795.00/9—852: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State
priority
218. Re Lie’s proposed trip to Europe. Trygve Lie informed me in strict confidence last night he has decided to make a quick trip to London and Paris this week to discuss Korea with Eden (and Churchill, if possible) and with Schuman. He inquired again concerning our “working paper” on Korea and told me frankly he had been informed of such paper by both the UK and Fr dels in separate conversations here. He seemed to be aware of its contents. I replied to him in the sense suggested by Messrs. Sandifer and Popper in telecon with them Sept 2.1Lie said he would like to see the paper before leaving for Europe. I was non-committal.
[Page 490]Lie went on to elaborate his own views which he hoped to discuss in London and Paris as follows: He does not believe broader economic measures or political measures will be agreed to by British and French nor that they would be of great practical value even if adopted by a bare two-thirds majority of the assembly. He feels Korea is “the one big UN issue” and that the future of the UN is heavily involved in what happens next. On the assumption of no armistice prior to the GA, he feels it would be necessary and desirable to discuss the Korean question in the Assembly.
In his view, the only action which will have any meaning from the point of view of maintaining UN solidarity as well as impressing the Commies would be the provision of additional forces in Korea. He wants to press this point with the Brit and Fr Govts, urging them to take an initiative to provide more forces and to urge other West Eur countries to do likewise. Lie will undertake to do what he can to persuade Belgians, Dutch and Scandinavians to increase troop contributions. He would point out that the continuing stalemate in the armistice talks causes profound concern in American public opinion which is already strongly critical of the failure of other UN members to contribute a fair share of fighting forces in Korea. Moreover, he would argue that such action is the only language the Commies understand and would be more likely than anything else to induce them to agree to an armistice. He believes it is wholly unrealistic for the Brit and Fr to oppose additional economic or political measures unless they come forward with an alternative, and the provision of more troops is the only practical alternative which Lie sees.
I told Lie I would like to have an opportunity to talk with him further on Tuesday, Sept 9, after obtaining guidance from the Dept. I outlined the arguments in favor of seeking GA action on economic and political measures, particularly in the event Commies should reject a preliminary GA resolution calling for a Korean armistice.
We agreed to meet Tuesday, Sept 9, at 11:00 a.m. I would appreciate urgent advice from Dept.2
- In response to a request by UN Secretary-General Lie for information on the U.S. working paper, Gross was authorized to inform Lie orally that the working paper did exist and to outline for him its contents. Furthermore, he was to tell Lie that the paper was now under consideration at the Department of State and that it has been communicated to certain governments to get their reactions. The Secretary-General would understand, Sandifer and Popper continued, that the Department of State could not provide him with copies of such working documents (memorandum of conversation, by Popper, Sept. 2, 1952;795.00/9–252).↩
- See telegram 109, infra.↩