Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

320/11–1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

top secret
priority

New York, November 15, 1952—12:34 a.m.

Delga 196. Re Korea. Secretary discussed with Eden and Pearson¹ situation arising from Menon’s attempt to draft a resolution on Korea. Secretary said situation had now become very serious. There were three points in particular re Menon’s latest draft which it was simply impossible for us to accept:

(1) The affirmation that force should not be used against PWs to prevent or effect their return to their homelands was not included in the proposals which the President of the GA was requested to transmit to the other side as a basis for armistice agreement. After some discussion Pearson and Eden agreed that this was correct and that this feature should be changed.

(2) The resolution as now drafted provided that after 90 days PWs not repatriated should be turned over to some other body (Political Conference), a fact which made a mockery of the principle of no forced return. The Secretary pointed out result might be that we would have these people in captivity indefinitely and that this continuing situation might induce PWs to forcibly resist transfer to Repatriation Commission or might produce a future crisis. He did not see what the political conference could do to solve the remaining elements of the PW question unless indeed the British, French and others should unexpectedly unite with the opposition to effect a solution against our own desires. Secretary informed Eden and Pearson that in examining all possible types of solution for the PW question we had considered this particular one in Washington, that it has been turned down by unanimous decision of the JCS, and that the President had agreed with this decision.

(3) The resolution was still badly drafted: Impression was now given that numbered “proposals” would be written bodily into the armistice. Precise terms to be included in armistice must be discussed and worked out by General Clark and negotiators; it was his responsibility. Eden said he appreciated this, though Pearson at first attempted to argue that such matters should not be left to generals.

Secretary stated that British and Canadians, in encouraging Menon, were themselves running very great risks. He asked how they would like it if the US, the USSR, and some Latin Americans voted against a Menon draft resolution with the UK, Canada and a group of Asians voting in favor of it. Eden agreed this would be a very bad situation.

Secretary told Eden and Pearson reaction to latest Menon draft would have to be carefully formulated in Washington, and that it might be taken up next Tuesday in meeting with Truman and Eisenhower.²

Later Secretary asked Department that arrangements be made to have General Bradley, JCS and other Pentagon agencies available for work tomorrow, November 15. Department officials will discuss situation with them at that time.³ Secretary also requested General Bradley be alerted regarding possibility his coming to New York Sunday, November 16, for conference with Secretary, Lovett, Canadians and British.⁴

While Secy was discussing situation with Eden and Pearson, Gross held long conversation with Krishna Menon (India) re latter’s latest draft of res on Korea (transmitted to Dept in Delga 193)⁵ which had been received at USUN few minutes before Menon’s arrival.

Fol are salient points of conversation:

1. Gross made clear at outset he was not authorized to negotiate with Menon or to make any commitments whatever. Gross wished to ask Menon a few questions and did not even wish Menon to assume these were the only relevant questions re draft.

2. First substantive point raised by Gross dealt with fact that specific provision force shld not be used to prevent or effect return of PWs to their homeland was not included in proposals to be transmitted to other side as basis for armistice. This was left for preamble while reference to force made in para 8 might apply to gen discipline or anything else. Menon said this was a typographical error and that para 8 shld specifically make point force shld not be used to prevent or effect return. Menon insisted there was no significance in separation of res into two parts, only one of which wld be sent to negotiators. As far as he cld see the entire res might be transmitted, but it was more convenient to send those parts which were “mechanical”. After considerable discussion as to what constituted “mechanical” parts, he said he wld consider Gross suggestions but cld make no commitments.

3. In discussion re para 5 of draft res concerning freedom of parties to persuade PWs re their rights, Gross repeated point previously made to Menon by Secy that we objected to mental coercion and third degree methods as much as to any other kind of force. Menon stated it was not his purpose to permit third degree methods and that arrangements worked out by Repatriation Commission wld insure against that.

Menon stated same principle wld govern para 7 re freedom of PWs to communicate with Repatriation Comm. Gross accepted statement and pointed out this wld be placing another burden upon already heavy task confronting umpire.

4. Gross then raised basic point that we cannot accept res which confronts PWs with choice of either going back home or remaining in captivity indefinitely. Gross pointed out para 16 of Menon draft must be so construed.

5. Further, Gross emphasized two reasons why fate of PWs refusing to return shld not be remitted to Polit Conference. First PWs might resist transfer to custody of Repatriation Comm as much as they wld resist repatriation if they knew they wld continue indefinitely under constraint; and second, Polit Conference was designed to settle polit questions re Korea and PWs wld, therefore, become mere pawns in conference activities. Gross stated we did not wish to get into a situation in which we wld have to negot on repatriation after an armistice. Menon seemed somewhat impressed.

6. Menon said he thought that our objection arose from fact that para 16 seems to prohibit comm from releasing PWs and that we wished comm to be free to release them. Gross replied he did not wish to discuss drafting changes but at very least it shld be clear that comm wld be authorized to release PWs and not merely to turn them over bound hand and foot to Polit Conference. Menon thought concept that comm shld be “authorized” to release PWs was a little too positive. Gross stated he thought it wld be better to direct comm to release PWs but that bare minimum wld be to authorize such release. By “release”, Gross said he meant giving PWs actual physical freedom to go where they wished provided country of destination was willing to receive them. Menon demurred, stating PWs shld not be permitted to go to Formosa. Gross evaded detailed discussion this question.

7. In this connection, Menon said he wanted to tell Gross frankly, but not for quotation, that there wld undoubtedly be no problem re Korean PWs; that as to Chinese he had reason to believe that ChiComs wld not expect all Chinese PWs to return home. Gross asked whether Menon meant that some Chinese PWs were considered “Chiang Kaishek agents” and Menon said “yes”.

