FE files, lot 55 D 128
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Subject:
- Future Tactics in Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- Admiral Fechteler
- Admiral Libby
- FE—U. Alexis Johnson
At the meeting held today from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in the Office of the Secretary of State, the foregoing persons discussed the next step in the Korean armistice negotiations with particular references to the differences in point of view that developed yesterday in the meeting between representatives of the Department of State and the JCS.1
The points of view expressed may be summarized as follows:
The Secretary of Defense stated that, at the request of the President, he together with the Service Secretaries of [and] the JCS had met on Monday2 with the President to reply to certain questions from the President concerning the general military situation in Korea as well as the armistice negotiations. He stated that all those present had expressed to the President complete unanimity of view (contrary to, for example, such matters as Formosa) on the strength of our military position in Korea and the undesirability of making any further concessions to the Communists in the armistice negotiations. At Mr. Lovett’s request, Admiral Fechteler outlined what had been stated to the President concerning differences in point of view between State and Defense on future tactics in the armistice negotiations. Admiral Fechteler stated that (1) there was agreement between State and Defense that a unilateral indefinite recess of the negotiations should be called pending receipt of a constructive proposal from the Communists, (2) Defense did not agree with State’s view that prior to the declaring of such a recess a [Page 523] “new offer” be made to the Communists and (3) Defense did not agree with State that if such a “new offer” was to be made it should be accompanied by a statement from the President.
The JCS and the Secretary of Defense consider that the substance of the proposal contained in the draft Presidential statement transmitted to General Clark in JCS 9179273 should not be made. On the one hand the proposal would represent such a departure from our previous “package proposal” as to indicate to the Communists a weakening in our position from the principle of non-forcible repatriation and therefore lead the Communists to expect further concessions on our part. On the other hand, if the proposal were accepted by the Communists it would be undesirable from a military point of view to leave this unresolved issue for further negotiations following an armistice as the Communists could use the period in the armistice for a buildup of their forces in overwhelming strength and then renew hostilities upon the basis of the absence of a resolution of the question with POWs, or could, in subsequent negotiations on the POW questions, extort undesirable political consequences from the US in exchange for Communist agreement on the POW question. The JCS and the Department of Defense also consider it important that the unilateral indefinite recess of the meetings at Panmunjom be declared by the UNC Delegation in order to impress the Communists with the firmness of our position. Therefore, the JCS and the Department of Defense consider that the UNC Delegation should immediately declare such a recess following conclusion of a meeting at which the UNC Delegation would present a review of the proposals that it has thus far made on the POW question and several additional variants thereon, on which the Departments of State and Defense are in agreement. It is the opinion of the JCS and the Department of Defense that this action, coupled with continuation of present and increasing military pressures, offer the best hope of forcing the Communists to accept our present position or come forward with a proposal consistent with our position on non-forcible repatriation which we could consider. Admiral Fechteler stated that the fact that one of our conventional F–4U fighters had recently succeeded in destroying a MIG in aerial combat indicated that the caliber of Communist pilots was going down and that the Communists were feeling the pinch of attrition of their pilots. The Secretary of Defense stated that our production of combat aircraft was now such that one month’s production was equivalent to our total of losses of aircraft in Korea from all causes for one year. Our general military strength was rapidly improving and we could indefinitely maintain our present military pressure in Korea. Admiral Fechteler expressed the view that if the Communists did agree to an armistice upon the basis of the suggestion of the Department of State, it would be important that there be no diminution in our military [Page 524] strength in Korea pending a resolution of the POW question, but that there would be heavy domestic pressures for “bringing the boys home” and reducing our rearmament effort.
The Secretary of State explained that we viewed the situation in much the same way as Defense and the JCS. We agreed that the problem was one of bringing additional pressure on the Communists to agree to an armistice. There were three fields in which these pressures could be brought: military, political and economic. From what he understood of the situation and from what had thus far been said he was not clear how it was possible to bring much additional military pressure. He noted that the Communists’ artillery and mortar fire on the front had greatly increased during recent weeks and therefore it did not seem that the Communists were feeling a severe pinch in their supply lines to the front. He stated that in the political field there was little that could be effective and one of the few things being open was the not-likely possibility that the free nations with diplomatic representation in Peiping would be persuaded to sever such relations—it was even conceivable that the Chinese would welcome such a step. We were therefore hoping that a proper platform could be constructed from which we could endeavor to obtain additional economic pressures. The UN General Assembly would be opening the middle of October and unless it was convinced that the UNC had exhausted every reasonable effort to obtain an armistice there would be strong pressures upon us to do something more. We desired to forestall those pressures by unmistakably demonstrating that we had already taken every reasonable step. Whether we liked it or not, the Mexican proposal had been made and was the subject of wide discussion and we could expect further discussion on it at the General Assembly. The UK and Canada with the support of Australia and New Zealand were urging on us the desirability of making a proposal such as that suggested by State. State entirely concurred that it was important to disabuse the Communists of any impression that our willingness to meet periodically indicated lack of firmness on our position on the fundamental issues and therefore also entirely concurred with Defense and the JCS that a unilateral indefinite recess shortly be called. As we viewed the situation the problem was one of building the best possible platform upon which to bring about such a unilateral recess. The question was therefore whether in the overall point of view State’s suggestion left us in a worse or a better position. In the contingency that the proposal was rejected by the Communists we would be in a much more favorable position in the UN General Assembly by having unmistakably demonstrated that we had exhausted every reasonable effort to obtain an armistice; unless the GA was satisfied that all reasonable proposals had been made there would be strong efforts difficult to resist to have the UNC put forward such proposals or in some manner transfer the negotiations from Panmunjom [Page 525] to the GA, which of course would be most undesirable; also, having taken such a step and having it rejected by the Communists would place us in a position to resolve the issue by unilaterally releasing the non-repatriates, thereby facing the Communists with a fait accompli incapable of further negotiation. In the contingency that the Communists accepted the proposal we did not see how the fears of JCS and Defense were justified. We would have succeeded in obtaining return of our own prisoners; if the Communists desired to renew hostilities there were many other pretexts other than the prisoner issue upon which they could do so; the armistice was not contingent upon subsequently reaching agreement upon the question of the remaining POWs and therefore if they renewed hostilities the Communists would do so in the face of “greater sanctions” statement which would have been issued; as we retain on our side the non-repatriates we are under no compulsion to obtain Communist agreement on the remaining POWs; and there were so many other questions not likely to be resolved in subsequent political negotiations that the addition thereto of the POW issue would not be a significant factor in whether or not those political negotiations succeed in reaching a definitive peace settlement.
The Secretary of State stated that he recognized that it could not be categorically said that either position was entirely right or entirely wrong and that the question was of such importance that the President should be given the opportunity to hear both points of view and reach a decision thereon. Mr. Lovett agreed and Mr. Acheson stated that he would get in touch with him later in the day concerning a meeting with the President on the matter.4