Office of the Historian

Eisenhower Library, Hagerty papers

No. 205
Extract From the Diary of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

[Washington,] June 3, 1954.

Thursday, June 3, 1954

In at 8:15.

Talked with Foster Dulles at some length in the morning.1 He had just received word from Bedell Smith in Geneva that the American Delegation wanted to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Reds on the question of the return of Americans, both military and civilian, presently held captive in China. Foster wanted to get my viewpoint on whether the negotiations between the United States and Red China would be construed here as the opening step toward diplomatic recognition of Red China. I said that the Chinese Reds, of course, would make a great claim that the start of talks on an official basis between the United States and themselves was such a first step.

I told Foster—and he seemed to agree with me—that (1) it would seem to me that the United States would have to take any step it possibly could to seek the return of Americans held captive in Red China; (2) that I did not see how the start of such a discussion could be construed as opening a negotiation for official diplomatic recognition; (3) that if he feared that might be the case, why didn’t Bedell put out a statement from Geneva announcing that he was going to enter into such negotiations but that they could not be construed as diplomatic recognition. The Secretary thought well of these ideas and said he would most certainly recommend that such word was sent to Bedell.

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  1. The conversation was recorded by Dulles’ secretary, Phyllis D. Bernau, as follows:

    “H. returned the Sec.’s call. The Sec. said we have a question and it has to be settled quickly. Should we negotiate at Geneva directly with the Chinese Communists for the return of Americans detained by the Chinese. It is largely a public relations question. We have been negotiating through the British, but the Chinese say they will not deal with them directly—they are trying to force us to deal with them directly. We have talked with them before as in Panmunjom. H. seemed to think it should be stated it does not imply recognition, and there is nothing more important than protecting American citizens. The Sec. said we will be open for criticism—H. thinks we could make a credit out of it.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

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