Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

711.5611/5–2954

No. 763
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 29, 1954.

Subject:

• Tokyo’s Telegram 2853² and the Japanese Situation

The Bikini accident of March 1 spotlighted the following major facts and implications to the United States of the situation in Japan:

1. The present Yoshida government is not at all times able to control its own bureaucracy. We doubt that Yoshida will remain much longer as Prime Minister and he may retire after his world trip in June and July. However, the trend in Japan is toward a more powerful grouping of the dominant conservative forces and a more effective government. This is a problem which the Japanese must solve for themselves.

2. International problems, particularly Japan’s mounting foreign exchange crisis, the strong role being taken by Red China, Russia’s thermonuclear capability, and Indochina, cause the Japanese Government and people concern over the value of their political and security ties to the United States. We expect to discuss these matters with Yoshida here in June and believe it would help if you personally would assure him of our determination to hold the line in Asia and as necessary to help Japan in its economic troubles.

3. The Japanese are pathologically sensitive about nuclear weapons. They feel they are the chosen victims of such weapons. We are doing several things to meet this situation:

a. Compensation. Embassy Tokyo feels this is the most important specific issue to dispose of. We have publicly announced we would compensate the injured fishermen and we have suggested to the Japanese Government the sum of $150,000. Any agreed figure would probably require Congressional appropriation. There are several difficulties: we have not been permitted to examine the fishermen; the Japanese will probably claim heavy damages of an indirect type such as for fish thrown away and lost profits. We feel we should be prepared to raise our initial figure, perhaps to $300,000, to avoid legalistic haggling and gain rapid agreement. We should then pay promptly.

b. Exchange of Information. With the cooperation of AEC we have transmitted to the Japanese scientific information on radioactivity. In conjunction with AEC we have several exchange projects in process. We feel that in the long run scientific interchange is the best remedy for Japanese emotion and ignorance and we intend to push such projects.

c. Yoshida Visit. We expect to inform Yoshida again of our regret over the March 1 incident and our desire to assist, and to give these statements wide publicity. We also plan to tell Yoshida we had hoped for more effective cooperation by subordinate Japanese officials, for more effective public information activities by the Japanese Government, and for better security measures. We think these improvements are likely in time and will go far to combat neutralism and apathy in Japan.

4. Effective defense of Japan will be very difficult until the Japanese assume a fair load themselves and until they understand their stake in the struggle against Communist tyranny. We are trying to prod them into doing more and are giving them very substantial military assistance. The most important thing that we can do to help is to treat Japan as a full, free-world partner and bring her as much as possible into our own and free world counsels. This is essential if we are to count upon the use of Japanese bases and other cooperation in any future conflict. We recommend regular high-level consultations with the Japanese on politico-military problems.

5. Japan’s economic problem is becoming increasingly serious. Things we should do to help solve it include:

a) Multilateral tariff negotiations to bring Japan into GATT.

b) Long-range plans for assistance to Japanese defense industries as a concomitant to military assistance.

c) Assistance to underdeveloped countries which will lay foundations for higher levels of trade for Japan and other countries.

Robert Murphy

1. Drafted in NA. In a memorandum to Dulles dated May 26, the President expressed concern about the Japanese situation as reported in telegram 2853, Supra, and asked for “a brief analysis of this situation in terms of what things we can and should do now to improve our prospects in that region.” (711.5611/5–2654)
2. Supra.