8. In discussion re release of non-repatriates, Menon referred to length of time for which each prisoner wld be in custody of Repatriation Comm. He thought this wld become a problem because of provision for delivery of PWs in agreed numbers.

Therefore, he was inclined to think that if it were possible for him to modify para 16 so as to authorize the comm eventually to release non-repatriates, he might have to change the time period to refer to a minimum of 90 days from the time any particular prisoner was transferred to the comm. Gross indicated he was disturbed by this comment because it showed that Menon considered detention period as a sort of “purge” period. This was not our view. US wish to assure PWs wld be processed as rapidly as possible and regarded time limit as maximum periods for that procedure. Gross felt that any attempt to use time limit as a minimum period of detention wld do violence to purposes for which whole procedure was being arranged.

9. In course of discussion re unacceptability present version para 16, Menon remarked it wld not help particularly if US agreed to this res. Gross asked whether Menon meant it wld help if US opposed the res; what help wld it be to Indians and UN if Commies were led to accept a bad res on ground US opposed it? Menon said this was not his meaning but that he thought it wld help if we abstained. Gross said US wld not abstain on any res it believed to be bad; either there wld be a good res or US wld vote against it. Gross then asked Menon whether he had reason to believe ChiComs wld accept this or any res. Menon replied that so far as he knew no summary or text had gone to Peking. In response to further questions, he said he had impression ChiComs might accept something along these lines, but that impression was based on “climate” and “inferences”. Reverting to substance para 16, Menon said he felt Polit Conference cld reach quick decision; that it wld be so composed as to permit it to make decisions of this sort; and that in all probability UN element opposing forced repatriation wld be in majority. (Selwyn Lloyd made similar observation to Gross this morning and was probably source of Menon’s idea.) Gross ended this phase of discussion by stating that as he saw it Menon’s reasoning was wholly fallacious. Commies in the Polit Conference cld stall decisions easily, and conference was not intended or constructed to discuss armistice problems.

10. Conversation then turned to composition and operations of Repatriation Comm. Gross remarked that assuming an umpire cld be agreed upon, which he doubted, umpire wld be overloaded with decisions and his position wld be especially difficult if he became involved in question of fate of PWs after they were turned over to Polit Conference. Gross asked Menon whether he had any reason to believe ChiComs wld be prepared to agree to an umpire. Menon said he had not and that there might be real difficulties on this point. Hence he had included in his draft provision for referring matter to GA if Repatriation Comm did not reach agreement within three weeks.

Gross asked if Menon meant that GA wld then be expected to designate an umpire. Menon sought to evade this question and finally said this wld be a natural assumption because there wld be no one else who cld do it. Gross repeated point previously made to Menon that we wanted to be sure comm wld not deadlock on a basis which wld reduce whole problem from a moral issue clearly understood throughout the world to a technical issue on a procedural problem. Therefore, negotiators shld be given discretion and opportunity to work out arrangement which both sides felt was workable. That cld not be done in NY. Menon denied vigorously anything in present draft res tied negotiator’s hands and stated he thought he had limited himself to minimum details acceptable to ChiComs.

11. In view of heavy US responsibility under UN decisions for carrying out mil operations and serious consequences of any unacceptable GA recommendations, Gross personally expressed view a great disservice wld be done to India itself, US and all our friends if Menon tabled a res prematurely. Gross referred in some detail to discussion with 21 cosponsors. He stated they unanimously agreed it wld be very desirable if Menon wld circulate to co-sponsors a copy of his draft before he submitted it formally to GA. Menon saw great difficulties in this procedure. He said he was under great pressure; leaks were occurring; he had been under instructions for a week to submit some res. Gross commented that his objective wld not be achieved if he were to incur resentment of a group of 21 countries. Gross admitted circulating anything to so large a number wld be almost tantamount to releasing text publicly, but wld not have formal aspects of submission of res. Menon said he was giving present text to the Russians. Gross expressed regret, stating this was bad way to keep res conf. Menon replied he was not so much interested in Russian attitude. He cld tell Russians that any time res cld be changed. In his view ChiComs wld make decisions with or without consulting Russians. He realized this was not our point of view. However, we had failed to follow Indian advice. If we had not crossed 38th Parallel Chinese wld not have intervened. We had made mistake of bombing Yalu River plants just as Chinese were at point of agreeing to an armistice. Gross said he cld not go into these problems; he did not have adequate information; but we must face situation as it exists today. Gross stressed importance of retaining maximum of solidarity in GA. Most members of GA, he pointed out, wld support 21-power draft and we were perfectly willing to go ahead with it. We might change it in some particulars but not substantially and we cld get a two-thirds majority. Menon stated that he wanted to make certain US wld not oppose his res and therefore promised, reluctantly, he wld not circulate his draft before Nov 17 or 18, promising he wld meanwhile think over this conversation.

Acheson

1. The meetings described in this telegram took place on Nov. 14.
2. Eisenhower, accompanied by Lodge and Joseph M. Dodge, met with Truman and his principal Cabinet officers and advisers on the afternoon of Tuesday, Nov. 18, 1952, for an hour and 15 minutes. Among the matters discussed was Korea. For Truman’s account of the meeting, see his Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 514–521. For Eisenhower’s assessment of the meeting, see his Mandate for Change, p. 85; Acheson’s Present at the Creation, p. 702, gives the Secretary’s perspective on the portions of the meeting which dealt with the situation in New York.
3. See the memorandum of discussion at the State-JCS meeting, Nov. 15, p. 634.
4. For the report of this conference, see p. 637.
5. Dated Nov. 14, p. 623.