Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756C.022/1–2552: Telegram

No. 181
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret
priority

Washington, January 25, 1952—12:32 p.m.

775. Eyes alone for Amb Cochran from Secy. I am concerned at the serious results which wld flow from any further hardening of the Indonesian attitude toward the New Guinea question. You will recall they asked us to use our influence with the Dutch to keep the negots at The Hague going on this subj¹ without reference to the Indonesian seizure of arms shipments on the way from Holland to New Guinea. As it happens, the Dutch had already decided to go ahead with The Hague talks and to try to work out something about the seizure of arms shipments separately through dipl channels. I think it is important that Indonesians fully understand that Dutch arrived at this decision without any pressure from us.²

I think it is perhaps more important that Indonesians fully understand our position in this whole matter. You will remember that position of Dutch and Indonesians tended to harden on New Guinea issue as long ago as Spring of 1950. Since that time, this govt has given no support to specific proposals of either party for settlement. We have until now taken the stand that the future status of western New Guinea shld be determined through direct negots between Dutch and Indonesians. That is why we were willing to ask Dutch to continue current talks at The Hague. It shld not be gathered from this, however, that our asking Dutch to continue those talks means that we were supporting Indonesians. On the contrary, I do not see how it will be possible for us now or in the future to support the present position of either side on this issue.

There is no prospect whatever that present Dutch Govt can or wld agree to a transfer of sovereignty over Western New Guinea to Indonesia. There are many internal reasons for this with which you are familiar and, as you know, they feel they can rely heavily on Austral support. Gen elections in Holland will occur at the end of June. It may be that the new Govt can arrive at some satisfactory solution with Indonesians. But I have doubts whether they can do this alone. For they are not alone. The Australians are very much present. If matters are allowed to drift too long, we see the seeds of an impasse of the Iranian and Egyptian order forming. We are at work and shall urgently continue to work on formulating possible compromises based upon such safeguarding as is possible of the basic interests of Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Australia. It is not a simple task.

But at present, for reasons mentioned above, no solution seems possible. Therefore, the fundamental U.S. interest is to keep the disagreement from becoming blown up, to prevent a breach, to help reach such agreements on the union as can be reached, leaving the door open for future talks.

For this purpose our present line of saying merely that the Dutch and Indonesians shld work out a solution is not adequate. They cannot do it now. Talks on this subj between them can last only so long at one time. Panmunjom is no model for this situation.

So we must try our best to give Indonesians wise guidance as we try to give it to Dutch. In this case, it means trying to get them to consider not only their domestic polit problems but the facts of life. Surely they have to pursue actively their objective, the NNG sovereignty. But they do not have to, and shld not, pull the house down around their ears like Salaheddin³ or Mossadegh,⁴ all to no purpose. It will not accomplish their purpose. It will assure its defeat, with tragic consequences. Dutch cannot agree now to a solution. Australians will react strongly to anything like the pattern followed in Palestine, Iran and Egypt.

On the other hand, persistence and moderation on the part of Indonesians will, I think, bring relieved cooperation from Dutch and Australians in the measurable future.

This is the direction along which our deepest interest urge that we shld guide them. It is no objection that to do so may put some strain upon their regard for us. We prize and must retain that regard. But its possession entails the responsibility to use it for our true and deepest mutual interests.

What I am asking you to do is a job which will be at least as hard to get done as the job you did for us on the Japanese Treaty. I am confident that you can handle this one just as well. As you have so often observed they are a new nation and in need of sound advice. I believe they will accept your good guidance on this issue, and I will support and help you in every way I can with them. It is vital to us that this issue does not explode.

We want any views you have on a substantive solution which would recognize Dutch, Indonesian and Australian interests and give hope of gaining acceptance of the three. In the meanwhile, of course, you shld say nothing about the possibility of any U.S.-suggested solution.

Acheson

1. Discussions took place at The Hague from Jan. 15 to Mar. 1, 1952 between representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands on the questions of revision of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the future status of Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian). No final agreements were reached during these discussions which were terminated by the departure of the Indonesian Delegation subsequent to the fall of the Indonesian Cabinet.
2. The Netherlands Government made the decision to continue with the talks prior to its receipt of a statement from U.S. Chargé William Trimble that the U.S. Government strongly favored such a continuation. (656.56D/1–752; 656.56D/1–952)
3. Former Egyptian Minister of the Interior and of Finance.
4. Prime Minister of Iran.