751G.5/7–1153: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
26. Repeated information Saigon 14, Paris 12. General Cogny1 yesterday described to me his conversation with General Hinh relative [Page 655] to latters expressed desire take over paramilitary forces of the north, and Cogny’s subsequent conference with Governor Tri on the subject, in terms essentially similar to those reported Consulate telegram 21,2 but with some slight shift in accent. Cogny said that Hinh’s plan relates primarily to so-called pacified areas in which command would according to present arrangements have passed from French to Vietnamese hands. It is in these areas that Hinh would like to station his new light battalions and so arrange that all remaining paramilitary forces and the civil administration itself be made subordinate to local Vietnamese military commander. Apart from what Cogny called the “military dictatorship” aspect of this question and which he heartily disapproves on grounds that once regular enemy forces have been driven from an area, full pacification can be effected only by a strong civil administration working as nearly as possible within democratic pattern which it is hoped political institutions here will ultimately adopt, as general responsible for security of north he is troubled by probability that once a delta region has been declared “pacified” and passed from his command to national army, it may once again be over-run by Viet Minh forces. As example he cited Bui-Chu which is one of provinces designated for “pacification” and transfer, what dispositions will be taken after shift of command responsibility if entire Viet Minh division 320 turns up within provincial borders, a far from impossible eventuality? Cogny said that he had advised Hinh to proceed with moderation and “not try to break anything which is now working”. With regard to Tri’s threat to resign if popular forces are removed from Governor’s control, Cogny said that during his 30 months in Tonkin the only Vietnamese team which showed imagination, courage and skill in meeting problems posed by the war had been furnished by Dai Viets, regardless of charges leveled against them by political opponents, and that for their tenure to be threatened in any way at this time is intolerable.
Cogny went on to say that he believes only possibility of winning war must be sought in full civil-military cooperation from top to bottom, such as appears exist in Viet Minh hierarchy. War cannot be won alone by French Union and national army troops, which he called “essentially mercenaries”. The only popular forces which have yet appeared on this side of the lines are Tri’s militia; they or some equivalent force are indispensable to consolidate victory in any given area. If these units were given over to army control, they would promptly lose the contact with the people, which constitutes their force, and become no more than an insignificant appendage to national army.