Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/12–654

No. 428
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] December 6, 1954.

Subject:

• China Item: Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

Participants:

• Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
• Mr. George Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
• Sir Roger Makins, Ambassador of Great Britain
• The Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Walter McConaughy, Office of Chinese Affairs
• Mr. Niles W. Bond, UN Political and Security Affairs

Ambassador Munro and Ambassador Makins called on the Secretary this morning to continue discussion of the subject item.

The Secretary opened his remarks by noting that the recent announcement of the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China had, as expected, gone off smoothly in terms of public reaction. He said that in these circumstances the U.S. Government would like to see the proposed New Zealand initiative proceed. In response to a question from Ambassador Munro concerning timing, the Secretary said that he saw no reason why it should not go forward within a week. He noted that New Zealand would succeed to the Presidency of the Security Council in January and said he assumed it might be awkward to proceed with their resolution during the month when the New Zealand Delegate was in the Chair.

Ambassador Munro recalled that there was a precedent in the Security Council for protecting the Chair during the discussion of items in which the President’s Government was an interested party, but said that he nevertheless thought it would be better to proceed under the chairmanship of the President for December, Mr. Malik of Lebanon. He added that if the item should come up in January he would step down from the Presidency and that Peru as the next in alphabetical order would take the Chair.

Ambassador Munro went on to say that he had received a telegram indicating that his Government was anxious to have the Secretary’s estimate of the possible effect of the New Zealand initiative on the bellicose intentions of the Chinese Communists. He added that his Government had been impressed by the apparently gentle reaction of the Peiping regime to the announcement by the U.S. of its treaty with Nationalist China, and requested the Secretary’s views as to how they would react to the proposed New Zealand resolution.

Ambassador Makins interjected that he had also received a message from his Government, in which Sir Anthony Eden had expressed himself in favor of a further delay in the proposed exercise. He said that the British Chargé d’Affaires in Peiping had reported an angry reaction there to the treaty announcement, directed not only against the U.S. but also against the UK as a “conniving party”. He said it was the view of his Government that, in order to proceed with the New Zealand initiative, we would need to have a certain minimum willingness on the part of the Chinese Communists to play along. He added that it was London’s estimate that this minimum willingness did not exist, and that even the Soviet Union would not be able to restrain the Chinese Communists from reacting violently to our proposed course of action. He said his Government therefore believed that to proceed with the New Zealand initiative at this time might be to stimulate the Chinese Communists to further acts of aggression. Ambassador Makins stated that his Government also had in mind that the presence in the General Assembly of three other controversial items involving Communist China would make it difficult to introduce another such item into the Security Council. He said that for these reasons Sir Anthony was not inclined to favor immediate action and that he wanted to discuss the matter further with the Secretary in Paris later this month.¹ He said that Sir Anthony also felt that all documents relating to the recently-concluded treaty, including the exchange of notes, should be published prior to proceeding with the New Zealand resolution. He then inquired as to the status of the exchange of notes insofar as possible publication was concerned.

The Secretary replied that, in the absence of public pressure in the U.S. for the release of the notes, we did not intend to make them public unless it should prove to be necessary in connection with the New Zealand initiative. He said, however that if it should be decided that the publication of the notes would be useful in the latter connection, we would be disposed to agree to their release. Ambassador Makins said that it would be the UK view that publication of the notes would be necessary if the New Zealand initiative were to proceed. Ambassador Munro said that this would also be the view of his Government. The Secretary said that in that event we would be willing to make public the texts of the notes, adding that if the New Zealand initiative did not go forward, we would probably not make any release at least until Senate hearings on the treaty.

Ambassador Munro then raised the question as to what action we should take in the event the New Zealand initiative should be followed by a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands. He added that he assumed that in such event we should all have to consult together as to further steps. Regarding Sir Anthony Eden’s suggestion that he discuss the present exercise with the Secretary in Paris, Ambassador Munro asked whether there were not some chance that earlier consultations could be arranged between the Secretary and Sir Anthony, perhaps through telegraphic channels.

Ambassador Makins stated that he would report this conversation, and in particular the Secretary’s views, to Sir Anthony at once. He pointed out, however, that advice being received from UK representatives in both Peiping and New York was generally in support of Sir Anthony’s own inclination to hold off a bit on the New Zealand initiative. Ambassador Munro said that he would similarly report the present conversation to his Government. The Secretary remarked that he would be willing to send a personal message to Sir Anthony on this subject if it would be helpful. Ambassador Makins said he did not believe such a message would get us very far along, and said that it was in any event the view of the UK Delegation in New York that the exercise should not be launched while the General Assembly was still in session, which would put it off until close to December 20th. Ambassador Munro said that he did not necessarily agree that it should be put off until the conclusion of the Assembly session, since he believed the timing should be the subject of day-to-day consultation based on the development of events. Ambassador Makins said that the views of the UK Delegation on this point did not represent a rigid position on the part of his Government.

