751G.00/8–1453
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)
Subject:
- Indochina Aid; Indochina and the Korean Political Conference; Madame Pandit’s candidacy to the Presidency of the General Assembly.
Participants:
- M. Jean Daridan, French Chargé
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Bonsal
[Here follows a brief account of discussion on Morocco.]
Aid to Indochina. M. Daridan, on behalf of M. Schumann, referred to recent exchanges of views on this subject and asked when the U.S. would be in a position to make a definite commitment of additional aid. The Under Secretary stated that he understands that our Embassy in Paris and M. Jacquet, the French Minister of State charged with Indochina Affairs, are in close touch and that we hope shortly to receive all the information promised by our French friends and required by us. He said that he himself is most anxious to go before the National Security Council in order to obtain definitive approval of the policy of additional aid to which preliminary approval has already been given. The Under Secretary stated that for this purpose he needed from the Department of Defense a final and favorable judgment as to the military elements of the Navarre plan and from Mr. Stassen, of the Foreign Operations Administration, a similar evaluation of the cost factors involved. The Under Secretary concluded that he hoped everything would be done both by the French and by interested agencies of our Government so that he could make his final presentation during the week beginning August 24th.
Indochina and the Korean Political Conference, M. Daridan referred to M. Schumann’s great interest in having our views on the possibility that we and the British would, at the Korean Political Conference support [Page 726] the French in an attempt either in the conference or collaterally to find some basis for terminating hostilities in Indochina through negotiation. M. Daridan emphasized the position already taken by M. Bidault when he was in Washington on July 10–14 to the effect that, in order to support an aggressive conduct of the war in Indochina, the French Cabinet and French parliamentary leaders must be given the clear impression that their government is leaving no way untried to secure an end to the Indochina conflict, including the way of negotiation which has at least achieved the cessation of hostilities in the case of Korea.
In reply, the Under Secretary stated that we were most anxious, as we had demonstrated, to give maximum support to the French in Indochina. He recalled, as had been pointed out by the Secretary to M. Bidault, that at the present time the situation in Indochina does not seem to present that basis of strength essential to a negotiation with the Communists. Looked at realistically, the situation is one which our common enemy has an interest in prolonging. Our understanding is that French military and political plans as well as our own assistance both present and future are designed to shift the balance in the free world direction. But it is evident that a prolongation of the present situation is at present in the enemy’s interest.
The Under Secretary then said most emphatically that we can at this time make no commitment to enlarge the agenda of the Korean Political Conference to make a place for Indochina or for any other topic other than the status of Korea. The Under Secretary touched briefly but forcefully upon the various reasons of a domestic political nature which make it impossible for our Government to depart from this position.
M. Daridan expressed disappointment. He said that our present position on this point seemed to be even more negative than that described by the Secretary to M. Bidault last month. He asked whether, if the French delegation should be able at the conference to develop on its own initiative and through its own efforts a promising prospect of negotiation on Indochina, either in the framework of the conference or otherwise, the United States would then support the French initiative. To this the Under Secretary again replied that he could make no commitment whatever at this time beyond stating that we would not, of course, refuse to examine any situation which the French might present to us but that he could not, at this time, give any indication as to what our attitude might be at the time. The Under Secretary was most anxious that there be no misunderstanding on this point.
[Here follows a brief account of discussion on the candidacy of Madame Pandit of India for the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly.]
[Page 727]M. Daridan then said that he was, of course, disappointed at the results of his conversation with the Under Secretary. On two points to which the French Government attached importance, namely the exploration with U.S. support of the possibility of an Indochina negotiation at the Korean Political Conference and the possibility of a change in the United States support of the Pandit candidacy, the Under Secretary had stated positions which the French Government must regard as negative. These positions would not assist the French Government in securing the necessary support for its policies, including the positive policies on which it has embarked in Indochina. Nevertheless, M. Daridan said that he himself, while he regretted our decisions, understood the difficulties with which we were faced and would give a complete report thereon to his Government.
In reply, the Under Secretary expressed appreciation of M. Daridan’s attitude. He added that in carrying out the program of positive support for the French effort in Indochina upon which we are embarked, a policy which may cost as much as $400 million additional next year, we too were handicapped by certain attitudes and policies of our friends. He referred in this connection particularly to support of the USSR and of India as UN-designated members of the political conference. He touched upon the question of the admission of Communist China to the UN—a question upon which the U.S. position must, for the present, be an adamant negative. He asked M. Daridan to reflect on these matters and their bearing upon the Administration’s efforts to secure popular and Congressional support in solving the budgetary problems of our friends at the expense of increasing our own deficit.