Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/6–3052: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

New York, June 30, 1952—11:58 a.m.

986. Re Korean truce talks. At Malik SC dinner June 27, I had following conversation with Zinchenko (UNASYG) on Korea:

While chatting about summer vacation plans, I commented that it did not look as if the SC would have to meet in August. Zinchenko at once said in a questioning manner, “unless perhaps Korea?” I replied that I thought an armistice in Korea was not possible so long as the Communists insisted on forcible repatriation of POW’s and that I could not understand how the Sov Govt could support the Chi and NK contention in view of principle adopted by Sov Govt regarding German POW’s. Zinchenko, who perhaps expected this question, replied that although he did not know too much about what I had called a “principle”, it was necessary for us to realize there was an “important difference between repatriation during a war and after an armistice”. The Geneva Convention “had to be applied” after the end of hostilities. Furthermore, during the war against Nazi Germany, it was “necessary to do everything to disintegrate the Nazis”. Moreover, the Sov Govt found great difficulties put in the way of their attempts to get in touch with Russian POW’s held in various parts of Europe. He implied the Sov position was taken in the hope of facilitating the return home of Russian POW’s.

I said I could not see how these matters affected the fact that the Sov Govt had taken the position that it was a humane principle to allow POW’s to go where they desired at end of hostilities. I disagreed with his interpretation of the Geneva Convention and insisted it was not intended under any circumstances to require forcible repatriation. This whole question was one we felt deeply about and would not retreat from. I added that representatives of Asian, Middle East and other countries had expressed to us their full support of this issue, in addition to the public statements which have been made by many govts.

Zinchenko replied that he understood the difficulty for us but “we must also realize how difficult it is for the other side”. He said with a shrug “after all, it is only offered to return about 60,000; that is not possible”.

I said Zinchenko must be aware we had done our best to discourage POW’s from resisting repatriation, that we were very disappointed when the screening showed such a large figure. We had no reason to want to hold on to them. Zinchenko asked “how about the difficulties on Koje?” I answered that everyone knew that organized troublemakers among the POW’s on Koje were to blame. Moreover, I felt the Communists had no moral standing on the whole POW question because of their refusal to agree to impartial supervision of screening or of POW exchange arrangements.

Zinchenko seemed to turn over in his mind my reference to impartial screening or supervision. After a brief hesitation, he said that I must realize the “Red Cross Committee” (presumably he meant ICRC) is “unacceptable” to the Chi and NK. However, “there are other Red Cross societies”. These societies could be used and there was no reason for us to insist on the “Red Cross Committee”. He then added that he was “confident” that the problem of both sides regarding the POW question, could be resolved, but there were “many difficulties in attempting to settle all the questions before an armistice”.

Zinchenko asked quite bluntly: “Why not sign an armistice on the basis of the Geneva Convention? After the armistice, if some of the prisoners on either side do not want to be repatriated, this could be taken into account.”

At about this point in our conversation, we were joined by Dr. Morozov, whom I had known in 1948 as the Sov rep on the Legal Committee of the 3rd GA but had not seen since. After listening for a moment, he had a few comments about the background of the Geneva Convention, agreed with Zinchenko’s argument that the convention required repatriation of all POW’s, and that it should be applied “in principle”. He then left us.

I said I could not imagine signing an armistice which dealt with the POW issue merely by including a general undertaking “to apply the Geneva Convention”. This was impossible since both sides had conflicting views as to the convention. Zinchenko denied that he was suggesting this. When I pressed him as to just what he did mean, he avoided a precise formulation. However, his suggestion appeared to boil down to this: Sign an armistice agreement which would provide for the application of the Geneva Convention. The Communists would insist this “in principle” requires general repatriation. It would be understood that “difficulties arising in applying the convention” would be taken into account. Presumably a group of National Red Cross societies, I suppose including one or two from satellite countries, would supervise the “application of the convention”.

I said I frankly could not see much chance for real progress along this line, although I was gratified to know that Zinchenko understood we were firmly determined not to agree to any principle or procedure which would involve forcible repatriation.

Zinchenko said he knew I was aware he was speaking “only as a person”. But he felt he had a “special responsibility” because of his position in the UN and his “interest in the UN”. I replied it was obvious we were both speaking purely personally. In this same spirit, did he mind if I asked him whether he thought the Communists really wanted an armistice in Korea? Zinchenko replied at once that he thought they did. He himself had felt at the time the Chi Communists and North Koreans agreed to start armistice talks that “they really wanted to reach agreement”. We should find some way to overcome the great difficulty they have in accepting the POW arrangement we were proposing.

Up to this point, Zinchenko had not referred to the suggestion relayed to us by Rafael, of the Israeli del.¹ Taking advantage of the informal tone of our conversation, I told Zinchenko that I had heard of a talk he had held with Rafael, but was not quite clear in my mind about the substance of it. After considering for a moment, Zinchenko said he had in a personal way mentioned to Rafael a “theoretical possibility” of signing an armistice and leaving the POW question to be settled afterward. He thought it was “important to discuss all possibilities”. However, he did not seem interested in following up this line and I did not think it wise to pursue the point.

Comment: During this conversation, which lasted 10 to 15 minutes, Malik was standing a short distance away conversing with several dinner guests. He did not join us. My impressions are:

1. Zinchenko deliberately opened up a discussion on Korea and Morozov’s participation was prearranged. In the many social and official encounters I have had with Zinchenko during the past two years, he has never talked so explicitly and in such a relatively unguarded manner. I was struck by such direct expressions as “why not sign an armistice, etc”.

2. The Sov Govt may be using Zinchenko for sounding us out rather than Malik, probably because Zinchenko’s UN position furnishes the Sov Govt a plausible reason for getting into the act so directly. In addition, it provides them an easy exit by way of denial or repudiation of anything Zinchenko says, since he is “not a Sov representative”. I am inclined to think Malik deliberately avoided joining us. On other similar occasions he has frequently done so.

3. The earnestness of Zinchenko’s manner as well as his avoidance of the usual recriminatory remarks conveyed a strong impression at least of a personal hope to see an armistice concluded. It is, of course, highly doubtful that Zinchenko, who we know maintains the closest contact with Malik, would hold or express such views if contrary to the Sov line.

4. I believe Zinchenko would be surprised if I did not follow up with him.

5. A question: We must not lose sight of the possibility that the Sov hate campaign is intended to prepare public opinion for Sov intervention in Korea or even for general war. However, might not the hate campaign be related to a possible Sov desire to see an armistice in Korea? One motive for the suddenness and violence of the campaign cld be to pave the way for the Communists to hail an armistice as the triumphant conclusion of a crusade to halt an “American reign of terror” in Asia. This could, to some extent at least, deflate the enormous prestige which an armistice would bring to the UN and to the US throughout the world, particularly in Asia and in Sov-controlled areas.

Gross

1. The reference is to Zinchenko’s observation to Rafael in early June that the armistice could be initialed on the basis of issues already settled and on the understanding that it would become effective upon resolution of the POW question; this information is contained in telegram 893 from New York, June 4, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128).