Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751H.11/4–2053

Memorandum by Ambassador Donald R. Heath to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

confidential

[Washington,] April 20, 1953.

Subject:

• Interview with King of Cambodia printed in New York Times April 19.²

I accompanied King Norodom Sihanouk to New York after his talks here with the Secretary and Vice President Nixon on April 17.³ He was pleased with his reception here and the chance to expound his thesis that the situation in Cambodia is potentially dangerous and that the French must therefore promptly make further concessions. At the same time he was obviously somewhat disappointed that neither the Secretary nor the Vice President at once promised to lend American support to his demands for further concessions and had reminded him that any break in the unity of the Franco–Indo-Chinese states front against the aggression in Indo-China of the Communists would work to the advantage of the latter. The King readily admitted that the French Union forces must remain in Indochina at present but remained insistent there must be further concessions from the French towards complete Cambodian independence in order to maintain the loyalty of his subjects who, he asserted, were now bitterly suspicious of the French.

On April 18 his Ambassador, Nong Kimny, had arranged interviews with a Time correspondent, with James of the New York Times (this I only learned later) and with a representative of the Agence France Presse. Early that afternoon the King told me that he was rather inclined not to make any statements to the press. I did not urge him one way or another but remarked that if he did receive the press I was confident he would handle any controversial subject discreetly. His Ambassador persuaded him to receive James and during the interview the King must have decided, probably impulsively, that here was a chance to build a fire under the French who, he feared from his talks with Auriol and Letourneau in Paris intended to take no action on his requests for additional concessions. The evening of March 18 the King gave a dinner which was attended by M. Georges-Picot (rumored to be a possible successor to Letourneau as High Commissioner) and Hoppenot, both French delegates to the UN and the French Consul General at New York. The King rather avoided my questions as to the outcome of his interviews with the correspondents, which had lasted almost the entire afternoon and I noticed that Ambassador Nong Kimny seemed definitely depressed. Sometime after the dinner I obtained a copy of the midnight edition of the New York Times and then understood why the King had avoided telling me of his interviews.

At seven the next morning I accompanied the King to the airport. He immediately asked me rather defensively, whether I had read and what I thought of his interview with the Times. I inquired whether he had been correctly quoted and he replied he had, except that he had not said “Cambodian justice does not apply to the French.” He had said that Cambodian justice did not apply to “foreigners.” He also disapproved of the headline which described his statement as a warning that “Cambodia may rise.” He had merely pointed out, he said, the dangers of the situation. The King said that he knew that America enjoyed liberty of expression and he thought the time had come to speak frankly. I answered that of course he was at liberty to say anything that he chose but asked his opinion what the reaction would be in France whose military forces and aid were necessary to the defense of the Associated States. The King said with an embarrassed chuckle, that the reaction would be very bad and then launched into a complaint of the reception of his demands by Auriol and Letourneau.⁴ Auriol, he said, had not replied to his first letter until after a month had passed and when the King saw him in Paris Auriol had, the King asserted, stated that France could not give any more concessions toward perfecting Cambodian independence at this time since to do so might lead to the overthrow of the Monarchy which France favored as necessary for Cambodian unity and independence. The King remarked that this was an absurd answer or rather no answer at all. Letourneau, the King asserted, had merely said to him that the King’s prestige was such that Cambodian public opinion believed and followed everything he declared. If the King told his people that Cambodia was in fact independent, that people would believe him. The King said they had believed him to date but this opinion was getting dangerously out of hand due to the effective propaganda of the rebel Son Ngoc Thanh. I asked the King whether any other arguments had been advanced against the immediate realization of some of his demands. He admitted rather reluctantly that he had been told that the temper of the French General [National] Assembly was such that it would not consider further concessions at this time and still support the heavy French military effort and financial outlays in Indo-China. I remarked that might indeed be a political consideration and went on to say that I hoped that when Letourneau returned to Indo-China as he was scheduled to do in a few days, that they would renew negotiations. I remarked that the Cambodian Ambassador had shown us a copy of the King’s communications to President Auriol which raised a large number of issues which would require some time for consideration. We were only just completing our own study in the Department. I hoped that after further study that France and Cambodia could get together on some mutually satisfactory arrangements.

The King evidently feeling that further justification of his press outburst was necessary remarked that before President Mayer’s visit to Washington the French Press had told of the French plan to ask the US to assume all the costs of the Indo-China war on condition that France would renounce further American aid toward the build-up of the NATO forces. I told the King that these press stories had no relation to the facts. There had been some discussions of the increased cost of the military effort in Indo-China which would result from the expansion of the National Armies of the Associated States and since France felt that she was already making her maximum outlay in Indo-China that this increase might involve additional American aid. Such an addition, however, would be only a part of the total cost of military operations. The greater part would still continue to be paid by France.

The King’s plane having been announced I terminated by saying that I trusted that the press interview would not hamper mutually satisfactory French-Cambodian arrangements. I told the King that we were very glad that he had visited the US and thought that the exchange of ideas which had occurred would be helpful.

1. Transmitted through Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. Reference is to an article by Michael James titled “King, Here, Warns Cambodia May Rise” which appeared on the front page of the New York Times of Apr. 19. King Norodom Sihanouk was on an informal visit in Canada and the United States, having previously visited France to raise the question of renegotiation of the agreements governing French–Cambodian relations.
3. In telegram 2039 to Saigon, Apr. 18, the Department of State informed the Embassy that King Sihanouk had spent Apr. 17 in Washington, participating in brief meetings with Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant Secretary Robertson, and French Ambassador Bonnet. He also visited Mount Vernon before returning to New York. (751H.11/4–1852) No record of those meetings has been found in Department of State files, but for comments by the Vice President on his meeting with the King, see extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, p. 546.
4. King Sihanouk presented letters regarding French–Cambodian relations to President Auriol on Mar. 5 and 25. The texts of the letters and additional documentation on the King’s negotiations with French officials in Paris during March and April are printed in Gouvernement du Cambodge, Livre jaune sur les revendications de l’indépendance du Cambodge (Paris, Imprimerie Centrale Commercial, 1953), vol. i, pp. 3–62 (hereafter cited as Cambodia, Livre Jaunei, I). For the communiqué of a meeting between Sihanouk and Auriol on Mar. 25, see L’Année Politique, 1953, p. 573.