Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

611.95/5–2852

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 28, 1952.

Subject:

• Discussion of NSC 118/2 by Policy Planning Staff.

The Policy Planning Staff on May 27 discussed NSC 118/2, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea”, in view of the suggestion made in the NSC Steering Committee that the paper be reviewed and of the consideration given to Korea at a recent State-JCS meeting. Besides Mr. Nitze and members of the Policy Planning Staff, there were present Ambassador Muccio and Messrs. Young, McClurkin, Frelinghuysen and Emmerson.

With respect to the contemplated meeting of the NSC Steering Committee next week, it was the consensus that the Department representatives need not be armed with a definitive position. They would be receptive to proposals or estimates prepared on the military side. Out of the meeting would probably come arrangements for a State–Defense working group to develop concrete proposals with respect to NSC 118/2.

The position which apparently received the support of the persons present and which was outlined briefly by Mr. Nitze at the end of the meeting is approximately as follows:

1. Unless the JCS indicate preparedness to allot additional military power to Korea and permit stepped-up military action, the alternative would appear to be continuance of the present situation and the bringing about of a situation in which ground action would be at a minimum and progress toward a de facto cease-fire might be possible.

2. Failing to achieve an armistice agreement, the UNC would continue air and naval action and would maintain roughly present positions and present strength in Korea. UNC willingness at all times to conclude an armistice agreement would be manifest to the Communists and any opportunities for effecting exchanges of prisoners, with or without formal agreements, would be seized.

3. Efforts would be increased to build up the numbers and efficiency of the ROK forces. (The JCS position that priorities should go to the Japanese Police Reserve was discussed, but it was pointed out that the 10-division force in Korea could be strengthened by additional mechanization, etc.)

4. The U.S. should make every effort to increase its general position in Asia as a deterrent against Communist aggression.

5. The U.S. should explore every possibility for strengthening the government of the ROK. Ambassador Muccio pointed out the numerous suggestions which he had made in the past for placing American advisers in the key posts throughout ROK ministries. He still felt this was a sound plan and if carried out, would contribute considerably to the stability of the ROK administration.

5. (sic) Consideration might be given to what military actions could be taken which would improve the UN position and impress Asians and allies generally.

Mr. Nitze felt that by following a policy as outlined above for about one year, the increased strength achieved by that time might make possible certain withdrawals of UN forces from present front positions and eventually from Korea. He proposed that the beginning of such withdrawals should be accompanied by a “greater sanctions” statement which would serve definitive notice on the Communists that any crossing of the line by them would be met by retaliation against China itself.

It seems to me that a general program as outlined above has much to recommend it. It would appear to me, however, that if it is obvious that the armistice negotiations are not going to succeed, we should consider the issuance of a “greater sanctions” statement at that time, rather than to wait for the period of build-up which Mr. Nitze suggests.²

It is assumed that the military estimate under preparation at the Pentagon and the paper prepared by NA will serve as bases for the work of preparing an NSC position on 118/2. It is noted that SE-27,³ the intelligence estimate on the naval blockade, will be of pertinence to this study.

1. The following marginal annotation was written on the top of the source text: “Any comments?, J[ohn] A[llison]”. The query was apparently directed to Johnson.
2. At this point, Johnson wrote the following marginal comment: “Probably so, but I doubt ability to get Allied agreement. I thoroughly approve rest of paper.”
3. For the text of SE-27, entitled “Probable Courses of Action With Respect to Communist China,” completed on June 5, 1952, see volume xiv.