751G.00/8–1254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
598. Rptd info Saigon 59. We saw first LaChambre and later Cheysson yesterday with Bonsal. Cheysson has just returned from special five day mission Saigon. Both reported that ineffectiveness of Ngo Dinh Diem regime has exceeded worst fears. LaChambre quoted last report from Ely to effect that incapacity of govt is exceeded only by its self-conceit (fauite). Cheysson termed Diem govt most hopelessly ineffective of all Vietnamese govts to date. No decisions were being made and no action taken in pressing problems including evacuation of non-Communist populations from north. French were obliged, LaChambre stated, to take matters in own hands in order to get anything done as in case evacuation from north. This is bad politically but they cannot do otherwise in face do-nothingness of govt. They report that original estimate that million refugees would have to be moved from north has now been scaled down to 200,000 including 70,000 Vietnam Army officers and families. Vietnamese National Army in north is disintegrating so rapidly that unlikely more than one-third of original force will remain under arms when Haiphong is evacuated. Soldiers were fortunately deserting without arms.
While we were with LaChambre unexpected news of Bao Dai’s statement that he was returning to Indochina in near future was received. LaChambre termed it “coup de theatre” totally unexpected in Paris although Cheysson reports rumor attributed to Queen Mother had circulated in Indochina. All evidence points to fact that decision is Bao Dai’s own. LaChambre commented that although he deplored Bao Dai and would welcome opportunity get rid of him in view present uselessness Diem govt return not likely worsen situation. Furthermore if it represents decision by Bao Dai take active part in govt and administration national affairs it might actually prove useful. On other hand Cheysson feared that return would further Vietminh objectives in that opposition to Bao Dai is so marked his very presence would drive people to Vietminh. Moreover he termed Bao Dai and Tran Van Huu [Page 1936] two Vietnamese most capable making deal with Vietminh. Evident from LaChambre’s reaction that French will do nothing to prevent return although Cheysson expressed wish there were some means do so.
LaChambre reported that Ely would arrive in Paris tomorrow night for stay 4–5 days to report to govt and obtain new instructions. General Allard is in Paris at moment working with War Ministry on needs for Expeditionary Corps in South Vietnam.
LaChambre raised question treatment Vietminh zone by U.S. with regard to control of trade and COCOM lists. What were U.S. intentions in matter? Did they intend treat territory on same basis China, barring trade in same products now excluded from China? We stated we were without instructions but that subject would undoubtedly be dealt with in near future.
In recounting ineffectiveness Diem and possible successor govts LaChambre inclined think govt headed by former PriMin Tam as most favorable possibility. He recounted efforts which Vietminh had already begun to attract support in South Vietnam by persuasion and fear. He referred to practice of leaving local party agent in villages evacuated by Vietminh and of terrorizing peasants by presenting them with pictures of Ho and Bao Dai and telling them they must make their choice. He believed that only means counteracting Vietminh tactics was to solicit aid and support of sects in fighting fire with fire. If this proved necessary Tam might be best equipped man to carry out job.
We also discussed question Sainteny’s mission to North Vietnam. LaChambre explained that he had been named “Delegate of French Govt” in order avoid any indication that he was official diplomatic or consular emissary of govt to Vietminh. French had acted quickly on Sainteny’s appointment in order to avoid any reciprocal step by Vietminh. Sainteny chosen both because he is well known to and trusted by Vietminh and because he is known to be “firm”. Moreover chosen because he is in no sense a career officer either in foreign or colonial service and therefore could not be considered an official representative of France either to a “foreign” or even “colonial” power.
Finally we touched on question our maintaining future representation in Vietminh zone which will be subject of immediately following telegram.1
- Telegram 599 from Paris, Aug. 12, reported that the Embassy recommended that the Consulate at Hanoi remain open until such time as pressure from the Viet Minh necessitated its closing. (125.456/8–1254)↩