751J.02/11–354: Telegram
The Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Department of State
[Received November 4—8:35 a.m.]
88. Repeated information Saigon 137, Phnom Penh, Paris unnumbered. At dinner Luang Prabang November 1 Crown Prince was in particularly jovial mood as result what appeared to be successful formation new government (re Legtel 89)1 which he characterized as not strong but stable. He admitted it was largely reshuffling old elements (rather than young team he had sought) but emphasized it was genuine National Union government which, if it received solid assembly majority as he anticipated, would remain in power until elections. These he said His Majesty intended to fix for June. While recognizing there was still possibility of slip-up, Prince was jubilant that, despite serious difficulties, he had been able persuade all political elements to cooperate. He gave impression he himself intended to provide missing element of strength.
Prince declared it is firm Lao intention to resist communism which is contrary to all traditions and sentiments its people. It would, however, be futile for Laos to try do so alone and unsupported. For resistance to be successful, the people must feel they are backed by US and other principal free world powers.
I assured Prince US intends to maintain its support and cited inclusion Laos in area covered by Manila Pact, continuing US aid to Lao military effort and economy, and accreditation Resident Minister. I also alluded to our intention to supply aid directly in future, to set up separate FOA mission in Vientiane and to open negotiations these subjects with new government as soon as it takes office. Prince expressed satisfaction with these assurances.
He was most optimistic re ability Lao government control internal situation if necessary outside support forthcoming and no further foreign aggression occurs. He ridicules claim Pathet Lao leaders are not Communists but asserts they are few in number and most of their followers will return to national camp after Viet Minh withdraw. He is bitter at inactivity ICC and naivete Indians but considers there will nevertheless not be serious difficulty in repossessing Sam Neua and [Page 2210] Phong Saly after November 21, if government acts with sufficient vigor as he intends it shall.
In summary he believes combination posture of military readiness, energetic police action, prompt economic aid to villages and active dissemination national propaganda will within next six months sufficiently stabilize internal Lao situation so that Viet Minh infiltration need not be feared and elections can be faced with confidence. On the other hand, he emphasizes that forced recruiting and removal to Communist countries of young Laotians which ICC has done practically nothing to prevent, will cause Laos trouble for years to come.
Prince’s optimism may well be excessive and have arisen in part from mood of moment nevertheless we find his courage, energy and confidence healthy and believe they may play important part in fostering conditions he forecasts.
- Telegram 89 from Vientiane, Nov. 3, is not printed. (751J.02/11–354)↩