Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–1853

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington,] April 18, 1953.

Indochina

General Collins gave a briefing this morning in the Secretary’s office on the Letourneau plan for cleaning up Indochina. He said that since Mr. Letourneau’s departure, the Pentagon specialists had examined the Letourneau papers in detail. General Collins then said the so-called Letourneau plan was not really a plan, but simply an outline of an operational program.

The theory of this program was that the French would first clean up the area in the south and turn it over to the additional native forces which would be raised. They would then proceed to do the same thing along the coastal belt in the center with additional new native forces, and finally they would clean up the Tonkin Delta area and then be prepared to attack the main Vietminh forces in strength. As each of the three foregoing areas was cleaned up, French regular troops would be released for action against the next objective, and the native forces would see that the cleaned up areas remained secure.

General Collins said the French had been trying to clean up the area in the south with regular forces for several years. They had been unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, he did not understand very well how the newly-raised native levies would be able to hold the area in the south effectively. He expressed the view that the French must establish a firm defense line across the main line of supply from China to the Vietminh forces in the center. This defense line would have to have provision for reserves so as to maneuver properly. He explained that the supplies from China were brought through difficult and rugged country largely on coolies’ backs, and that air was ineffective against such supply lines because they consisted of narrow jungle trails and because the bearers could disperse and conceal themselves in the jungle very easily.

General Collins said he was very much concerned about the totally negative French attitude toward adopting some of the training procedures with which the U.S. has had so much success in Korea. General Collins said that General Trapnell and our MAAG believed that the French arguments against the adoption of such procedures were totally spurious. He gave a copy of a message from Trapnell (attached hereto) covering this point. General Collins also expressed the view that the French concept of the battalion being the largest native unit was fallacious. He believed there should be larger units than battalion, and thought the French were reluctant to build larger units because of the fact that this would mean native officers would be in a position of greater leadership and prominence. General Collins advanced the thought that Marshal Juin might be helpful in getting the French to adopt more realistic training than this in Indochina, since he had been much impressed with what he saw in Korea.

There was some discussion about aid for the French in Indochina, with an inference that if the French did not do what the U.S. told them, they should receive no aid. Secretary Dulles commented on this discussion among MSA, Defense, and Treasury, and asked General Collins whether, if the French would not do what the U.S. wished, we should stop all aid for Indochina. He pointed out the implications of the fall of Indochina to the whole Southeast Asian picture. General Collins replied that we should not cut off aid to the French in Indochina if they did not do everything we thought they should, but that we should use maximum effort and persuasion to get them to adopt a more sensible program.

[Annex]

Telegram from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group at Saigon (Trapnell) to the Department of the Army

secret

[Saigon, 15 April, 1953.]

MG 619 A. Personal for Eddleman and Clark.

1. Translation of complete French report on visit of French and Associated States representatives to ROKA tng ctrs pouched to DEPTAR 31 Mar. 53.¹ For your info general French reaction is that US instructional methods cannot be effectively adopted in Indochina since:

(a) No stability of front or security of rear areas exists in Indochina;

(b) Indochina war is not “Classic” Combat;

(c) Basic combat unit is battalion rather than division; prohibitive cost of establishing “soldier factory”; and

(d) French and Vietnamese temperaments are not adaptable to specialization, regimentation and subordination since these methods do not consider the personality of the individual. Report is concluded with general statement that without abandoning conceptions peculiar to French Army, inherited by Vietnamese, adoption of US methods to limited extent might result in increased output, unity of doctrine, speedier activation.

2. MAAG considers this is a discouraging report containing completely fallacious arguments, manufactured by French to justify resistance to any change or modernization of “Traditional” French methods and slanted to defend French position determined prior to Korean visit.

3. Conclusion summarized para 1 above considered here as fabrication for US consumption without any actual French commitment to adopt any US method. MAAG can see no validity to French resistance nor any reason why US training methods could not be adopted more beneficially.

4. Will exchange additional teams and continue to press for adoption of ROK training system.

1. Copy not found in Department of State files.