Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/9—1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

secret

Washington, September 19, 1952—7:29 p.m.

126. 1. As you are aware Dept has obtained reactions several govts participating in Korean action (UK, Australia, Fr, Can, New Zealand, South Africa) to preliminary Departmental thinking on handling Korean case at 7th GA. Dept has re-examined its position in light comments these govts, and will continue do so, taking into acct also developments at Panmunjom. We believe, however, that in view of press reports concerning US negots with above dels which have already reached other participating govts, and in view gen interest in Korean item by all UN membs, time has come extend negots to other friendly dels.

2. Suggest negots shld be undertaken first with participating govts, including those mentioned above to whom previous working paper² was distributed. To latter you shld indicate that Dept’s present thinking has taken into acct their comments re first part working paper; US does not consider it desirable raise stage 2 with others at present. New approach does not imply that US has given up idea of further efforts at later stage in 7th GA, and we continue desire their views as to what shld be done if GA action outlined below brings no results and it becomes clear that there is no reasonable likelihood that continued patient negot will achieve armis. As you know we will be discussing this matter with UK here next week. Dept will also discuss this aspect with Fr and Commonwealth Govts listed in Wash in near future.

a. We recognize difficulty of discussing Korean question without being able report on proceedings and US plans at Panmunjom. In gen, however, you may indicate that UNC will continue exhaust every possibility for reaching agreement at Panmunjom prior to GA.

b. Fol approach is based on assumption that when Assembly convenes we will not have achieved armis in Panmunjom, and there will be no increased likelihood achieving such armis at that time. On this assumption, we believe that situation at Panmunjom will be such as to show that UNC has made every effort achieve honorable armis, and that achievement armis depends entirely upon Commies giving up insistence on forcible repatriation PWs.

c. In circumstances, US believes that GA shld take up Korean question at very early stage in session. Korean question was not discussed at 6th session because it was then felt that discussion wld hamper Panmunjom negots and wld not contribute to armis. At this stage, with negots reduced to one specific point and with no progress on this point in many months, discussion and appropriate GA action cannot hurt chances of armis and indeed might improve them. Further, while US continues believe that armis is mil question and that negot on specific issues shld be conducted directly by parties in field, we recognize strong UN interest in question and desire of membs to discuss it.

d. As to substance discussion: US continues desire and hope for armis and to make every effort conducive to that end; we recognize similar desire on part all non-Commie countries. Discussion and action by GA shld, therefore, be such as is calculated to help achieve an armis. US believes also that it is paramount importance to maintain and demonstrate unity and determination non-Commie UN membs on behalf early end to Korean fighting in accordance with UN principles. We believe cause of peace wld be served by firm and overwhelming stand by UN membs in support of UNC position on outstanding issue at Panmunjom and GA request to Commies to agree to armis on basis these positions.

e. We believe that position which UNC has taken on PW question is entirely right and only one UN can take. We further believe this position fully supported by free peoples throughout world. UNC has made it clear that it has no desire retain any single POW; or to send PWs to any particular country; PWs resisting repatriation wld be released from PW status and free to go to any available destination of their own choice. UNC has made it clear that it is prepared consider any possible solution for impasse on POW question consistent with basic objection to forcible repatriation. UNC has offered various alternatives to Commies, including impartial procedures for determining desires of individ POWs; proposals to save Commie face by not compelling them admit publicly that they have accepted principle of non-forcible repatriation. We have also offered them devices which wld help play down fact that number of their PWs refuse return. Commies have remained adamant. UNC recognizes that there may be additional variants on UNC proposals which cld be suggested, but it cannot see that these wld be any more acceptable to Commies. If Commies before or during GA show slightest indication of interest in exploring any particular suggestion consistent with basic principle non-forcible repatriation UNC prepared to negotiate at Panmunjom and to make all possible progress towards arms.

f. US believes that useful action which GA cld take at this stage is overwhelming vote for res along fol lines:

“The General Assembly

“Noting with approval the efforts of the UN negotiators to achieve a just and honorable armistice to bring an end to the fighting in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles;

“Noting further that disagreement on one remaining issue alone has to date prevented the achievement of such an armistice;

“Endorses the positions which the United Nations negotiators have taken on the issues on which agreement has been reached, as well as on the question still in issue;

“Calls upon the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by responding favorably to the outstanding proposals of the UN negotiators;

“Requests the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities and to report to the General Assembly, as soon as he deems appropriate, upon any reply received or the absence of any reply.”

g. US wld also be interested views other govts as to further steps which cld be taken in event flat negative reaction by Commie above res.

4. Your comments on above requested.

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Henkin and cleared with Johnson, Allen, Bonbright, Stelle, and Hickerson.
2. For a text, see p. 454.