Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/8–1953

The Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in France (Labouisse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

Paris, August 19, 1953.

Dear Livie: On the eve of my departure on leave, I want to send you a few personal impressions and cautions concerning the Indo-Chinese situation. This is probably unnecessary, but I shall be happier after I have set out certain of the factors which I believe should be taken into consideration by Washington in determining our policies and actions in this field. I shall leave a copy of this letter for the Ambassador’s information upon his return next week. He may or may not agree, and, in the latter event, will doubtless so inform you.

The points I want particularly to stress are, in effect, an expansion of the “word of caution” contained in the last paragraph of Embassy telegram 285 of July 22.¹ For some time I have felt real concern that the Indo-Chinese problem would end up in our lap. The reasons underlying my concern may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. It has been obvious for many months that the French could not carry on, even at the current level, the Indo-Chinese operations without American budgetary support comparable to that granted by us during the last two years. It has also been obvious that there is no likelihood of a successful conclusion to the Indo-Chinese operations if only the current level of effort and expenditure is maintained.

2. The first time that the facts were really aired publicly in France, and the French limitations of action more or less understood by all concerned, was during the Mendès-France investiture debate. It was apparent at that time that a large part of the French Assembly, and I believe indirectly the French public, concluded that things could not continue on as at present. The Mendès-France line was that France could not afford to continue indefinitely the expenditures in Indo-China and hope to build and sustain a sufficiently strong economy at home. He also apparently believed that a continuation of substantial U.S. aid was not the answer and that, in fact, it enabled France to put off taking certain necessary internal measures so desperately needed. The failure of France to achieve sufficient economic and financial strength and stability at home, when coupled in his mind with a coming inevitable “political catastrophe” in the Associated States, led him to favor some type of early negotiations which would enable France to withdraw gradually from Indo-China without yielding too much to Ho Chi Minh. (There is and was, of course, serious doubt in many minds here that a negotiation at this time could satisfactorily protect our common objectives in the area. American official opinion considers negotiations are impossible under present conditions.) I believe that the foregoing is a reasonably fair exposition of Mendès-France’s position. I have stressed his position because he has had a very important influence in the recent development of French thinking on this subject.

3. It is my personal opinion that few, if any, French leaders now believe that a real and clear-cut military victory is possible in Indo-China. Even those leaders who are opposed to the idea of a negotiated settlement do not, to my mind, have a very specific idea as to how to bring about a successful conclusion to the war. They all recognize, of course, that substantial aid will be needed if there is to be a chance of success. My belief is that even when political leaders think of a “successful” or “satisfactory” conclusion to the matter, they are now thinking in terms of developing sufficient military strength on the part of the Associated States forces to provide a basis for an eventual progressive withdrawal of French Union forces after a period of some eighteen months to two years—and even then probably on some negotiated basis.

4. Although some members of the Laniel government would doubtless like an early reduction in the French commitments in Indo-China, I believe that Laniel and his government as a whole wish to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, most probably within a framework similar to that suggested at the end of the preceding paragraph. Laniel’s government has indicated a strong intention of doing all it can afford, materially and politically, to that end. Laniel, however, has indicated that substantial further financial aid from the U.S. will be necessary, above the $485 million currently contemplated. His government has for some time now been trying to work out a specific program to submit to us.

5. We have not, up to this moment, received anything very concrete from the French. I hope and expect that something will be forthcoming today or tomorrow. But even if it does, and even if the dimensions of the additional financial aid requested prove to be within the realm of U.S. possibilities, it is here that my real concern commences—as I shall try to outline in the following paragraphs.

6. The approach which the French make to us may well be to say that France can no longer afford to finance the operations and buildup of the forces of the Associated States, and to suggest that we take over this expenditure. See paragraph 4 of Embassy telegram 572 of August 13.²

7. The probability contemplated in paragraph 6 above must be related to the fact that the French have already granted the Associated States a very large degree of independence. It appears to me that the government is now prepared to go about as far in this direction as the individual Associated States wish.

