Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

711.5611/5–2054: Telegram

No. 762
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

top secret

Tokyo, May 20, 1954—2 p.m.

2853. Subject: Fukuryu Maru.

1. End of 1954 Pacific nuclear tests gives us opportunity for first assessment import Fukuryu Maru incident for US–Japan relations. Full implications may not be known for years but certain conclusions of critical import to US policies are now possible.

2. Conclusions are unpleasant, some even ominous. However, espionage or provocation by vessel or crew do not seem be in picture. No intelligence available our agencies has yet provided basis for initial US suspicions. Disturbing policy implications flow, however, from Japanese official response and national reactions to incident. Severe deficiencies in security, administrative discipline, emotional stability, and cooperativeness have been exposed. Even though we understand extraordinary emotional strain this incident imposed on Japan, we will have to take into account these weaknesses.

3. Emotionalism attending incident here was product worst possible combination factors: Japan with its World War II atomic legacy; high seas fishing areas, over which Japanese nerves already rubbed raw by closures of traditional open fishing zones on part Japanese neighbors and by seizures innocent fishing vessels by Red China, USSR, and ROK; fish itself, which as main item Japanese diet brought incident home to every family and at height tuna season, thus affecting both food supply and dollar exports; and time of accident where variety other factors worsened thoroughly bad situation.

(a) Incident corresponded with passage first postwar appropriation for atomic energy research in Japan; every ministry and agency was asserting its claims to these funds and to designation as Japan’s chosen atomic instrument. Custody of ship and patients immediately became object intense bureaucratic jockeying.

(b) Incident coincided with mounting government crisis and growing Cabinet fatigue. Fifth Yoshida Cabinet was being harried in Diet, shaken by scandals and procurators probes, and threatened by gathering revolts inside Liberal Party and by Conservative merger maneuvers outside its control. It was compelled to concentrate its depleted energies on its own survival while working through a difficult legislative calendar. To make matters worse, bureaucratic dissatisfaction was brewing at national level because of government and party deficiencies and at local level because of Cabinet’s attempts to recentralize administration. The press was using all this to whip up its continuing campaign against a government which appeared all but tottering.

(c) Incident coincided with heightening tension in Far East; twin issues of Korea and Indochina, toward which Geneva seemed to Japanese to hold scant promise, created specter of new and larger war not unrelated to Pacific tests in Japanese minds. If it came, most Japanese could not see how they could escape involvement, probably atomic involvement, and prospect horrified them. At same time curious ambivalence in Japanese character asserted itself. Destinies of Far East were about to be decided in Korea, in Indochina, and at Geneva, and Japan was excluded from negotiating councils. Japan craved occasion to assert its position and remind world of its importance.

4. This was psychological and political background for Fukuryu Maru incident. When new pressures of Japan’s exposure to “ashes of death” were added, government and people cracked. Period of uncontrolled masochism ensued, as nation aided by unscrupulous press, seemed to revel in fancied martyrdom, and US-Japanese cooperation broke down. For a time, on Fukuryu Maru incident, government in Japan ceased to govern.

5. Breakdown was triggered by small group Japanese scientists and doctors, many of whom were fuzzy-minded leftists, pacifists, neutralists. Nearly all seemed animated by resentments arising from occupation with its ban on Japanese atomic research; by hostility toward ABCC and its SCAP-founded correspondent, the National Institute of Health; by sense of outrage over purges in medical and scientific field. All of them had vistas of nation-wide publicity at home and world-wide scientific prominence as exclusive proprietors of world’s first hydrogen-bomb patients.

6. For first few days doctors and scientists held the field, with uncontrolled statements and releases made more lurid by sensationalist press. Then Communist and pacifist and neutralist agitation and propaganda apparatus moved into situation that was made to order for them to (a) alienate Japan from US; (b) derive nuclear intelligence; (c) pose as champions of Asian racialism; (d) attempt delay or have suspended 1954 thermonuclear tests. Press treatment their charges and complaints turned from mere sensationalism to avalanche of abuse against US. American doctors were vilified; US offers of assistance portrayed as attempts to conceal evidence or minimize injury to Japan; Embassy expressions of regret over incident denounced as either belated or insufficiently effusive. National responses to combined exertions Communists, scientists, and press irresponsibility were immediate and overpowering. The most senior levels of the government under incessant prodding from the Embassy at first attempted half-heartedly to gain control of situation. They persevered for about three weeks; they were routed.

