Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/1–2853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] January 28, 1953.

Subject:

• Situation in Indochina

It is the purpose of this memorandum to recall briefly the main features of the current situation in Indochina. A separate memorandum contains a number of recommendations for possible use at the time of your conversations with M. Mayer.²

Opposing Forces

It is estimated that there are currently under arms some 860,000 men engaged on both sides of the struggle (460,000 on the side of the French Union including the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and some 400,000 in the forces of the Communist-dominated, trained, equipped and supplied Viet Minh). About half the forces on either side may be described as combat-trained regular forces with the remainder consisting of regional levies, irregulars, guerrillas, home guards and so on. On the French Union side, there are some 73,000 Metropolitan Frenchmen and perhaps 50,000 North Africans, Foreign Legionnaires and Senegalese.

There is being created a Vietnamese Army designed to consist of eight divisions of regular troops officered by natives by the first of January 1955. A French military mission consisting of over 900 officers and 4500 noncommissioned officers is actively engaged in this project. In addition there are currently plans under consideration for the raising of 40,000 additional native levies to be organized in light battalions and also perhaps 20 to 30,000 militia troops in the Tonkin area.

Zones of Influence

The major area of Indochina is of course Viet Nam (consisting of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina) and this discussion will be limited to that area. The forces of Vietnam and of the French Union control the metropolitan areas of the chief cities of Hanoi and Saigon and a few small areas besides. In addition, there are three main areas where the French Union and the Vietnamese authorities maintain a structure of local administration and control the major communications through a network of military posts but where the enemy conducts guerrilla operations more or less at will. These areas are the Tonkin delta, the Hue-Tourane area in central Annam, and certain portions of Cochinchina.

These areas are separated from each other by large areas which have been for many years and are now under enemy domination and administration. The population of the Viet Minh controlled territory has been estimated at as high as eleven million—nearly half the total population of Viet Nam.

During the past two or three years there has been a net increase in the amount of territory ruled by the Communists. Last fall, most of the Thai mountain country northwest of Hanoi was lost to them.

Current Military Situation

The major combat area is in Tonkin to the north. The dry season there, during which large scale military operations are practical, runs from October 1st to about April 1st. It had been hoped that last fall the Franco-Vietnamese forces with their superior armament and superior mobility (reinforced by some 50 transport planes obtained through U.S. help on a special priority basis) would be able to assume the initiative and inflict serious damage on the enemy.

Instead, it was the enemy who assumed the initiative and overran the Thai country, a mountainous region inhabited by tribesmen traditionally friendly to the French. The Franco-Vietnamese forces, in order to hold two posts in this area, were obliged to commit a large portion of their mobile forces and almost all of their air force to emergency defensive operations including an airlift.

These operations were successful and resulted in inflicting 9,000 enemy casualties at a cost of some 4,000 for the defending forces. The successful defense of these two posts will also, presumably, prevent the enemy from mounting any important offensive in the direction of Laos.

At the same time, the Franco-Vietnamese forces claim to have made some progress in cleaning out enemy forces in the Tonkin delta.

Nevertheless, the balance of operations during the current fighting season does not represent any real progress toward a solution. The enemy is in a position to assume a further initiative. He has, for example, recently initiated an offensive of perhaps two regiment strength in south central Annam.

Factors in Military Stalemate

A memorandum of “Informal Comments on the Military Situation in Indochina”, furnished by General Cabell, Director of the Joint Staff,³ gives the following as major factors in the continuance of the military stalemate:

“Although the French have been successful in inflicting severe losses on the Viet Minh, and have considerably disrupted the Viet Minh economy, over-all French operations cannot be considered successful because of their failure to arrive at a political solution that obtains the support or patriotism of the Vietnamese people.

“Terrain difficulties, the guerrilla nature of the Viet Minh operations and the political apathy of the population preclude decisive consolidation of areas cleared of Viet Minh, unless these areas are physically occupied by friendly forces. This commitment is beyond the capabilities of the friendly strength.

“Because of lack of cooperation of the Vietnamese people, a large number of Franco-Vietnamese forces are occupying static defense posts within the Tonkin defense territories. If the Vietnamese Government were supported by the people, such posts within the delta could be held by light security or police forces. As long as the people refuse to inform on the Viet Minh hiding in their midst, the Franco-Vietnamese will be incapable of clearing the delta, and while large numbers of Franco-Viet army and navy combat forces are tied down in policing the delta, they will find few opportunities for meeting the enemy in force.

“The French have had considerable success in forcing the dissipation of Viet Minh manpower, but this success in turn has been largely neutralized by the Viet Minh‘s success in forcing the wide dispersal of Franco-Viet forces. No region in the entire French-held territory can be considered secure against Viet Minh raids and large-scale sabotage.”

The memorandum goes on to refer to the failure of the French to conceive a strategy in terms of offensive warfare. “Even their more offensive measures,” it states, “are predicated in terms of defensive, i.e., to induce the Viet Minh to attack a well defended French position”. Absence of night fighting ability on our side is also mentioned, and, of course, the common land boundary with Communist China makes of the latter country in essence the “Viet Minh rear base and virtual sanctuary”.

