Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 653, “Korea”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

top secret

[Washington,] September 3, 1952.

Subject:

• Korean Armistice Proposal

In the Panmunjom negotiations the UNC has already indicated that it is prepared to return 83,000 odd prisoners of war in exchange for the 12,000 UN prisoners the custody of which the Communists have admitted. The UNC has further proposed that an armistice be concluded on the basis of such an exchange and that the remaining prisoners in our hands be rescreened thereafter, provided the Communists agree to abide by the results of such rescreening.

In recent weeks the Communist press in the United States has been proposing a cease fire in Korea and the later political negotiation of the problem of prisoners of war. This proposal, voiced also by the Progressive Party presidential candidate, has been carried by the official press in the Soviet Union.

The UNC can obviously not accept a cease fire except as part of an armistice and it obviously cannot conclude an armistice that would leave UN prisoners in the Communists’ hands. However, since the UNC is prepared to conclude an armistice if it can secure the return of UN prisoners and if it is only required to return those who have indicated their willingness to go back to the Communists, it may be possible to take the initiative in seeking a conclusion of the hostilities in Korea without altering the stand on non-forcible repatriation by agreeing to undertake future negotiations concerning those prisoners who have not indicated a willingness to be repatriated.

Up to the present time the UNC proposals have been such as to require the Communists to agree in principle to non-forcible repatriation. If the Communists desire an armistice but cannot bring themselves to conclude one at the cost of loss of face, the previous proposal of the UNC could be amended so as not to require prior agreement by the Communists to abide by the results of the rescreening but merely to agree to continue to negotiate about the matter.

If the UNC proposal, so modified, is introduced at Panmunjom it probably will be treated as no more than reiteration of the previous proposal, since the principle of non-forcible repatriation has been so consistently emphasized in the negotiations. For such a modified proposal to provide that degree of face-saving that might conceivably permit an armistice to be concluded, it would appear much better to put it in a different context. This could be done by having the proposal made by the President.

The Mexican Government has just transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a Mexican proposal for dealing with the prisoners of war who have indicated they would resist repatriation.¹ The Mexican proposal is probably not a particularly useful way of dealing with the outstanding issue in the negotiations but it would provide the President with an opportunity to make the approach suggested above without appearing to be doing so in response to the urging of the Progressive Party of the New York Daily Worker.

It is, of course, true that leaving one of the armistice issues unsettled for later negotiations might provide a pretext to the Communists for renewing hostilities if at a later time they were inclined to do so. However, there will doubtless be any number of equally good pretexts under the agreed armistice provisions as, for example, those relating to the limitations on military buildup, the rights of inspection teams and the questions left for future political settlement such as the withdrawal of foreign forces. The only protection that an agreement can provide against a renewal of hostilities is already provided by the agreed article to the effect that the armistice, once concluded, will remain in force until superseded by another agreement.

If the President makes such a statement, the negotiators at Panmunjom might at the same time indicate to the Communists that we are prepared to deal with the outstanding issue in several ways, either before or after an armistice. The negotiators could, for instance, suggest an approach similar to that in Chou En-lai’s alternative B and, as General Clark has suggested, that we would be prepared to agree not to send the remaining prisoners of war to Formosa but that we would be willing to request some impartial country, such as India, to take control of them.

We might also have Ambassador Kennan discuss the President’s statement with the Russians and indicate that this should provide a means of terminating hostilities in Korea, the continuation of which is not without risk to both sides.

If the above approach is decided upon, General Clark could be told that his suggestion for putting forward a variety of proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is a matter that could be considered at a later date, after we have received indications as to whether or not the proposals described above provide an acceptable basis for concluding an armistice.

Attached is a draft presidential statement for consideration.

Paul H. Nitze

[Attachment]

Draft Presidential Statement

The President of Mexico, Mr. Aleman, has transmitted to the United Nations a proposal which his Government has made in an effort to remove the remaining obstacle to an armistice in Korea.

The proposal of the Mexican Government takes account of the fact that agreement has been reached between the two sides in Korea on all of the provisions of an armistice with the exception of those articles dealing with prisoners of war. Even in this respect, as the Mexican Government has noted, there is a large measure of agreement. The Communists have declared that they were prepared to return to the United Nations 12,000 United Nations’ prisoners and representatives of the United Nations have frequently stated that we are prepared to return 83,000 prisoners of war whom we hold. The only outstanding issue in the armistice negotiations relates to persons not included in these numbers.

The Mexican Government has proposed that the prisoners of war each side has already offered to return to the other be immediately exchanged, and has suggested a way of dealing with the remaining outstanding issue so that an armistice need not await the final disposition of this question.

This Government, and the other members of the United Nations with which it is associated are sincere in their desire to see an armistice completed in Korea. It is true, as the Mexican Government states, that a large area of agreement has now been established in the armistice negotiations.

As agent of the United Nations for the Unified Command in Korea, I therefore propose that the opposing sides mutually undertake to carry out all the articles that have been agreed to by the negotiators dealing with matters other than prisoners of war, and to take those actions which each side has already declared itself ready to take by way of returning prisoners of war to the control of the other side. This would mean that the United Nations would return 83,000 prisoners to Communist control; that the Communists would return 12,000 prisoners to United Nations control; that there then would be an immediate ceasefire and armistice in Korea; and that the persons not included in the numbers to be exchanged would be the subject of subsequent negotiations. The Mexican Government has suggested one possible basis for such negotiations. There are other ways in which this matter could be dealt with without the use of force. If the Communists share our desire to bring an end to fighting in Korea, the way is open.

1. For text of the Mexico proposal, see telegram 202, supra.