authorities. When President
Rhee excitedly replied
that Clarence Rhee might have done so but that
he didn’t know of it, I mentioned that I knew Clarence
Rhee very well and knew that he never made a move
without direction.
I finally said that these things had been mulling over in my mind for
some time and that I had now received a query as to whether the
reports received were true that the police and Youth Corps had been
used in at least three of the National Assembly by-elections on the
5th of February. President Rhee thereupon went into a long involved
dissertation on Korean politics repeating over and over that I knew
him and that the two of us had talked matters over very frankly and
openly in the past three years; that I had been misled and that
these reports came from his enemies in the U.S., and that I should
dismiss them as such.
I did not take exception or argue with him as I felt I would have
more influence with him, in the long run, by just letting him know
that I knew how he was acting. I ended by saying that I felt I was
at the
[Page 50]
end of my rope in two
vital matters: (1) in having to explain and justify some of the
activities of Korean officials and (2) in my attempts to allay the
widespread ROK distrust of US–UN
motives. I pointed out that this distrust is not new and cited as an
example his refusal to accept my assurances and General
Walker’s assurances that we were not
running out of Taegu and leaving the ROK to the mercies of the North Koreans last year. I
also referred to the deadlock on the Aid Agreement. I was jarred at
the attitude displayed during the long drawn out discussions. This
attitude was more akin to Communists fighting Fascists, than what
should prevail between allies who had fought side by side for twenty
months. He thereupon went into a long discussion of the Aid
Agreement which will be recorded elsewhere.5