8. The obvious move on the French side under these circumstances is for them to suggest (as intimated by Reynaud on July 22—see paragraph 6 of Embassy telegram 285) that our assistance to the Associated States forces (under paragraph 6 above) be arranged directly with the Associated States, thus leaving the support and equipping of all indigenous Indo-China forces to us. At this point we will have taken a really firm hold on the bear’s tail along with the French. (In this connection, I have received some very definite indications from a responsible French official that this latter objective is an important element in French thinking.)

9. It is not difficult to foresee that from this rather vulnerable position, we may end up being the sole possessor of the bear. For example:

(a) Even with the Laniel government in power, increasing public pressures may develop within France for a reduction of French Union forces committed to Indo-China, which would make not only the contemplated increase in those forces impossible, but could well force a reduction. Such a development does not appear to me to be at all out of the question, particularly so long as the truce reigns in Korea. This development will be fostered by the lack of belief in a military victory (see paragraph 3 above) and by the current very unstable domestic situation. As an indication of the French government’s concern in the matter, their plans to move new troops out to Indo-China are being laid in the utmost secrecy.

(b) The Laniel government could well fall during the coming months and a new government, desirous of an early French withdrawal from Indo-China, take over.

(c) The possibilities envisaged in (a) and (b) could be aggravated by developments in Morocco and the other territories of North Africa which would make the continued—much less an increased—use of French forces in Indo-China (particularly the troops recruited in the North African area) more and more difficult.

(d) The possibilities of a real and thorough-going general strike in France during the fall months may well serve to increase the above possibilities.

Under any such circumstances, our position would not be an enviable one. If the French, for some such reason as suggested above, loosen their hold and reduce their forces committed to Indo-China, the least we could expect would be to be faced with a Greek-1947-type situation. The worst, of course, would directly pose the question of the employment of U.S. troops.

Our increasing involvement in Indo-China is, to my mind, not simply a question of some additional financial or end-item aid. We must view the situation with an eye toward the very real possibility that we will end up shouldering full responsibilities—the deeper our involvement at this time, the greater the difficulty of our position if a real French retrenchment ensues. We could, in such event, well be faced with the dilemma of employing U.S. troops or of the U.S. being charged with the responsibility of letting the Indo-Chinese bastion go down the drain. (I fully realize that in the eventualities under discussion, the responsibility would not be solely ours—and, in fact, would be primarily France’s. However, Communist propaganda would not fail to point out U.S. unreliability, etc.)

I mention the above concerns to you largely because I believe that the most careful consideration should be given by the U.S. policy-makers in the coming weeks to the possibilities envisaged above, and that these unpleasant possibilities should be evaluated in terms of our security interests in Southeast Asia and of other possible alternative courses of action.

All of the foregoing is, of course, without reckoning with possible Chinese moves. That is another subject. I merely wanted to point out some of the problems that could stem from the situation in France.

I shall be in New York on September 2d and will telephone to you to inquire whether you consider it would be useful for me to come down to Washington. In my absence from Paris, my part in this matter will be carried on by Lane Timmons³ and Don McGrew, working, of course, in close association with Ted Achilles⁴ and Phil Sprouse, and with the Ambassador on his return.

My best wishes to you.

Sincerely yours,

Harry

1. Ante, p. 693.
2. Telegram 572 from Paris, Aug. 13, not printed, reported the discussion that day between Labouisse and Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for the Associated States, regarding French aid requirements for Indochina. Paragraph 4 indicated that the United States would apparently be asked to provide financing to cover full costs of the national armies in excess of what the Associated States themselves could contribute. (751G.5 MSP/8–135S)
3. Deputy Chief of the MSA Mission in France.

4. The following handwritten notation by Theodore C. Achilles, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in France, appears on the last page of the source text:

   “This is not a pleasant picture but I think it is an accurate one and that Harry has given it in good perspective.”