Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/8–2953: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
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Paris, August 29, 1953—1 p.m.

819. Limit distribution. Re Deptels 671, August 26¹ and 683, August 27.² I returned to Paris today and at Laniel’s invitation I dined alone with him. He appeared considerably sobered and somewhat discouraged at the situation revealed by the strikes. He feels that the government was successful in handling the situation but that the strikes showed the deep feeling of malaise in the French economy. Therefore he feels that it is urgent that he be enabled to announce his new budget in general terms as promptly as possible. Further economies which he intends to make in the civilian sector depend on his ability to make economies in the military budget which in turn depends on what the United States is prepared to do to help him in Indochina. Therefore, for his own domestic political reasons he is most anxious to come to a rapid decision on Indochina. I told him that we were very favorably disposed but that we required certain additional information which Jacquet is preparing (Embtel 799).³

I told him that the sooner we received that information the better and that in any event we were most anxious to come to a decision at the NSC meeting scheduled for September 10. He had not yet had opportunity to be fully informed by Jacquet concerning our requests for additional information but said that he was seeing Jacquet tomorrow morning and would tell him that it was of top urgency for the United States to get the information it desired during the course of the coming week.

As to the Navarre Plan he said the decision to send out the 9 additional battalions was definite provided of course the funds were available from the United States to carry out the rest of the plan, i.e., the creation of the necessary additional Associated States forces. This is same position he took in talks with me and MacArthur the end of last month. The additional troops will not be sent unless France is assured of adequate assistance from the United States to create the necessary local forces.⁴ We could of course predicate the granting of such additional assistance on the actual arrival of the 9 additional battalions in Indochina. I personally feel that this is the way the matter should be handled.

We talked to some extent about the possible economies in the French European defense establishment. Laniel has not yet received definite figures from Pleven but hopes to have such figures next week. The French NATO forces will be kept at least at the levels foreseen for the end of 1953. The total economies possible in these forces now appear to be more in the order of 50 billion francs than the 100 billion francs Laniel mentioned to me in July.

I mentioned the items described in Deptel 683 and Laniel was uninformed about them. He said that he would make inquiries about the training of senior Vietnamese officers which he felt to be most important.

He was encouraged by the meeting he had today with Bao Dai. He said he had received a much better impression of Bao Dai than he had expected. Bao Dai was hopeful and thought that victory was possible in 12 to 18 months. Bao Dai said he was prepared to call up the necessary manpower to create 85 to 100 new battalions in 1954.

Laniel said in conclusion that he felt that the Viet Minh were now at the peak of their power and on the way down. He was confident of victory in a fairly short period of time if the funds were available. France must end her commitments in Indochina very soon and the Navarre Plan was the only way to do this with honor. I told him we would give him an answer promptly as soon as we received the necessary additional information from Jacquet.

Hughes and Martin have been and will continue to be kept fully informed on situation.

Dillon

1. Supra.
2. In telegram 683 to Paris, Aug. 27, not printed, the Department instructed Ambassador Dillon to raise with Premier Laniel certain deficiencies in French organizational and training efforts in Indochina which the Department of Defense believed to exist. (751G.5 MSP/8–2753)
3. See footnote 4, supra.
4. In telegram 824 from Paris, Aug. 30, Ambassador Dillon reported that Jacquet had again stated that the French decision to send nine additional battalions to Indochina was unconditional. The movement of troops would commence in mid-October. The French Government saw no possibility, however, of continuing this extra effort beyond April 1954, unless additional aid from the United States were forthcoming. The reinforcements were being dispatched on a temporary basis, pending the outcome of the ongoing aid discussions. (751G.5/8–3053)