795B.00/6–3052
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
official–informal
Dear Alex: I want you to know that I have had nothing out of CINCUNC as to their thinking on the mechanics for intervention should it become inevitable. Only occasionally am I informed of telegraphic exchange between CINCUNC and DeptAr. On matters pertaining to the Korean situation you can assume that messages which do not clearly specify “repeated to Pusan” are not seen here.
I know that this matter has been the subject of study in Tokyo for some time. Last week Schirven and another lad from G–5 spent some time here. Schirven called on me, but made no mention of this project. We discussed only the problem of activating the Economic Board1 and staff for UNC membership.
What disturbs me is the indication that the thinking in Tokyo is in the nature of military government set-up for Korea if intervention becomes necessary, calling for American personnel in the hundreds.
General Herren and I have discussed this matter entirely on our own, and we agree that the concept of military government for Korea with a huge staff is dangerous and unnecessary. My concept, which is shared by Herren and Plimsoll, is that if the need arises, UNC would have to take the responsibility on the basis of proper directives, but would act through the ROKA Chief of Staff or ROK Chiefs of Staff. When the decision is made, or should an “explosion” here precipitate the need for taking such a deplorable step, we would have to move decisively and instantaneously and isolate the very few “bad eggs” and preserve as much of the ROK governmental administrative structure as possible.
Colonel Hensey and a large delegation are due in Seoul today, and here Wednesday morning. This note is mainly a suggestion that NA keep its eye out in order to avert the possibility of JCS approving some program that has not been thoroughly cleared here.
My very best to you. I still don’t feel anywhere satisfied with our efforts thus far. We still need your prayers.
Sincerely,
- The reference was to the Combined Economic Board, which the Meyer Mission recommended. With a member from the Unified Command and the ROK, the Board was to be given the power of making binding recommendations on the use of all foreign exchange and the task of integrating such recommendations into the UNC assistance program (Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 219).↩