Ambassador Munro remarked that the matter of the imprisoned fliers was due to come up today in the General Committee,² although it probably would not reach the plenary before Wednesday or Thursday.³ He said that he understood it to be the view of the U.S. Government that there would be no justification in inviting the Chinese Communists to be represented in the debate. The Secretary confirmed that it was the U.S. view that their presence would serve no useful purpose. He pointed out that the Peiping regime had already made its statement on the case, and said that even if we accepted their version (which we did not) there would still be a strong case for the release of the fliers. In this connection he recalled that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had asked for the return of prisoners of war even in cases in which they had been convicted of crimes committed either before or after their capture. He asked rhetorically what the Chinese Communists could say that would change this situation. Ambassador Munro expressed agreement.

Ambassador Munro then inquired as to what reaction there had been from Formosa with regard to the announcement of the treaty. Mr. Robertson said that there had been no particular reaction beyond what would normally be expected. The Secretary said that there had been some reaction in the U.S. to the effect that the treaty constituted a write-off of Chiang’s hopes to return to the mainland, but that there had been really very little excitement considering the controversial nature of the subject matter. He added that he had inquired of Senator Knowland concerning Congressional reaction, and had been told by the Senator that there had been no particular reaction one way or the other in either wing of his own party.

Returning to the New Zealand initiative, Ambassador Makins said that his Government had from the first regarded that move as a first step toward a wider settlement, and that the question now raised itself as to whether it would still serve that purpose. He said the UK view was in general that under existing circumstances it probably would not. He pointed out that while there were also obvious risks involved in not going ahead, it was the view of his Government that these would be outweighed by the risks attendant upon proceeding with the New Zealand initiative at the present time. He conceded, however, that this was a finely-balanced question.

The Secretary agreed that it was certainly a difficult question to answer. He said that it might be argued that the announcement of the treaty with Nationalist China might spur the Chinese Communists to intensify their aggressive acts in the absence of a new deterrent, and that the New Zealand initiative might provide just such a deterrent. He said that he had no great hopes that the Chinese Communists would behave themselves and accept the jurisdiction of the Security Council in this matter, but that he believed that the mere presence of the item on the Security Council agenda would tend to act as a deterrent, even though no positive result should eventuate. Ambassador Munro said that his Government was generally in agreement with that point of view, but that they also needed the support of the UK in proceeding with their resolution. The Secretary stated that he would be content merely to have the New Zealand item remain on the agenda of the Security Council, and that he would not be disposed to force the issue by further action against the Peiping regime if they did not accept the Security Council’s decision. He said that it was his own opinion that the Chinese Communists, however violently they might speak, tended to think rather coldly and unemotionally. He said that they might be compared to chess players in that they were not likely to be provoked into any action without having first weighed the costs deliberately. He said that he realized that we were here dealing in imponderables, and that we could never be absolutely sure, but that this represented his own point of view. The Secretary said that once the item were placed on the Security Council agenda it would be easy to delay taking further action, since both sides would have to be heard and this would itself involve considerable delays. He said there would be the advantage, however, that the mere presence of the item on the agenda would focus attention on the desirability of a peaceful solution.

Ambassador Makins asked whether the U.S. would be inclined to press the matter to a vote. The Secretary replied that he would not be so inclined, but would be willing to rely on the deterrent effect of the fact that the matter had been brought under Security Council consideration. The Secretary added that under these circumstances the matter might drag on for weeks if not months without positive action. Ambassador Munro expressed agreement and added that during that period we would at least be talking and not fighting.

The Secretary asked if Ambassador Makins would report these views to Sir Anthony Eden, who, he thought, might be under the impression that we were intending to force the matter through to some positive action. Ambassador Makins replied that he would certainly do so.

1. Secretary Dulles attended the Fifteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 549 ff.
2. The General Committee decided that day, by 10 votes to 2 with 2 abstentions, to recommend inclusion of the item in the agenda of the General Assembly and, by the same vote, to submit it directly to the Assembly in plenary session. For text of statements made by U.S. representatives in the General Committee that day, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 20, 1954, pp. 932–934.
3. Dec. 8 or 9.