Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/8–2053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret
priority

Washington, August 26, 1953—7:02 p.m.

671. For Ambassador. Embassy despatch 589² received yesterday most disappointing since it does not provide adequate information for US to formulate a position re additional aid. While fully appreciating primary concern Laniel Government in past three weeks has been French strikes, we had understood from his conversations with you and MacArthur that Indochina problem was of greatest urgency, that additional US assistance soonest for Indochina was essential part of his over-all program, and that full information would be supplied by about August 7. Almost one month has elapsed since these talks and now information which finally furnished is inadequate to enable us make judgment. This delay gives us serious concern not only because dry season is rapidly approaching in Indochina and French reinforcements are obviously needed there, but also because we had hoped and still hope US–French agreement could have been reached late August or early September so reinforcements could be on move to Indochina by October 1, which Pleven in late July indicated to General Gruenther as tentative target date for departure. Obviously speed with which French move reinforcements to Indochina will have important bearing on their ability deal with expected Vietminh attack and will have important bearing on our judgment as to degree of success French may expect in implementing Navarre Plan. Furthermore, announcement by French and commencement of actual movement of reinforcements from France to Indochina prior to reconvening of Assembly seems obviously most desirable in view of fact Laniel’s program for Indochina will not be popular with either public or Parliament.

We had also hoped meet Laniel’s desire to make early visit to US and see President. For your information only, on August 3 we discussed this possibility with President and he agreed in principle to such visit if French program judged satisfactory.³ We had hoped might occur late August or early September.

In separate telegrams we are sending you questions re French plan, reflecting coordination with Defense and FOA.⁴ Understand you are arranging appointment with Laniel, August 28 and urge you explain to him that while we sincerely desire assist French substantially in cleaning up Indochina, delays in receiving information are creating serious complications for us. In particular, we must know when French intend begin movement of troops to Indochina and when they will arrive there. We therefore trust he will give his personal attention to seeing that we get answers to questions soonest so that US can reach decision. Must have info by morning September first if NSC is to act next week. Otherwise action will be delayed to September 10 which would make mid-September visit improbable. If he still desires visit US and see President prior to reconvening Parliament you may, speaking personally and not for US Government, tell him that if necessary information is forthcoming and if US finds French program satisfactory, you believe it might be possible for him to visit Washington about mid-September and you would be glad to recommend such visit at that time. Although we have not yet discussed mid-September visit with President we believe it would be possible and would strongly recommend it if French program satisfactory and if Laniel could come then. We are certain in considering usefulness of trip Laniel will carefully weigh French public opinion reactions. We have specially in mind old line of “French blood bought with US dollars” and other psychological considerations which might relate to trip immediately after strikes. These remarks are not intended to discourage Laniel but merely to make sure disadvantages as well as advantages will be carefully considered. You might also tell him you know President’s schedule for latter part September and early October is already so very full with visit of Panama President and other long-standing engagements that you doubt feasibility of visit then.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department. Repeated to Saigon for information as telegram 321.
2. Dated Aug. 20, p. 732.
3. According to the log of the President’s appointments for Aug. 3, he met with Under Secretary Smith and Counselor MacArthur on that morning. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”) No record of the meeting has been found.

4. In telegram 672 to Paris, Aug. 26, the Department transmitted questions regarding specific costs and requirements of the French program. (751G.5/8–2053) Telegram 673 of the same date, reflecting discussions with the Department of Defense, contained requests for additional information on French military strategy and plans for sending reinforcements to Indochina. (751G.5/8–2553)

   In telegram 799 from Paris, Aug. 28, Ambassador Dillon reported that Embassy officials had transmitted a memorandum based on Department telegrams 672 and 673 to Marc Jacquet, French Secretary of State for the Associated States, on Aug. 27. Jacquet expressed the hope that his government could reply by Sept. 1. (751G.5/8–2853) The Embassy sent the text of the memorandum to Washington in telegram 868 of Sept. 2. (751G.5/9–253) Prior to receipt of Department telegrams 671, 672, and 673 on Aug. 26, the Embassy had also requested additional information on the French program in a memorandum delivered to Jacquet on Aug. 25. The text of that earlier memorandum is contained in telegram 869 from Paris, Sept. 2. (751G.5/9–253)