7. The record of their attempts disclosed following:

(a) Lack of domestic security framework: Access to Fukuryu Maru itself was not restricted until March 18, five days after return to port. As late as March 27 reporters and photographers were freely allowed aboard. Samples of fall-out ash were removed, officially, from vessel, but no inventories of these samples were taken and no control maintained. Unknown quantities were removed unofficially by various visitors, analyses of ash constituents were widely published in all newspapers. Access to patients was uncontrolled until removal to Tokyo March 28, and has since been partially restricted for medical reasons but without any security screening of visitors. Invariable government reply to Embassy representations has been to claim that due to occupation reforms, no laws exist restricting publication scientific data or permitting screening of scientific personnel. Claim is, of course, legalistic and immaterial in emergency situation.

(b) Lack of control over bureaucracy: Inability of Cabinet to enforce discipline inside administrative organization has characterized entire period. Government was unable compel or persuade civil servants to actions they opposed; direct orders from Prime Minister to Cabinet and from Ministers to staff were flouted; formal commitments to US were ignored. Government suffered and accepted series humiliating retreats. Over opposition of Welfare and Education Ministries bureaucrats, government was unable comply with successive Embassy requests; (i) to turn Fukuryu Maru over to US Navy for decontamination; or (ii) to sell it to US; (iii) to purchase it from owner and sink it. Ship will be retained for research. Re patients, government not only unable provide access for examination by US physicians but appointments made at Cabinet level for them to visit patients were refused by bureaucrats in charge. Re inspection of reported cases of additional radioactive fish and vessels, government was unable carry out arrangements confirmed by Foreign Office for access by US experts because of “failure of coordination between Ministries concerned”. Critical point is not display of insubordination itself but government’s acceptance of it and its failure take disciplinary action against offenders.

(c) Lack of information apparatus: Government was not only unable to control or coordinate press statements by bureaucrats and government doctors or to restrain slanderous attacks on US but it was also unable have its own statements and corrections published. Formal assurances of centralization all press statements in official committee have been and are being repeatedly breached. Government’s disavowal bureaucrats tendentious April 21 statement went unreported, as did subsequent press conference by Minister Welfare¹ using US materials to attempt quiet public hysteria re nuclear contaminations. We cannot help but feel government was less than strenuous in these instances, for we know of no previous case in which press has successfully imposed complete blackout of government statements.

(d) Extent of national atomic vulnerability: These crowded industrialized islands have long been recognized as perhaps world’s most susceptible nuclear targets, and not less so because of direct World War II experience. What must now be recognized is depth of Japanese fear of nuclear weapons, their conviction of doom in event of war, and, as consequences their readiness to panic and their intense gullibility in nuclear matters. Throughout past eight weeks, no report of long-range air or sea contamination, no story of food or water pollution, no theory of genetic deterioration seemed too wild for acceptance. To unlimited targets of opportunity in Japan, to total lack of civilian defense organization must now be added this dangerous psychological vulnerability of Japanese to weapons and devices of nuclear technology. If Communists understand this latter element, and there is no reason to believe it has escaped their attention, the consequences for our military planning with respect to Japan could be extremely grave. In the event of war or an imminent threat, if Communists astutely manage and carefully prepare a psychological-military operation involving threat of nuclear weapons against Japan, this might well on basis present record produce national stampede that would sweep over any Japanese Government that attempted to halt it. In this process our own bases could be isolated and even made untenable.

(e) Strength of neutralism and isolationism: Finally, record of period has revealed that certain national traits have not been extinguished in postwar Japan: A feverish sense of pride and sovereignty, willingness to sacrifice long-term advantages for short-term gains, and tendency to go it alone. Shrillness and baselessness of attacks on US good will and “sincerity” throughout entire period are indicative of sentiment to disengage from US.

We should not underestimate force of this sentiment and its relations to our efforts to establish system of collective action in Far East. It greatly strengthens neutralists appeal.

