Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

711.5851G/6–2453: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret

Saigon, June 24, 1953—11 a.m.

2552. Repeated information Paris 474. No distribution outside Department. For Johnson (FE) from Bonsal. O’Daniel mission¹ arrived twentieth and has been engaged series intensive briefings and discussions with French and Vietnamese military. Group departs for Hanoi today returning about twenty-seventh.

Cordial working relationships have been established. O’Daniel has injected a number of fresh ideas and suggestions in discussions particularly with Navarre, Bodet (his deputy) and Bondis (head of forces in south Vietnam) in stimulating, forthright fashion and apparently without giving offense. Specific reactions as yet undetermined although reasonable suppose at least some of these concepts have fallen on fruitful soil.

Navarre himself gives me impression being offensive-minded. His broad strategic thinking resembles Letourneau-Allard outline with time-table somewhat improved. He contemplates strategic offensive in Tonkin area for September next year preceded by maximum of offensive activity of tactical nature in that area prior to date indicated. He is aware danger heavy enemy offensive capability beginning September this year but hopes throw enemy off balance through limited offensive action.

Navarre proceeding Paris early July to present plans to government. I believe those plans will be favorably influenced by vigorous O’Daniel approach. I believe also that they may include request for additional French Union forces, perhaps in amount equivalent to two divisions.

My impression is that unless French and Vietnamese can concentrate in Tonkin this fall sufficient mobile forces seriously to hurt the enemy and to deprive him of the broad capacity for initiative which he has enjoyed over past year, situation may deteriorate irretrievably. Political evolution and developments here and in France, war weariness, continued high prestige of Ho forces, and other factors with which Department abundantly familiar support this impression.

It would be my hope that at Bermuda meeting,² President could discuss situation with French Prime Minister and encourage his support of prompt positive approach to military situation and discourage wishful thinking as to possibility of a negotiated settlement free world could live with. (Idea of reinforcements from French Union has been advanced by Admiral Radford and by others who have studied situation here. General Navarre should of course not be brought into picture by us at Bermuda.)

It would seem important at Bermuda:

(1) To combat French illusion that Indochina situation can at this stage honorably be settled by negotiation with Chinese Communists or with Soviets;

(2) To give French such indications as may be possible that, if as result of vigorous military offensive by Franco-Vietnamese against Viet-Minh, Chinese Communists should invade Indochina, we would not abandon them but would indeed support them vigorously on sea and in the air;

(3) To emphasize need for handling political development of Associated States in manner more consistent with political necessities and with professions of faith made by French in past. Useful tripartite statement could perhaps be made along lines earlier suggested.

Ambassador Heath concurs.

Heath

1. The O’Daniel Mission was announced in Department of State Press Release No. 329 of June 20, 1953, which read as follows: “In response to an invitation from the French Prime Minister when he visited Washington last March, a U.S. military mission headed by Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, presently commander, U.S. Army Pacific, will arrive at Saigon on June 20. Its purpose will be to pursue discussions with Gen. Henri Navarre, Commander in Chief, Indochina, on the manner in which U.S. material and financial support of the effort of the French and Associated States armed forces in Indochina may best contribute to the advancement of the objectives of defeating the Communist forces there and of bringing peace and security to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. It is believed essential to insure an increasingly close integration of U.S. assistance with the plans developed by the authorities of France and of the Associated States.

   “Arrangements are being made for the military leaders of the Associated States to participate in these discussions. The vital role of the national armies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and the increasingly important assumption of high military responsibilities by the Associated States will make these discussions of particular interest.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, p. 909)

   For the terms of reference of the mission, as prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in collaboration with the Department of State, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 59–67. The mission consisted of 12 military officers, including General O’Daniel. Bonsal, Director of PSA, accompanied the group as political consultant.

   For the report of the O’Daniel Mission, July 15, 1953 (without annexes), see ibid., pp. 69–96. A copy of the report, including its annexes, is in file 711.5851G/71553.

2. See footnote 3, p. 608.