751G.5/1–2953: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1511. Repeated Paris, Hanoi unnumbered. General Salan came to see me yesterday to discuss military situation and prospects. He said that it was absolutely necessary to increase the Viet army by some 40,000 men and he regretted that Bao Dai had sent General Hinh on a useless errand to Paris (from which he only returned today), thereby retarding by several weeks final agreement between French and Viet authorities as to the organization, armament, and financing of the new battalions. However, he thought that agreement would be reached early in February and bulk of the new battalions ready for service in the 1953–1954 campaign. Although Franco-Viet position was stronger than a year ago and would be very considerably improved by the proposed increase in the Viet national army in a few months, he did not expect to be able to “break the back” of Viet Minh forces in 1953–1954 campaign season.
He thought that decisive victories could not be achieved until 19541955. To my inquiry whether there was anything that French, Viet, or we might do to speed up action, he said that, if he could get two additional divisions of French troops promptly, this would completely “change the face” of the situation. He had not asked for additional troops from French, since he had taken it for granted his request would be refused because of French obligations under NATO and general French desire to build up a metropolitan army to overbalance that of Germany. He did not agree with this attitude, but did not [Page 372] believe he could change it. The most he felt able to do was to insist that there would be no withdrawals of French expeditionary force during the next year and he felt he had fairly good assurances there would be no withdrawals during that time.
As regards American arms aid, he had for two years requested an additional squadron of F–84’s and one of B–26’s. He could use another squadron of C–47’s. Such additions, of course, would necessitate French Air Force furnishing additional pilots and maintenance crews. When General Lecheres1 arrived in a few days, he would discuss insistently with him possibility of raising the present ceiling on French aviation personnel in Indochina.
However, for moment further increases in fighters and light bombers was not of great urgency as long as he had the support of the French aircraft carrier Arromanche. If he could have two aircraft carriers—with planes—it would be ideal. He was enthusiastic over the contribution made by carrier-based aviation in the Indochinese war. He had one definite request to make of us and that was that the C–47’s loaned by the US last Fall for a few months be not taken away at this time. There would be at least two or two and a half months of good weather for land and air operations in north, for which he would need all his transport planes and, after good weather ended, then he expected he would need these planes to transport troops for temporary operations in south. In south it would be possible to carry on military operations through May and he expected at that time to accomplish some extensive cleaning out of the Viet Minh in Cochin China. I reminded him that last August he had said that he thought that would entirely clean out Viet Minh by end of 1953. He said that that was no longer his opinion. A great deal could be done during remainder of year, but he thought that final eradication of Viet Minh in south could not occur before sometime in 1954.
- Gen. Charles Lécheres, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force.↩