8. For present, assessment of lasting damage done by incident must be incomplete. Position of neutralists, pacifists, feminists, and professional anti-Americans while by no means dominant has been strengthened. Doubts re wisdom and feasibility of Japanese rearmament in nuclear age have increased. It may be coincidence but NSA enlistment rates are reported sharply down throughout country. Elements, in both Conservative and Socialist circles, working for some kind of accommodation with Red China have increased their activities, and government quarters can not be unmindful of this. Furthermore, press has begun to call on government to exact guarantees from US that Japan will never be used as base for launching atomic war against Asian neighbors. Senior Foreign Office official in answer to questions from Independent member told Diet Committee May 12 that US could bring nuclear weapons into Japan without informing Japanese Government and acknowledged that “since there is no mutual security system there is fear we will not be consulted when atomic and hydrogen bombs used”. This agitation may well continue and expand, and it will strengthen latent desire for early revision security treaty including some form nuclear understanding. Beyond this point much will depend on how quickly and satisfactorily we can settle specific issues in Fukuryu Maru case. Here nub of problem is settlement claims; on this we still await Japanese response to our compensation formula. With compensation settlement and end 1954 series much of sensationalism surrounding incident should disappear. It will be to Japanese interest to close out or explain away administrative deficiencies and national vulnerabilities incident has illuminated. It is probable that short of imminent threat of war in Far East, point of our greatest dependence on Japan, we shall not again be shown so sharply lack of Japanese domestic security, absence of effective control over bureaucratic apparatus, paralysis of government in information field, and desire to pull free of US and other foreigners. Strength of Japanese neutralism and isolationism may more often be evident.

9. Remedies for these weaknesses must be sought in development stronger, tougher-minded Japanese Government and in recovery of people from postwar psychosis. But a regime fortified with increasingly centralized security and information controls, indispensable as such a development is on present evidence, would not of itself be enough. It is highly questionable whether stronger Japanese Government had it existed in March 1954 would have produced different national response to Fukuryu Maru. Panic might have been more controlled; hysteria might have been more managed and purposeful. We might more quickly have arrived at present dead center where government seems to be letting matter ride. Specific actions it could now take, if it desired to bring incident to speedy close, would be to provide us with complete clinical reports re patients, to submit lump-sum compensation estimate, to control utterances of at least senior personnel. Failure take any these steps is at this date probably attributable more to lack of willingness than to lack of capability. And this reluctance in turn would seem derive from desire extract some advantage from uncontrolled panic of March and April in terms stronger bargaining position re Japan’s role in Far East collective action system or revision of security treaty. Also government not unmindful political advantages demonstrating independence from US.

10. In these matters whether we deal with strong or weak government in Japan we are involved in heart of problem of Japan’s national survival in nuclear age. Neutralism in Japan will vary in direct proportion to conclusion Japanese leaders reach as to whether relationship with US can provide, more than any other course of Japanese action, defense and security in period when both US and USSR possess thermonuclear weapons. Ultimate significance of Fukuryu Maru incident will thus be first whether we can devise a defense strategy for Japan’s security in light enormous new complications that 1954 thermonuclear test series has established and then whether we can persuade a much stronger Japanese Government that our planning has solved problem to extent it can be solved.

11. Many of conclusions above patently serious. This, of course, does not of itself mean we should draw in our lines but rather that certain realities with which we have to live are now more apparent. I look forward to discussing this further when I am in Washington.²

Allison

1. Ryuen Kusaba.

2. Allison was scheduled to arrive in Washington on June 2 to help prepare for the visit of Prime Minister Yoshida.

   The Secretary forwarded a copy of this telegram to President Eisenhower under cover of a note dated May 24, which concludes as follows: “This [telegram] is particularly relevant in view of the prospective visit here of Prime Minister Yoshida. Also it is relevant in relation to the talks which you may be having with Churchill.” (711.5611/5–2054) For documentation on the talks held in Washington June 25–29 between U.S. officials and a British Delegation headed by Prime Minister Churchill, see volume vi.

   Telegram 2635 to Tokyo, May 27, marked “No distribution” and “For Ambassador from Secretary”, and drafted by Dulles, reads: “President has read your 2853 and found it of great interest and value from standpoint of policy formulation. I look forward to seeing you next week.” (711.5611/5–2054)