Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

top secret

[Washington,] July 9, 1952.

Questions Concerning Part II, CX 51489¹

1. Who are the neutral nations envisaged in paragraph 3b(2)? We should, if at all possible, find a formula that does not require the four “neutrals”, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, to engage in operations or reach decisions. The recent careful staff study² given to the operation of the neutral supervisory commission in conjunction with the Swiss and the Swedes reinforces the belief that this four-nation group will find it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in operations which require decisions by the group as a whole.

2. As presently phrased, paragraph 3b(2) envisages responsibility for guarding and handling of non-repatriates being turned over to the “group of neutral nations”. Such a group, whatever its composition, cannot be expected to have the forces and facilities for handling POWs and, as presently phrased, it would seem that this concept is not realistic. How, exactly, does Clark envisage that this concept would work in practice?

3. It is anticipated that, at the least, the Swedes and the Swiss will show a marked lack of enthusiasm for undertaking additional responsibilities concerning prisoners of war. They are already unhappy over the role of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, feeling that many of the provisions of the armistice agreement relating to the Commission may be unworkable and that the US will expect them to do much more on the Commission than in fact the terms of the armistice agreement permit. They are also very skittish in their reactions to the President’s proposal for a five-nation observation group of conditions on Koje. We should not, without prior consultation with them, initiate any proposal which gives them a still additional role in Korea.

4. While it may be correct that ultimately some commitment not to send Chinese POWs to Formosa may be required to obtain an armistice, the difficulties of carrying out such a commitment are so great that it should not be proposed by us at this stage. In this connection it should be noted that Chou En-lai’s Alternative B makes no mention of any such commitment. Therefore, the stipulation mentioned in paragraph 3b(3) should be eliminated from any proposal made by us to the Communists at this time. However, we should reach a decision as to whether we are prepared to undertake such a commitment if required by development of negotiations.³

1. Dated July 7, p. 380.
2. Not printed (795.00/6–952).
3. Johnson wrote the following at the bottom of the source text: “Copy given to Gen. Collins who took [it] to Japan & discussed with Gen. Clark.”