Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Gullion”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] July 10, 1953.

Subject:

  • Indochina

In your use of the “talking papers”2 concerning Indochina, the following points may be particularly worth bearing in mind:

1.
Undesirability of a “negotiated peace”. The geographical, historical and psychological reasons for this are hard to cover in a talking paper. Mr. Bonsal, just back from Saigon, via Paris, will be at the bilateral meeting and can supply detail, if required.
2.
The split in the French Cabinet. Mr. Bidault represents the wing which would go slower on implementing the French pledge for more Associated States autonomy: Mr. Reynaud is said to be for more forthright independence. The difference is responsible for the diluted character of the French note to the Associated States. Our talking paper and the draft communiqué3 are slanted to the farther-reaching solution. Ambassador Dillon has cleared them.
3.
Assurances to the French in case of Chinese intervention. In line with the communique following the Mayer visit in March,4 we may say that any armistice which released Chinese troops for action elsewhere would be a fraud and opposed to understanding on which armistice is based. However, the French may understand more by this than we can promise under our constitutional system and in conformity with our UN obligations. They should be given some understanding of the steps we would have to go through.
4.
Use of American troops. In the Joint Chiefs paper attached to the “talking paper”,5 Indochina is said to be “essential” to United States security; on the other hand, the Joint Chiefs are not now prepared to recommend deployment of US forces in case the French leave or are defeated, short of Chinese intervention. Under the circumstances, I would not say that we had a firm position on this capital point.

  1. Drafted by Gullion of S/P.↩
  2. For an abstract of document STF D–2, July 6, on Indochina, see footnote 2 to the memorandum by Bowie, p. 640. For position paper STF D–2b, “Indo-china—French Position,” July 9, see p. 644. Additional background material prepared for the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting of July 1953, is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 157–158.↩
  3. The draft communiqué has not been identified.↩
  4. For extract, see p. 436.↩
  5. Not identified.↩