751G.00/11–554: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1
priority
[Received 3:49 p.m.]
1927. Repeated information priority Saigon 263. Embassy officer had hour’s conversation with Bao Dai last night. Bao Dai was affable but nervous and was on defensive throughout most of conversation.
We reported first on Collins mission, reasons for it and hopes of what it would accomplish. We expressed regret at Heath’s departure, which Bao Dai strongly seconded, but hope that Collins’ presence Saigon should serve as proof US determination bolster Vietnamese govt and help bring about solution to difficulties which have beset Ngo Dinh Diem since office. We referred to Collins’ high rank and authority and to previous cordial working relations with Ely.
We told Bao Dai that we regarded his role as important in solving present difficulties and influence he could exert in effecting reconciliation dissident elements might be decisive. We outlined in detail and with emphasis position US Govt that legally-constituted govt Vietnam headed by Ngo Dinh Diem must be given every chance to succeed and that our policy of granting support to that govt had been confirmed in Washington during Franco-American conversations last Sept and several times since, notably during Secretary’s last visit to Paris. Policy still remained in force. We referred to Franco-US agreement in matter and to recognition both countries fact that if Free Vietnam is to be retained in free world community and occupied Vietnam restored [Page 2211] to it govt must be given every chance to succeed by receiving not only unequivocal support both countries but that of Chief of State as well.
We referred to dangerous conflicts in Saigon, particularly that between Hinh and Ngo Dinh Diem. We reminded Bao Dai of influence he might bring to bear to solve these conflicts which had helped to cause virtual paralysis of govt functions. We asked what his views and intentions were in the matter.
It became readily evident from Bao Dai’s replies that he had anticipated our questions and declarations of policy well in advance and was fully prepared with right answers. He expressed understanding and agreement with virtually all our points. He acknowledged his own responsibilities, explaining that he regarded himself as father of group of naughty children who must be brought into line without taking side of one child against another. He recognized necessity of giving Ngo Dinh Diem govt full support and intended to do so. It was with a view to contributing to solution of present difficulties, particularly personal feud between Diem and Hinh, that he had decided to take certain action. For moment action consisted in sending personal emissary Luy Quang to Saigon with personal messages expressing his position. Quang bore letter to Hinh in which Bao Dai ordered Hinh back to Paris for consultation and suggested methods by which it could be made possible for Hinh to obey Bao Dai’s command without losing face in Vietnam. He had also sent message that he wished sects, particularly Binh Xuyen, to cooperate with Diem govt and hoped General Bai Vien would accept a cabinet post.
Bao Dai emphasized that in taking this action he was not taking sides with Diem against Hinh. He believed that principal responsibility for Diem–Hinh feud lay with former who had behaved in tactless and offensive manner and had, in effect, “double-crossed Hinh” by not living up to plan which would have permitted Hinh to withdraw from the scene gracefully and have avoided feud. In this Diem had permitted unpardonable error of forcing Hinh lose face, Bao Dai said. This was another indication of Diem’s political ineptness which had proved itself to be greater than Bao Dai had anticipated when he had named him to office. He regretted both this and Diem’s tendency to be inordinately stubborn as well as his packing of govt with relatives. Nevertheless, Bao Dai’s faith in Diem as patriot and potential leader stood firm. He would succeed at his job if he could be prevailed upon to accept advice and participation in govt of other leaders who were more politically sophisticated and who brought with them the strength which Diem required in order enforce his politics.
Bao Dai added that his action in recalling Hinh to Paris was only part of what is required to solve present impasse. Other essential step is to convince Diem that he must be more conciliatory to actual and [Page 2212] potential members govt, must reduce his own stubbornness and cease to rely solely on brothers and personal entourage for advice at expense of other leading Vietnamese. Bao Dai said that he could not influence Diem in this regard and that task must therefore fall upon us. He therefore suggested that in conjunction with his own action vis-à-vis Hinh that Heath or General Collins be instructed by Dept to lay down strong line to Diem about being more cooperative. Bao Dai thought that Collins’ assumption new duties might provide an excellent opportunity for making this position clear to Diem and would fit in well with Bao Dai’s own démarche to Hinh. We replied that we would make these views known promptly to Department and Saigon and could assure Bao Dai that necessary steps would be taken.
We questioned Bao Dai with regard to present movement in Paris to advance Buu Hoi as potential Vietnamese leader. Bao Dai said that he had the highest regard for Buu Hoi as patriot and humanitarian but that he thought it would be a pity to throw scientist into “den of lions” when services could best be used to serve mankind in another capacity. In any case, he had no intention of advancing such plan for present as he intended concentrate on solving problems of present government not on finding substitute for it. He did not mean exclude possibility, however, that Buu Hoi might at some future date assume some public office in Vietnam.
We referred to rumors that Bao Dai was returning to Vietnam himself in near future and to effect this had of prolonging present political paralysis in Saigon. Bao Dai stated rumor was not true. He had no intention returning Vietnam for present at least, believing that his services as Chief of State could best be used to arbitrate difficulties and thus bolster present government. Nevertheless he reserved right return at any time when in his judgment presence Saigon required.
We asked whether Bao Dai was confident that Hinh would follow orders. He believed he could be counted upon do so. Provided Ngo Dinh Diem behaved tactfully and made it possible for Hinh to withdraw without loss of face. We asked whether Hinh’s summons to Paris indicated he would be removed from present position as Chief of Staff. Bao Dai said not. Hinh was best man for his job as Diem was best man for his. He did not intend to dispose of one in order to preserve the other for both were sorely needed but he intended to do his best to effect reconciliation.
We were struck by effort Bao Dai had obviously given to preparing correct answers for us. With his customary shrewdness he had evidently surmised what our position would be from other manifestations of it we have given recently and prepared himself to give satisfaction. His satisfactory responses to our points were so assiduous that some of the arguments we had held in reserve were not necessary. We believe [Page 2213] he intends to do what he says not because he has any deep set faith in Diem but because it is path of least resistance and one which may best further his own personal fortunes. Nor do we doubt that one of Quang’s tasks in Saigon is as reported to ascertain that in exchange for Bao Dai’s support and effort to influence Hinh to conform Diem will agree maintain both Bao Dai’s crown and purse.
If Hinh should fail to answer Bao Dai’s summons or Quang should come back with a negative reply from Diem on the proposed deal we would not be surprised see Bao Dai immediately assume new tactic condemning Diem and supporting another. But we believe that for the moment, at least, his cooperation can be counted on and it would appear wise to attempt to enhance prospects for success Bao Dai’s gesture toward Hinh by influencing Diem to carry out his share of the bargain as requested.
During conversation, Bao Dai refrained from usual derogatory comments about French. He asked what French position with regard to Diem was, stating that only French official he saw regularly was DeJean. When we confirmed that decision give full support to Diem represented joint Franco-US position, Bao Dai appeared pleased to have confirmation of what he had probably already been told by French.
Bao Dai was apologetic for not having received us when we originally requested interview and in parting expressed hope we would maintain closer contact henceforth, with which we of course agreed.2