795.00/11–1452
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)
Subject:
- Developments in Korea.
1. Internal Political Situation
CIA Reports received in the Department on November 10 indicate the possibility of a coup d’état occurring in Korea some time at the end of November or early December. Two factions are reported to have recently developed in Korea and are presently plotting the overthrow of the Rhee Government. It appears that both groups fear a coup by [Page 626] the other and there is no indication that they might combine their efforts in their common objective.
One group is reported to be headed by John Chang, former Korean Ambassador to the United States and former Prime Minister, and by Cho Bong-Am, a converted Communist and runner-up to Rhee in the last presidential election. This group receives its support from the military headed by General Yi Chong Chan, former Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army and now attending Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.
The second group, which times its coup d’état for early December, is headed by Chong Il-Kwon, former Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army and currently Deputy Commander of the United States[?] 8th Corps and Sin Song Mo, former Minister of National Defense.
Although CIA received these reports from a well-evaluated source, the Embassy’s appraisal is to deny their veracity (Pusan’s Top Secret telegram No. 628).1 Ambassador Muccio, DRF, and Army G–2 view these reports with great scepticism. We do, too.
2. Republic of Korea Behavior in the United Nations
On Wednesday, November 5, Foreign Minister Pyun made a long and impassioned speech before the Political Committee,2 in which he laid the blame for the Korean hostilities at the door of the Soviet Union. In denying Republic of Korea guilt for initiating the hostilities, he said that although his Government desired to unify Korea by force if necessary, during the period 1949–1950 the United States had denied the Government sufficient military assistance, including small arms, sufficient to accomplish the task. He likewise made it clear that it was his Government’s firm and lasting desire to unify Korea under the Republic of Korea Government and that it would never condone any armistice arrangements which left the country divided. In his speech of November 10 before the Political Committee, Vishinsky found no trouble in exploiting Pyun’s remarks to refute the Secretary’s careful and elaborate case on Communist responsibility for the aggression of June 25, 1950.
On November 11, the Korean Delegation circulated a lengthy pamphlet (46 pages), copies of which have not yet been received by the Department, in which the Korean Government, with an accompanying fanfare of propaganda, demands arms for two million men so that they may unify Korea and condemns the armistice negotiations as a hoax and a Communist plot. Member Delegates deplored Foreign Minister Pyun’s speech as being inept and inappropriate and have likewise condemned the circulation of this propaganda pamphlet. The United States [Page 627] Delegation has asked our advice on any measures to stop the Korean end runs.
On a more helpful note, Ambassador Muccio reports that Ambassador Yang wants him to look over the draft of his (Yang) forthcoming speech before the Political Committee.
3. UNKRA
Kingsley’s3 meetings with General Clark were highly successful, leading to agreement in principle on joint planning and execution of programs, and that UNKRA should carry out a $70 million program during this fiscal year. Kingsley presented the program on November 10 to his United Nations Advisory Committee. He candidly recounted his difficult conversations with President Rhee, who wants full control over Korea’s reconstruction and leaves a real doubt whether he wants UNKRA “in Korea” at all. This revelation has greatly disturbed the Canadians and the British. It is evident that UNKRA faces a major political hurdle in commencing the program. It is Kingsley’s view, with which we tend to concur, that he should get full backing from governments and then present the program to Rhee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is some indication that the British and Canadians would like to see agreement reached with the Republic of Korea before Advisory Committee approval. The program is to be considered again by the Advisory Committee on November 24. The interested governments are to have positions by that date. Pyun’s tactics in New York and Rhee’s intransigence with Kingsley have together had a discouraging impact on the Canadians and the British, who are wondering if they shouldn’t “chuck” the whole UNKRA effort.
The other major UNKRA problem is whether the joint Army and UNKRA program as agreed in Tokyo can actually be carried out within the framework of stabilization. This is now being studied both in the field and here.
4. Payments to Republic of Korea
Eighteen million dollars was paid to the Republic of Korea on November 7, representing monthly installments due under the May 24 exchange of notes through the month of September. Before the payment was made, it was necessary for State to write a letter to Army, however, [Page 628] and there were once again muttered threats by the Republic of Korea to cut off won advances. We have written a further letter to Army pointing out the disadvantages to the United States of delays, and urging that during the first week of each month the installment for the previous month should be paid or else the Republic of Korea be told exactly why we are withholding payment. General Marquat is pushing in the same direction.
(11/17/52)
Since the above was written, the Republic of Korea has informed the Command that all advances of won will cease as of December 15, 1952 “unless all outstanding dollar payments for won advances be made at once”. This announcement is contained in a letter to Admiral Hanlon from the Acting Prime Minister, Paek Tu Chin (see Pusan’s telegrams No. 630 and 631 of November 15).4 Representatives of the Embassy and the Command have been meeting in Pusan to work out recommendations to Washington which should be reaching here at any time.
- This five-page telegram, dated Nov. 14, 1952, is not printed (795B.00/11–1452).↩
- The speech was given on Monday, Nov. 3, not Nov. 5; see UN document A/C.1/SR.518.↩
- J. Donald Kingsley was Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which was established by Resolution 410 (V) of the General Assembly, Dec. 1, 1950, and which was directed by that resolution to plan, initiate, and carry out a program of relief and reconstruction in Korea with the expectation of an early peace on the Korean peninsula. Peace, of course, did not come to Korea. UNKRA therefore worked out an agreement with the UNC, which took effect on Jan. 1, 1952, allowing it to undertake relief and rehabilitation projects during the period of hostilities with the mutual agreement and cooperation of the UNC. The understanding did acknowledge, however, the UNC’s primary responsibility for relief and economic aid to the ROK during the period of active hostilities and for 180 days thereafter (UN document A/2222, pp. 1–3).↩
- Neither printed (both 795B.5 MSP/11–1552).↩