All this adds up under present conditions to a shortage of troops on the Franco-Vietnamese side for the mounting of offensive operations and the assumption of the initiative.

One should not neglect also the factors which prevent the enemy from making progress:

1) General fire superiority and greater mobility of Franco-Vietnamese units as compared with Viet Minh units.

2) Heavy bombing by the French air force of roads used for the movement of supplies, especially from China.

3) Bombing of irrigation works reducing food supply in Viet Minh held territory.

4) Warweariness resulting from failure to reach announced goals and growing strength of French-led forces. American support of the Franco-Vietnamese effort is a factor here.

The enemy is having his troubles with supplies, recruiting and the general political attitudes on his side. A determined offensive could cause him serious difficulty.

Political Situation

So far as the Vietnamese people who are active in the current struggle are concerned, there seems no doubt that the preponderance of leadership, energy and courage is enlisted on the other side. The fact that the forces of Ho Chi Minh, barred as they have been from the major cities and forced to establish their headquarters and bases in unhealthful and remote areas, have held the field for over six years, is a tribute to a very high morale maintained by able political organization.

The record on the Franco-Vietnamese side is far from as good. Since 1946 there have been a number of false starts. It is only in the past two years that a real beginning has been made in the creation on our side of a governmental structure which may hope to have popular appeal. Some progress has been made; some good leaders, such as the Prime Minister Tam and Governor Tri of North Vietnam, are working effectively and seem really to be moving people with them. But without French help and inspiration, the Government of Viet Nam would have a low vitality indeed. Its hold over the people in the areas where it governs is not sufficiently strong.

The elections which were held January 25 represent an important step in the attempt to create a base of popular representation for the regime. The elections have apparently been more successful in this direction than was anticipated and our observers in the field describe them as a real blow to the Viet Minh. Yet the fact is that there is a great deal of apathy in Viet Nam and there is also a large group particularly in intellectual and professional sectors which is consciously “attentiste” allegedly because of a lack of faith in French intentions and possibly also because of doubt as to the outcome of the current hostilities.

The lack of any positive leadership on the part of Bao Dai who is supposed to be the Chief of State reflects the lack of indigenous political dynamism on the non-Communist side; it may also be motivated by doubt as to the West’s military potential in Indochina.

Even though there are on the side of the Government of Viet Nam well over 300,000 native soldiers and even though these soldiers can be trained and equipped to the point that they would be technically superior to the Viet Minh, there is no doubt that the latter would have an easy victory if the forces of the French Union were removed from Indochina.

The development of real political vitality on the non-Communist side is essential. It can be stimulated by progress in the military field. And in turn it can create the conditions necessary for further military progress.

This situation of low political vitality prevails in spite of the basic agreements between the French and Vietnamese Governments whereby the latter was granted a measure of independence within the French Union limited, on paper at least, only to the extent strictly necessary because of the inability of the Vietnamese unaided to defend their independence. Thirty-four foreign nations have recognized Viet Nam as an independent state. The qualifications for membership in the United Nations of Viet Nam and of the other Associated States are widely recognized. M. Letourneau stated publicly last summer in Washington that, once the present struggle was over, it would be up to the people of the Associated States to determine their relationship to the French Union. “The French Union,” he said, “is not a prison”. (We gather that the French authorities in Paris felt that M. Letourneau went a bit far on this occasion; he has made no other statements of this nature.)

Cost of the War

The total money cost in 1953 of the war in Indochina is estimated in the current French budget presentation at the equivalent of $1,680 million, of which $340 million are a French estimate of the value of direct United States end-item aid to Indochina. Of the balance of $1,340 million remaining, the French estimate a contribution of $100 million from Vietnamese sources. This leaves $1,240 million to the carrying of which the French count on over-all United States aid in the amount of perhaps $430 million including the sum of $100 million allegedly promised to Letourneau last June. (For a full discussion of this problem, reference is made to Annex 2 of the French briefing memorandum prepared for the Secretary.)⁴

The fact that the French Government in its budget presentation to the Assembly has apparently allocated a maximum of U.S. aid to Indochina rather than to other objectives is indicative of the importance attached to the amount of that aid as a factor in inducing the Assembly to continue its support of the effort in Indochina.

Perhaps more important even than the financial cost is the extent to which Indochina absorbs the trained military manpower of France. Eight thousand or 26% of Metropolitan France’s professional officers in 33,000 or 37% of her professional noncommissioned officers are currently in Indochina. These men serve a twenty-seven months tour of duty there; some are on their third such tour.

1. This memorandum was drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA. A chit attached to the source text indicates that a copy was taken on the plane to Europe by Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State, for the Secretary of State.
2. Supra.
3. The memorandum, dated Jan. 22, was transmitted to Bonsal by Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Jan. 23. The document is in PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Defense Memos”.
4. See footnote 4, p. 364.