JCS Records, CCS.092 Asia (6–25–48), sec. 43
Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
JCS 1992/227
[Extract]
Possible Military Courses Of Action In Indochina
. . . . . . .
conclusions
5. Without overt Chinese Communist intervention the Communist forces in Indochina do not have the capability now of forcing the French by military action alone to withdraw from Indochina.
6. Possible military courses of action which may be taken in conjunction with the French and other Allies to counter Chinese Communist aggression are discussed in Enclosure “A” to J.C.S. 1992/1462 and are valid under the circumstances cited therein.
7. If the French are forced by military action to withdraw from Indochina as a result of Chinese Communist aggression there is no feasible military course of action which can be taken by the United States in Indochina to prevent Communist forces from overrunning that country.
8. In the event the French are forced to withdraw as a result of a political decision, the United States might undertake the following courses of action:
- a.
- Course A—Support and intensify the development of native forces and deploy U.S. and Allied forces to the area to undertake operations with the objective of reducing Communist activity to the status of scattered guerrilla bands.
- b.
- Course B—Support and intensify the development of native forces, deploy sufficient ground forces to hold critical strong points vacated by the French and provide air and naval support for such operations as may be undertaken until such time as indigenous forces can undertake the objective in a. above.
9. If current French plans for the expansion of native forces have reached an advanced stage of completion the United States might undertake the following possible courses of action:
- a.
- Course C—Support and intensify the development of native forces and provide air and naval support for such operations as can be conducted by indigenous ground forces.
- b.
- Course D—Support and intensify the development of native forces by supervising training and providing the necessary logistic support for such operations as can be conducted by the indigenous forces.
10. Any augmentation of forces or increases in supplies and equipment to implement any one or a combination of the foregoing military courses of action in Indochina would result in diversion of like amounts from Republic of Korea (ROK) augmentation and support, and/or from approved North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Substantial increases in supplies and equipment for military aid to Southeast Asia would require immediate expansion of U.S. military production with corresponding fiscal support and a delay in implementation equivalent to production lead time if diversion from other programs is to be avoided.
11. The United States might undertake the following implementing political actions prior to or in conjunction with any one or a combination of the foregoing military courses of action:
- a.
- Obtain a commitment from the French to effect an orderly transfer of responsibilities in Indochina by extending the period of withdrawal as long as practicable.
- b.
- Seek to obtain U.N. action in Indochina similar to that taken with regard to Korea, with the provision that the United States be designated as executive agent.
- c.
- Because of their immediate interest in the area, obtain significant force contributions from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and the National Government of the Republic of China (NGRC).
- d.
- Call for the immediate formation of an Asiatic League which would include the NGRC and would provide forces to combat Communism in the Far East.
recommendation
12. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions in paragraphs 5 through 11 above.
. . . . . . .